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Judicial Review for Enemy Fighters:
The Court's Fateful Turn in Exparte
Quirin, the Nazi Saboteur Case
Andrew Kent 66 Vand. L. Rev. 153 (2013)
The last decade has seen intense disputes about whether
alleged terrorists captured during the nontraditional post-
9/11 conflict with al Qaeda and affiliated groups may use
habeas corpus to challenge their military detention or military
trials. It is time to take a step back from 9/11 and begin to
evaluate the enemy combatant legal regime on a broader, more
systemic basis, and to understand its application to future
conflicts. A leading precedent ripe for reconsideration is Ex
parte Quirin, a World War II-era case in which the Supreme
Court held that saboteurs admittedly employed by an enemy
nation's military had a right to access civilian courts during
wartime to challenge their trial before a military commission.
Even though admitted members of an enemy nation's military
had never before accessed the civilian justice system during
wartime, the Court in Quirin declined to explain why it
reversed course in such a significant fashion. Since and
because of Quirin, it has become accepted that literally any
individual present in the United States has a constitutional
right to habeas corpus.
This Article first shows that on the legal merits, the
Quirin Court's ruling on court access was erroneous. The
history of lack of court access for enemy fighters and
nonresident enemy aliens is reviewed, starting with the
English common law background on which the U.S.
Constitution was written and continuing through the
Founding period to the Civil War, World War I, and beyond.
Second, the Article seeks to explain why the Court acted in
such a surprising fashion in Quirin-ruling in favor of
unsympathetic enemies during wartime, even though case law
and other legal authorities provided solid reasons to reject
their plea for court access. To do so, the Article draws on a
diverse set of explanatory tools, including those of legal history
and political science. Next, the Article shows that Quirin's
rejection of the old framework governing court access for enemy
fighters and nonresident enemy aliens has had profound but
underappreciated doctrinal consequences-including helping
lead to the result in Boumediene v. Bush. The Article then
argues that, as a policy matter, admitted or otherwise
undisputed combatants in an enemy nation's employ do not
need and probably should not have a right to access U.S.
courts during wartime. Quirin was thus wrong on the law and
highly problematic as policy. Finally, the Conclusion
highlights both current and potential future situations in
which the Article's legal analysis could be important.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1942, in the middle of World War II, the Supreme Court
entertained a habeas corpus petition filed by German military
saboteurs who had been caught by the FBI after slipping into the
United States and ordered by President Roosevelt to be put on trial for
their lives before a hastily conceived military commission sitting in
Washington, DC. The administration argued to the Supreme Court as
a threshold matter that admitted members of an enemy's military who
invaded the United States during wartime lacked any right to access
civilian courts. On the merits, the government contended that the
saboteurs had no substantive constitutional or statutory rights to be
154 [Vol. 66:1:153
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free from military detention and trial. The proceedings before the
Supreme Court were extraordinary. The Court received briefs two
days after announcing it would hear the case and held argument that
day and the next. Immediately afterward, the Court issued an
exceptionally terse per curiam opinion, captioned Ex parte Quirin,
stating that military jurisdiction was lawful and the trial could
continue.' The saboteurs were subsequently found guilty by the
military commission-the outcome was never in doubt, largely
because of detailed confessions-and they were promptly executed or
sentenced to long prison terms. Then for three months, the Supreme
Court wrangled internally about how to justify its decision. Ultimately
the Court issued a much longer opinion that rejected the government's
first argument on access, holding that the saboteurs did have a right
to habeas corpus review but, as prefigured by the per curiam, agreed
with the government on the merits.
Although the decision was generally applauded when issued
and later was successfully invoked in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld to justify
holding an American citizen captured in Afghanistan after 9/11 in
military detention,2 modern scholarly accounts of Quirin by historians
and constitutional lawyers have been positively scathing.3 Leading
articles call Quirin a "troubling" and even "putrid" precedent and an
"institutional defeat" for the Court.4 The conventional account is that
a Court beholden to President Roosevelt-he had appointed eight of
the nine justices and had close relationships with several-deferred
too much to the executive because of wartime pressure and dislike for
the saboteurs, and with undue haste blessed an illegal military
commission process that executed six men after a quick and
1. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1942).
2. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion).
3. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order, 75 FORDHAM .
REV. 475, 482 (2006) (calling the Court's decision "shameful"); Harold Hongju Koh, The Czse
Against Military Commissions, 96 AL J. INT'IL L. 337, 340 n.17 (2002) (calling Quirin an
"embarrassing tale') (internal quotation marks omitted); Stephen I. Viadeck, The Laws of War as
a Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 295, 315 (2010)
("[P]opular and academic commentaries on the decision have been nearly uniform in their
withering criticism of both the merits of the Court's analysis and the unusual means by which it
disposed of the case.").
4. See Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military
Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL W. L. REV. 433, 433, 477 (2002) (calling the history of
military tribunals "putrid" and contending that the decision in Quirin lacked "any real legal
foundation'); David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J.S. CT. HIST., July 1996, at 61, 80
("institutional defeat"); Carlos M. Vizquez, 'Vot a Happy Precedent" The Story of Ex parte
Quirin, in FEDERAL COURTS S'IORIES 219, 219 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010)
("troubling").
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perfunctory trial, with an opinion filled with dubious or even
disingenuous legal reasoning.5 Justices who decided the case have not
spoken kindly about Quirin. Frankfurter called it "not a happy
precedent."6 Douglas wrote that "it was unfortunate the Court took
the case."7 Chief Justice Stone described the process of drafting the
final opinion as a "mortification of the flesh."8
The fact that the Supreme Court held, over the executive's
objections, that the saboteurs had the right to seek habeas corpus
relief in Article III courts has been viewed by most critics of the
decision as the only redeeming feature of an otherwise exceptionally
regrettable episode in the annals of Supreme Court decisionmaking. 9
However, under well-established law, the saboteurs, having admitted
that they were enemy fightersIO and, with one exception, nonresident
5. See, e.g., Brief of Legal Scholars and Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner [Effect of Quirin] at 2, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184); LOUIS
FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL 172, 174 (2003); PIERCE O'DONNELL, IN TIME OF WAR
HITLER'S TERRORIST ATTACK ON AMERICA xiii-xiv, 213 (2005); 12 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION, 1941-1953, at 314-20 (2006); Michal R. Belknap, The
Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L.
REV. 59, 83-87 (1980); A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 WIS. L. REV.
309, 331; Danelski, supra note 4, at 80; VAzquez, supra note 4, at 220, 241, 246.
6. Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum Re: Rosenberg v. United States, Nos. 111 and 687,
October Term 1952, at 8 (June 4, 1953) (on file in the Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law
School, Pt. I, Reel 70) (quoted in FISHER, supra note 5, at 171).
7. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, at 138 (1980).
8. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Roger Nelson (Sept. 20, 1942) (on file in Box 22 of
the Harlan Fisk Stone Papers, Manuscript Div., Library of Congress).
9. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 5, at 172-73; WIECEK, supra note 5, at 318; Judith Resnik,
Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 592-93 (2010);
Vizquez, supra note 4, at 246.
10. I use the term "enemy fighter" to refer to all members of (1) the armed forces of a
foreign nation involved in a military conflict with the United States (or Great Britain, when
discussing British legal history), whether they are formally enrolled as soldiers, sailors, or
airmen or perform some other military function, or (2) an organized terrorist or guerilla group
engaged in an armed conflict with the United States. Although the term "enemy combatant"
could have been used instead, I ultimately decided to avoid it because its controversial
deployment during the George W. Bush Administration was distracting for some readers of
earlier versions of this Article. Older cases and commentary often referred to fighters who were
detained during a conflict as "prisoners of war." When discussing these older sources, I use the
same term, not meaning thereby to be making judgments about whether, under the modern law
of armed conflict, the individual in question would be entitled to prisoner-of-war status and its
special entitlements. Cf. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art.
4(A), opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
POW Convention] (setting out detailed criteria regarding who is entitled to prisoner-of-war
detention and treatment). Some old English sources used the term "prisoner of war" in a broader
sense, including not only enemy fighters but also alien enemy civilians who were detained during
wartime for reasons of state. I do not use the term to include that latter category.
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enemy aliens," had no right to be in court in the first place.
Undisputed enemy fighters like the saboteurs had never been
understood to have a right to access civilian courts to claim protection
against the U.S. government from the Constitution and other
municipal (domestic) laws. Similarly, enemy aliens resident outside
the United States, even if they were civilians rather than combatants,
had no right to access the nation's courts during wartime. If the
Supreme Court in Quirin had applied this established law and
declined to participate in the matter, it would not only have been
faithful to precedents, it might, ironically, have preserved institutional
legitimacy in the eyes of some critics.
Although the Justices who supported court access and merits
review for the saboteurs privately may have thought it justified only
because they were on trial for their lives before a military commission,
Quirin's holding on access was not framed as being proper only in
such high-stakes circumstances. Subsequently, the Court and
commentators have understood Quirin to stand for the broad
proposition that any person held in military custody within the United
States has a right to habeas corpus review. 12
This Article contends, first, that Quirin was incorrect to allow
undisputed members of an enemy military to access the courts. I have
previously used the term human-rights universalism to describe the
view that military enemies should be able to invoke a judicially
enforced Constitution for protection during armed conflicts.13
Longstanding legal rules precluded human-rights universalism, but
the Court in Quirin declined to apply them, without any explanation.
Not only was there a good amount of case law and commentary from
11. An enemy alien is a subject or citizen of a nation at war with the United States.
12. Even the first George W. Bush Administration, (in)famous for its aggressive claims
about executive primacy and judicial disability during wartime, conceded before the Supreme
Court that alleged Taliban fighter Yasir Hamdi had a right to habeas corpus because he claimed
to be a U.S. citizen and was held in the United States. See infra notes 390-391 and
accompanying text.
13. Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court's Misreading of the Insular
Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 104-05 (2011). I have called this view of the Constitution's scope
human-rights universalism because it resembles a phenomenon in international law. "Classic
international public law recognized the separation between the law of peace and the law of war."
Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection and
International Humanitarian Law, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 789, 789 (2004). But in the modern
era, there has been a concerted effort to inject human-rights law-the law of peacetime-into the
realm of war in order to impose limits on states' warmaking powers in addition to those found in
the less restrictive laws of war. &e, e.g., id. at 789-91. Similarly, for much of U.S. history, it was
understood that "we have a constitution of government for war and a constitution of government
for peace," and that the international laws of war-and not a judicially enforced Constitution-
protect military enemies in war. Kent, supra, at 104-05 (citations omitted).
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earlier in American history, but in two cases bookending Quirin in
1942-one decided in January 1942 and the other in November 1942-
the Court articulated long-standing legal rules that, had they also
been applied in Quirin in the summer of 1942, would have barred the
saboteurs from challenging military jurisdiction in civilian court. 1 4
The Supreme Court's failure to apply established law in Quirin was,
in some respects, inexplicable-all the more so because the Court
itself did not deign to give any reasons or cite any authorities. One
burden of this Article is to try to explain the inexplicable. This
revisionist account of Quirin uses the tools of lawyers, legal historians,
and political scientists-including both internal (legal and
institutional) and external (biographical, political, and ideological)
perspectives-to account for why the Court failed to apply well-
established law that would have allowed it to side with a popular
wartime President against very unsympathetic claimants.
This Article's account of Quirin cuts strongly against the grain
of modern scholarship about the case. Once the importance of the
court access issue is highlighted, Quirin is seen to be a significant
defeat for the government at the hands of a Court that disregarded a
substantial body of contrary case law and other legal precedents. And
rather than being cowed by a popular President during wartime, the
Court wanted to and did demonstrate its independence by rejecting
the President's contention that the habeas claims could not be heard.15
Second, the Article contends that Quirin's allowance of habeas
corpus claims by undisputed enemy fighters is highly problematic as a
policy matter. On the one hand, undisputed enemy fighters in nation-
to-nation wars generally do not need judicial protection under the
Constitution and other domestic laws because they are protected by a
comprehensive regime of international law as well as by diplomacy,
military-to-military arrangements, and norms of reciprocity. Judicial
protection may well be necessary when detainees challenge the facts
underlying the government's categorization of their status-for
example, maybe they were just innocent civilians caught at the wrong
14. See infra Part IV.
15. As to the merits issues raised by the saboteurs, to the extent that the Court's decision
has been criticized because it did not cite a lot of precedent and therefore seemed unsupported or
unpersuasive, see, e.g., Danelski, supra note 4, at 72 (offering this criticism), that is because no
admitted enemy fighters had ever before had access to U.S. courts, and so no precedent was put
on record about how to handle their claims once in court. But undisputed enemy fighters lacked
any judicially enforceable rights, and so their legal claims were, a fortiori, meritless. In other
words, the Court's error on the threshold issue of access explains away the many criticisms of the
Quirin Court's performance on the substantive issues.
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place at the wrong time rather than enemy fighters. 16 This felt need
for judicial review is even stronger in nontraditional conflicts, when no
national government might be advocating for the detainees,
international legal protections might be spotty or even nonexistent,
and norms of reciprocity are less likely to matter. But once the
jurisdictional fact of being an enemy fighter is conceded or established
beyond dispute by a competent tribunal, as will almost always be the
case with prisoners of war in a state-to-state war,17 the need for
judicial review is substantially diminished.
On the other hand, judicial review of military detention and
trial is costly. A wide variety of habeas corpus claims can be made
because requests for habeas relief may be premised not just on alleged
violations of individual constitutional rights, but on alleged structural
constitutional problems, violations of statutes, violations of treaties, or
on a general lack of legal authority to detain.'8 Challenges to
sufficiency of the government's factual evidence justifying wartime
detention of alleged enemies by the U.S. military have also been
common.19 There are many potential costs associated with such
habeas corpus claims by military enemies, including aid and comfort
to the enemy, use of scarce judicial time and attention, expenditures of
investigatory and litigation resources by the U.S. executive, and the
likelihood of overdeterring the U.S. government from detaining or
trying dangerous individuals. While these costs might well be justified
in nontraditional armed conflicts against nonstate actors where there
may be many "false positives" in detention, the costs are arguably
16. A great number of the detainees in U.S. custody as part of the post-9/11 conflict withal
Qaeda and the Taliban have disputed the government's version of the facts justifying their
detentions.
17. The Geneva Conventions require that a "competent tribunal" be used to determine
whether a person, "having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the
enemy," qualifies as a prisoner of war if there is "any doubt" about the matter. See Geneva POW
Convention, supra note 10, at art. 5.
18. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006) (listing non-exclusive criteria for issuing
writ of habeas corpus: a prisoner "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States'). A structural separation of powers claim, as well as alleged violation of
congressional statutes, were vindicated via habeas in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557-
58 (2006). Lack of detention authority simpliciter, as well as alleged violations of the
Constitution and the Non-Detention Act, were the basis for the habeas claims in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 507 (2004). Recently, Congress has removed the ability of habeas
petitioners to raise claims based on the Geneva Conventions, see Military Commissions Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note (2007)), a
potentially significant limitation for the kinds of military detentions discussed in this Article.
19. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the
Habeas Iena, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 769-70 (2011) (discussing habeas claims of detainees in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and at Guantanamo Bay).
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unjustifiably high when the potential habeas litigants are undisputed
enemy fighters in a state-to-state armed conflict, as in Quirin.
The Article proceeds in six major parts. Part II gives an
overview of the facts of Quirin-the saboteurs' mission and capture,
the Roosevelt administration's deliberations about what to do with
them, the military commission trial, and the Supreme Court litigation.
Part III reaches back to old English common law and then marches
through American history, showing that it had been established for
centuries that persons situated as the Nazi saboteurs were had no
right to seek relief from civilian courts during wartime. Part IV
continues this theme, examining the two cases decided by the
Supreme Court in 1942 that, by their reasoning and holdings, seemed
to suggest that the Court should have ruled in Quirn that the
saboteurs had no right to access the civilian court system. Part V
considers whether different rules regarding court access applied to the
one saboteur who was (probably) a U.S. citizen. Part VI attempts to
understand why the Justices disregarded established law and ruled
against a powerful President they liked and respected, during the
depths of wartime and on behalf of despised enemy saboteurs. Part
VII discusses the underappreciated doctrinal legacy of Quirin and
then suggests policy reasons why opening U.S. courts to undisputed
enemy fighters during wartime is problematic. The Conclusion
discusses the contemporary significance of the Article's findings.
II. BACKGROUND AND LITIGATION IN QUIRIN
The facts underlying Quirin are colorful, but it is not necessary
to go into them at length.20 Eight German military saboteurs came to
the United States and were captured and put on trial before a military
commission. Seven petitioned the lower federal courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The eighth, George Dasch,
had been cooperating with the U.S. government and did not seek
habeas corpus.
A. The Saboteurs
In the filings with the Supreme Court, the Germans conceded
the truth of the following facts, except where noted otherwise. All
eight men had been born in Germany and lived for some time in the
20. For a fuller account, see MICHAEL DOBBS, SABOTEURS: THE NAZI RAID ON AMERICA 15-




United States.21 Seven were German citizens; one, Herbert Haupt,
had become a U.S. citizen as a child when his parents were
naturalized.22 While the United States argued that he had lost that
citizenship, Haupt disagreed, and the Court assumed that he was a
citizen. 23 All eight men returned to Germany after Hitler's rise to
power,24 where they were recruited for a sabotage operation in the
United States.25 The eight attended a training course conducted by an
officer of the German High Command held "at a sabotage school
operated at a place near Berlin, Germany," where they "receiv[ed]
instruction in the use of explosives."26 They were paid by the German
High Command during their training and agreed that for their
services for the German military "they or their relatives in Germany
were to receive salary payments from the German Government."27 In
other words, the saboteurs were employees of the German military. 28
They were instructed to wear German Marine Infantry uniforms
during their landing on American shores, so that if caught they could
claim prisoner-of-war status, rather than being treated as spies.29 In
two teams of four men, the saboteurs were transported by German
Navy U-boats from occupied Europe to the U.S. coast, where, in mid-
June 1942, they came ashore at Long Island and Florida, wearing all
or parts of their German uniforms and carrying explosives and cash. 30
The beaches where they landed were within areas designated by the
U.S. military as parts of the coastal defense lines, and were actively
patrolled by either Army or Coast Guard forces. 31 When the Germans
came ashore, they doffed their uniforms and buried them and the
explosives, before splitting up and heading inland. 32




25. Respondent's Answer to Petitions at 2, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (No. -
Original and Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of July 1942 Special Term) [hereinafter Respondent's
Answer] (setting out stipulated facts).
26. Id.; see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
27. Respondent's Answer, supra note 25, at 3; see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
28. Two had previously been formally enlisted as soldiers in the German military. See
VAzquez, supra note 4, at 221. On the backgrounds of the eight, see FISHER, supra note 5, at 6-
16; Danelski, supra note 4, at 62-63.
29. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22; Respondent's Answer, supra note 25, at 4; see also FISHER,
supra note 5, at 23.
30. Respondent's Answer, supra note 25, at 2-3; see also Quirn, 317 U.S. at 21-22.
31. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22 n.1.
32. Id. at 21.
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One day after arriving in the United States, one of the would-
be saboteurs, George Dasch, telephoned the FBI to turn himself in.33
He traveled to Washington, DC, so he could present himself at FBI
headquarters. 34 Though initially skeptical of his story, the FBI
interrogated Dasch, who quickly revealed everything he knew about
the plot and his coconspirators. With this information, the other seven
were arrested. By June 27, 1942, just two weeks after landing, all
eight were in FBI custody.35 The FBI then publicized the arrests,
omitting that Dasch had turned himself in.
B. The Decision for a Military Commission
The Department of Justice, the War Department, and the
White House now began to debate what should happen to the captured
saboteurs. 36 Fairly quickly, they decided not to try the captives in
civilian court or a statutory court-martial. There were several
considerations involving secrecy, deterrence, evidence, and the
likelihood of achieving the result desired by all in the U.S.
government: death sentences. 37 Therefore, the President, upon the
advice of Attorney General Francis Biddle and military legal advisers,
33. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 32-33; Danelski, supra note 4, at 64; Vdzquez, supra note
4, at 223.
34. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 34; Danelski, supra note 4, at 64-65; Vdzquez, supra note
4, at 223.
35. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 38-42; Danelski, supra note 4, at 65.
36. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 45-49 (detailing interdepartmental conflicts regarding the
use of a military tribunal).
37. To deter future German sabotage attempts, the U.S. government wanted to create the
impression that it had infiltrated German military or intelligence agencies. The trial
proceedings, therefore, needed to be secret to keep the truth from being publicized. See Vdzquez,
supra note 4, at 224. Under the Constitution, only a military trial could be conducted in secret.
Another consideration supporting a military trial was that civilian statutes violated by the
saboteurs did not allow sufficiently severe punishments. With the possible exception of Haupt,
who, assuming he was a U.S. citizen, could be indicted for treason and faced with the death
penalty, the saboteurs had only committed low-level civilian crimes-conspiracy to commit
sabotage, customs offenses, and immigration offenses-which carried short prison terms. See
FISHER, supra note 5, at 46-47; Danelski, supra note 4, at 65-66; Vizquez, supra note 4, at 224.
The President and other officials believed that the death penalty was warranted because of the
inherent seriousness of the offenses, the historical fact that the punishment for wartime spying
and sabotage was generally death, and its deterrent effect on future attempts. A court-martial,
the court used primarily to try U.S. service members, was ruled out by the administration
because by statute (the Articles of War) the rules of evidence in the court-martial were strict, a
death sentence was available only if the jury of military officers voted unanimously, and anyone
convicted had procedural rights such as the right to appeal to the Judge Advocate General, which
added time and uncertainty to the outcome. See Danelski, supra note 4, at 65-66; Vizquez, supra
note 4, at 225.
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decided to use a military commission, a nonstatutory tribunal used
extensively to try spies, guerrillas, and others during the Civil War
and the Filipino insurrection of 1899-1902.38 The provenance of
military commissions was even older than this. Rudimentary kinds of
military commissions were employed by General Washington during
the Revolutionary War and by commanders in other early conflicts,
such as the First Seminole War. 39
C. The President's Proclamations
On July 2, President Roosevelt issued two proclamations. The
first stated that:
[A]ll persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United
States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such nation, and who
during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States ... through coastal or
boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to
commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the laws of war,
shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals ... .40
This announced the decision that the saboteurs would be tried in a
military commission. Next, the proclamation set forth President
Roosevelt's view that the saboteurs had no right to access civilian
courts: "[S]uch persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or
maintain any proceeding directly or indirectly, or to have any such
remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf, in the courts of the
United States . . . ."41
The President issued a second proclamation on July 2, this one
constituting and appointing the members of a military commission to
try the saboteurs, and directing that it meet on July 8 or as soon as
possible thereafter.42 Seven U.S. Army generals comprised the
military commission.43 The President appointed as chief prosecutors
Attorney General Biddle and the Judge Advocate General of the Army,
Myron Cramer. Several Army officers were appointed defense counsel.
Formal charges were filed in early July, alleging that the saboteurs (1)
violated the customary laws of war by penetrating the defense lines of
the United States in civilian clothes for the purpose of committing
espionage or sabotage; (2) violated Article 82 of the statutory Articles
38. David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46
VA. J. INT'L L. 5, 40-46, 48-51 (2005).
39. Id. at 18-22, 27-29.
40. Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942).
41. Id.
42. Appointment of a Military Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942).
43. FISHER, supra note 5, at 52.
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of War by providing or attempting to provide information, weapons,
and supplies to enemies of the United States and by spying; and (3)
conspired to commit the violations of both the customary laws of war
and the Articles of War.4 4
The trial started at the end of the first week of July. Based on
legal research conducted for the defense by, among others, Major
Lauson Stone, son of the Chief Justice of the United States,45 defense
counsel Kenneth Royall decided that the military trial was
unconstitutional and must be challenged in civilian court through
habeas corpus. The Supreme Court was in recess for the summer.
Defense counsel feared that, if they did not move quickly, the
saboteurs would be convicted and executed before judicial review could
occur. Royall got in touch with Justices Black and Roberts, and on
July 23, Royall, another defense lawyer, Biddle, and Cramer met with
Black and Roberts at Roberts's farm in Pennsylvania. 46 Biddle joined
defense counsel in urging the Justices to call a special summer term to
hear the case. 47 Roberts and Black were persuaded and spoke to other
Justices by telephone. On July 27, the Court announced publicly that
it would convene for a special term to hear the case starting in two
days' time. Legal papers were quickly drawn up. Habeas corpus was
sought both directly in the Supreme Court and also in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, the judicial district where
the military commission trial was currently ongoing. 48
On July 29, briefs were filed with the Supreme Court.
Testimony had been completed in the military commission, and only
closing arguments and deliberations of the commission remained. The
same morning, oral argument began before the Supreme Court. It is
clear from the transcript that the Justices were not prepared-how
could they be? The Court heard several hours of oral argument,
recessed for the evening, and then heard several more hours on July
30. A hurried conference was held that afternoon, at which the
Justices decided that the military commission would be upheld in a
44. Id. at 61-63 (reprinting the charges and specifications).
45. See Alpheus Thomas Mason, Inter Arma Silent Leges: Chief Justice Stone's Views, 69
HARV. L. REV. 806, 814 (1956). At the outset of the oral argument in Quirin, the Chief Justice
revealed his son's involvement and offered to recuse himself, but the government and defense
urged him to hear the case. Id at 815-16.
46. Danelski, supra note 4, at 68; Vizquez, supra note 4, at 228.
47. See FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 337 (1962) ("Kenneth Royall and I flew up to
Philadelphia, to request Justice Black, who was staying with Justice Roberts on his farm at
Chester Spring, Pennsylvania, to urge the Chief Justice to call a special term of the Court.").
48. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 67-68; Danelski, supra note 4, at 68.
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short per curiam order, with a full opinion to be filed later. The per
curiam was issued on July 31.
D. The Court's Two Decisions
The government argued lack of court access as a threshold
issue:
The great bulwarks of our civil liberties-and the writ of habeas corpus is one of the
most important-were never intended to apply in favor of armed invaders sent here by
the enemy in time of war.... Traditionally, all States in time of war have denied
belligerent enemies access to their courts.49
The President's proclamation, said the government's brief, was simply
"an affirmation of a long-settled rule denying belligerent enemies any
access to our courts."50 To support the proposition that "no writ of
habeas corpus will be granted for prisoners of war," the government
cited eighteenth-century English decisions denying habeas corpus to
anyone who was concededly a prisoner of war.5' The saboteurs' brief
argued that the proclamation had no effect because it was not
authorized by statute, and cited Ex parte Milligan, a Supreme Court
decision from the Civil War,52 as well as several other authorities, all
inapposite.53 Defense counsel framed the court access issue as an
unconstitutional attempt by the President to suspend habeas corpus
in an area where no martial law could prevail because it was far from
the front lines.5 4 On the merits, the saboteurs argued that the military
trial violated the jury and grand jury guarantees of the Constitution
and several provisions of the Articles of War, notably the requirement
for a form of appellate review by the Judge Advocate General's office. 55
They also argued that only Congress, not the President, had authority
49. Brief for the Respondent at 8-9, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (Nos. - Original and
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, July Special Term, 1942) [hereinafter Government's Brief].
50. Id. at 13.
51. Id. at 17 (citing Rex v. Schiever, (1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B.); 2 Burr. 765; Furly v.
Newnham, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B.); 2 Doug. 419; Three Spanish Sailors, (1779) 96 Eng.
Rep. 775 (K.B.); 2 Black. W. 1324). For a discussion of these cases, see infra Section III.B.
52. Brief in Support of Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 16-18, Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1 (1942) (Nos. - Original and Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, July Special Term, 1942)
[hereinafter Petitioners' Brief] (discussing Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)). Milligan
is discussed infra, in the text accompanying notes 222-229.
53. The brief cited a federal district court case, New York state case, and law review case
comment--each of which concerned alien enemies who were peaceful civilians with prewar
residences in the United States. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 52, at 16-19. None of these
authorities were on point factually or legally to the questions presented in Quirin.
54. Id. at 38.
55. Id. at 21, 31-36, 62-63.
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to create and make rules for a military trial, and that the specific
offenses charged were defective in various respects.56 The government
responded that the Constitution and Articles of War authorized trials
by military commission for "belligerent enemies," and that the
saboteurs had no cognizable rights under the Constitution or laws of
the United States.57
On July 31-only two days after receiving the briefs and four
days after first announcing that it would hear the case-the Court
issued the per curiam opinion. It recited the procedural posture and
then stated:
The Court holds: (1) That the charges preferred against petitioners . . . allege an offense
or offenses which the President is authorized to order tried before a military
commission. (2) That the military commission was lawfully constituted. (3) That
petitioners are held in lawful custody, for trial before the military commission, and have
not shown cause for being discharged by writ of habeas corpus. 58
The per curiam did not address the prosecution's argument that the
saboteurs had no right to judicial review. It is clear that, at their
conference before issuing the per curiam, the Justices discussed how
to handle the government's and saboteurs' competing arguments
about court access, but it is not certain exactly what, if anything, the
Court agreed upon.59 The per curiam stated that a full opinion would
be issued when ready.
A few days later, the military commission found all eight men
guilty and sentenced them to death.60 In an ordinary court-martial,
the next procedural step would have been a form of appellate review
conducted by the Judge Advocate General. Here, he was one of the
prosecutors, and the President's proclamation had declared that the
sole review would be by the President. The full record was thus sent
directly to Roosevelt, who agreed with the convictions. On August 8,
six of the saboteurs were electrocuted, but Roosevelt commuted
Dasch's and one other's sentences to prison terms because of their
assistance to the prosecution.61
For three months, the Court struggled internally to agree upon
a full opinion explaining the result announced in its per curiam
decision. Finally, on October 29, 1942, a unanimous Court issued an
56. Id. at 21-29, 40-51.
57. Government's Brief, supra note 49, at 11.
58. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 11.
59. See infra notes 364 & 366 and accompanying text.
60. Danelski, supra note 4, at 72.
61. Id.
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opinion written by Chief Justice Stone. On the issue of access to the
courts, the opinion stated:
The Government challenges each of these [claims by defense counsel that the military
commission was contrary to the Articles of War and unconstitutional]. But regardless of
their merits, it also insists that petitioners must be denied access to the courts, both
because they are enemy aliens or have entered our territory as enemy belligerents, and
because the President's Proclamation undertakes in terms to deny such access to the
class of persons defined by the Proclamation, which aptly describes the character and
conduct of petitioners. It is urged that if they are enemy aliens or if the Proclamation
has force no court may afford the petitioners a hearing. But there is certainly nothing in
the Proclamation to preclude access to the courts for determining its applicability to the
particular case. And neither the Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy aliens
forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners' contentions that the Constitution
and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military
commission. As announced in our per curiam opinion we have resolved those questions
by our conclusion that the Commission has jurisdiction to try the charge preferred
against petitioners. There is therefore no occasion to decide contentions of the parties
unrelated to this issue.62
Taking the three key sentences one at a time, this is what they
appear to say. First ("But there is certainly nothing . . . ."), whether or
not the proclamation has the effect of denying access to the courts, the
Supreme Court was authorized to look at the proclamation to see if it
applied to these specific petitioners. This had to be true but was
essentially irrelevant-no one questioned that the proclamation spoke
directly to the situation of these saboteurs, or that the Court had the
right to read its words to see if it applied. Phrased in technical terms,
no one disputed that the Court had jurisdiction to decide its own
jurisdiction.63 The second ("And neither the Proclamation... .") is the
key sentence, and it is the very definition of an ipse dixit. The Court
cited no authority and gave no reasons for allowing the saboteurs to
access the courts via habeas corpus. It simply asserted the result. The
Court should not have treated such a significant issue in so high-
handed a manner."
62. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25.
63. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 291 (1947)
(quoting United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906)) ("[This Court] alone necessarily had
jurisdiction to decide whether the case was properly before it."). See generally Stephen I.
Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2107, 2113 (2009) (discussing jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction).
64. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower
Federal Courts, and the Nature of the "Judicial Power," 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 973-74 (2000)
(suggesting that when the Court declines to give reasons but simply asserts its power to mandate
a result, it is arguably acting more like a legislature than a court exercising the "judicial power"
given by the Constitution); Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CIii. L. REV. 1455, 1465-
67 (1995) ("[]t is part of our understanding of judicial practice that judges' opinions should be
reached by a process of 'reasoned elaboration,' and that judges should explain, justify, and give
reasons for their decisions.').
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The third important sentence ("As announced in our per
curiam.. . .") is ambiguous. The Court might be implying that the
issue of court access had already been decided adversely to the
government by the per curiam. If so, the Court had not stated any
such thing in the per curiam. It is true that the reasons given in the
per curiam for denying the habeas petitions went to the merits,
suggesting that the Court may have implicitly resolved in favor of the
saboteurs the threshold question of access. But it could also have been
true that the Court, in its extraordinarily curt per curiam, passed over
the threshold question in silence because on the merits it was clear
that the saboteurs had no right to relief. One might think that now
that the Court had the time to explain its result in this extremely
high-profile and significant case, it had some obligation to indicate
how it had resolved the important issue of court access. The Court
chose not to. Alternately, this sentence might have an even narrower
meaning, that the merits of the saboteurs' claims had been resolved
against them already in the per curiam. If that was all the Court
meant, it was quite correct but trivially obvious and hardly worth
mentioning. The meaning of the sentence depends on what the Court
meant by "those questions"--either (1) all of the issues including court
access discussed in the preceding sentence, or (2) only those merits
questions referenced in the second part of the preceding sentence, that
is, the saboteurs' "contentions that the Constitution and laws of the
United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military
commission."
In light of this potential ambiguity, some might question
whether the Court did in fact render a holding on the threshold
question of court access. Perhaps Quirin is a "relic[] of the pre-Steel
Co. era," when the Court did not always neatly distinguish between
jurisdictional and merits questions, and often decided jurisdiction by
reference to the merits. 65 But I think it is clear that the Court did
decide the jurisdictional question of court access. Contemporaneous
correspondence of Chief Justice Stone, the author of the opinion,
shows that he understood the full October opinion to have issued a
holding about court access. 66 And in subsequent decisions, including
65. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Problem of Jurisdictional Non-Precedent, 44 TULSA L REV.
587, 590 (2009) (discussing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), and other
cases).
66. See infra notes 345-47 and accompanying text.
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one coming only four years after Quirin, the Court viewed Quirin as
having issued a holding on court access. 67
On the merits, the Court in its full opinion in Quirin held that
Congress in the Articles of War had authorized military commission
trials for offenses against the laws of war committed by enemies and
that Congress had constitutional authority to do so;68 that the
saboteurs' conduct brought them within the category of persons who
could, under the international laws of war, be tried militarily for the
charged offenses;69 that the jury and grand jury provisions of the
Constitution were never intended to bar military trials for enemy
belligerents, even if they were U.S. citizens;70 and that Milligan
applied only to U.S. citizens who were civilians.7' One issue divided
the Court: the question of compliance with procedures specified in the
Articles of War. The full opinion stated that some Justices believed
these procedures were not intended to benefit "admitted enemy
invaders," while others believed the Articles to be applicable but not
shown to have been violated by the President or his military
commission; all Justices agreed that no right to relief arose from the
Articles of War.72
III. HABEAS LAW PRIOR TO 1942
By 1942, centuries-old legal rules barred the saboteurs from
accessing civilian courts. Those rules held that: enemy aliens who
lacked peaceful prewar residence in the United States were barred
from the courts during the war; agents of an enemy government,
including as a paradigm case enemy fighters, could receive no
protection against the government from domestic law and were barred
from accessing the courts, including by using the writ of habeas
corpus; and all enemy aliens-even civilians with a peaceful prewar
residence in the United States who ordinarily could access the
courts-were barred from the courts during the war so far as
necessary to prevent the use of the courts to accomplish a purpose
67. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474-75 (2004); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
779-81 (1950); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946). Though Yamashita, Eisentrager, and Rasul
all saw certain Justices dissent, none questioned that Quirin had decided the issue of court
access.
68. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1942).
69. Id. at 30-37.
70. Id. at 38-46.
71. Id. at 45-46.
72. Id. at 47-48.
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which might hamper our own war efforts or give aid to the enemy. Of
course, in state-to-state wars, most enemy fighters are also
nonresident enemy aliens, rendering it unnecessary to distinguish
between these two bases for denying court access. But when a U.S.
citizen is involved, or when the conflict is against a nonstate group
(meaning that no one is technically an enemy alien), the distinctions
are important.
Of these rules, the one concerning enemy fighters was least
well settled in law because in the centuries before Quirin enemy
fighters almost never attempted to bring suits during wartime. The
rule against their doing so is thus found not in holdings of courts but
primarily in judicial dicta and learned commentary, and also follows
as a policy matter from related legal rules. I argue in this Part that
the rule barring enemy fighters from court was as well established as
those concerning nonresident alien enemies, but candor requires an
acknowledgement that its sourcing in decided cases is nowhere near
as solid.
One issue where the historical record does not speak with one
voice concerns the situation when the government and the prospective
litigant disagree about key facts like citizenship, domicile, or status as
an enemy fighter. While the record is clear that people who were
undisputedly enemy fighters or nonresident enemy aliens were barred
from the courts, the sources are not uniform about court access where
those facts were disputed.
This Part traces the development of rules regarding court
access from English common law through the American Founding, the
Civil War, the wars of imperialism at the turn of the twentieth
century, and World War I. Readers who do not need to be convinced
that American law prior to 1942 proscribed court access during
wartime for admitted enemy fighters and civilians who were
nonresident enemy aliens should skip to Part IV.
Before proceeding, a note about habeas corpus history and
terminology is necessary, as well as some caveats about what this
Article covers and what it does not. This Article concerns the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, a writ dating back to ancient English
common law used to test the legality of a prisoner's detention. 73 The
detainee or a representative petitions a court to issue a writ to the
jailer requiring an explanation of why the detention is lawful. If the
court finds the detention is unauthorized or unlawful, it has the power
73. See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 16-17 (2010).
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to order the detainee's release.74 Habeas corpus is protected by the
U.S. Constitution: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it."76 As Professors Fallon and Meltzer have
observed, "[J]ust what [the Habeas Suspension Clause] protects is a
difficult puzzle."7 6 The most common answer, adopted by the Supreme
Court and many commentators, is that the Suspension Clause
protects, at a minimum, habeas corpus "as it existed in 1789."77 The
writ as it existed when the Constitution went into effect was the writ
of English common law origin, and hence exploration of English legal
history has become an integral part of the analysis of the scope and
reach of the U.S. writ.
In a recent article, Fallon and Meltzer provide a useful
categorization of the types of habeas questions that arise in military
detention cases: (1) "jurisdictional questions, involving the authority of
a court to entertain a detainee's petition at all"; (2) "substantive
questions, involving whether the Executive has lawful authority to
detain particular categories of prisoners"; and (3) "procedural
questions, involving both (a) the lawfulness of the administrative
procedures followed by the Executive in classifying particular
individuals as subject to detention or in trying them for war crimes,
and (b) the appropriate scope of judicial review of decisions by
executive officials or military tribunals."78
Throughout the Article, I frame the main disputed issue as
whether the saboteurs had a right to "access the courts" via habeas
corpus, because that is the way the Supreme Court did in Quirin and
other cases. 79 Whether a given party has the right or capacity to bring
74. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Jurisdiction,
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2037 (2007) (reviewing the
basics of the writ); Gerald L Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of
Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 970-71 (1998) (same).
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
76. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 74, at 2037.
77. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
746 (2008); Stephen I. Viadeck, The New Habeas Revision, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 942 (2011)
(book review of HALLIDAY, supra note 73).
78. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 74, at 2034.
79. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1942) ("[The executive] insists that petitioners must
be denied access to the courts, both because they are enemy aliens or have entered our territory
as enemy belligerents, and because the President's Proclamation undertakes in terms to deny
such access to the class of persons defined by the Proclamation."); see also Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950) (analyzing whether German agents convicted by the U.S.
military tribunal sitting in China and subsequently detained in U.S.-occupied Germany had a
right via habeas corpus to have "access to our courts').
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suit in the first instance is a jurisdictional question under Fallon and
Meltzer's schema. In addition to speaking about "access to the courts"
or the courts being "open" or "closed" to enemies during wartime,80 the
Supreme Court has variously described the question of an enemy
alien's or enemy fighter's access to U.S. courts as concerning both
judicial "jurisdiction" and personal "standing" or "capacity" to sue.81
Standing and jurisdiction are of course distinct concepts, but they are
two sides of the same coin here.82
In 1942, when the German saboteurs sought habeas corpus,
Congress had provided broad jurisdiction for the federal district courts
to issue writs of habeas corpus; the statutes did not distinguish
between whether the petitioner was a citizen or alien and provided
only that judges must act "within their respective jurisdictions." 83 My
argument is that there was an implicit limit on the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to hear habeas corpus petitions and at the same time a
personal incapacity to sue for the enemy litigant. The Court has said
this jurisdictional limit and corresponding incapacity derives from the
common law and the law of nations84 but has always been leavened by
80. See, e.g., Masterson v. Howard, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 99, 105 (1873) ("The existence of war,
does, indeed, close the courts of each belligerent to the citizens of the other .... ); accord Brown
v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 184 (1872) (quoted infra note 201).
81. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765 ('The ultimate question in this case is one of
jurisdiction of civil courts of the United States vis-A-vis military authorities in dealing with
enemy aliens overseas.'); id. at 776 ("The standing of the enemy alien to maintain any action in
the courts of the United States has been often challenged and sometimes denied."); see also
Conrad v. Waples, 96 U.S. 279, 289-90 (1877) (quoted infra note 201); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 532, 536 (1867) (same).
82. The Court has frequently conflated the question whether a given person has "a right to
judicial review" via habeas corpus "of the legality of executive detention" with the theoretically
separate question of "the federal courts' power to review applications" for habeas corpus from a
given petitioner. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474-75 (2004) (treating these as the same
question); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732, 745 (framing the question presented as whether
petitioners had "the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus" and stating that "[tlhe
[Suspension] Clause protects the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of
the Judiciary to call the jailer to account'). On the Supreme Court's lack of clarity about the
precise legal status of the court access inquiry, and the varying consequences of viewing it as a
matter of standing, civil capacity, subject matter jurisdiction, individual rights, or separation of
powers, see Andrew Kent, Do Boumediene Rights Expire?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 20,
32-37 (2012).
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1940) ("The Supreme Court and the district courts shall have the
power to issue writs of habeas corpus."); 28 U.S.C. § 452 (1940) ("The several justices of the
Supreme Court and the several judges of the circuit courts of appeal and of the district courts,
within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty.').
84. See, e.g., Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776 (reviewing the historical development of the rules
concerning enemy suits in "the common law and the law of nations"); Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S.
69, 74-75 (1942) (holding that "the common law today" allowed civilian enemy aliens, resident in
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constitutional considerations sounding in separation of powers.85 If a
given detainee has a constitutional right to habeas corpus review,
then he or she cannot be deprived of that by an implied exception to a
jurisdictional statute or a civil incapacity arising from the common
law and law of nations. 86 Therefore, my argument is necessarily also
that persons who are undisputedly nonresident enemy aliens, and in
particular enemy fighters, had no constitutional right to access the
civilian courts during wartime via the Habeas Corpus Suspension
Clause, the Due Process Clause, or otherwise.
The relevant provisions of the Constitution and habeas
jurisdictional statutes do not have express exceptions for nonresident
enemy aliens and enemy fighters. But in our legal system, it is
perfectly appropriate and reasonably common for statutory or
constitutional language to be defeasible-subject to limitation or
annulment (defeat) in certain respects-by background rules of the
common law or law of nations.87 A well-known example, which, like
the topic of this Article, concerns capacity to sue or be sued, is the rule
derived from the common law and law of nations that U.S. states have
sovereign immunity from certain kinds of suits. 8 8 And as James
Madison explained to the Virginia ratifying convention, the broad
language about jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution was
qualified by the rule of the common law and law of nations that alien
enemies were barred from court during wartime.89 It should be
unsurprising that the Habeas Suspension Clause is similarly
qualified, because that clause has always been understood to protect
habeas as it was known to the common law. 90
the United States, to bring private suits during wartime); Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
216, 236 (1871) (quoted infra note 201).
85. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755 (resorting to "fundamental separation-of-powers
principles" to decide whether Congress was constitutionally required to allow alien detainees at
Guantanamo Bay petition for writs of habeas corpus); Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765 ("The
ultimate question in this case is one of jurisdiction of civil courts of the United States vis-h-vis
military authorities in dealing with enemy aliens overseas.").
86. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 477-78.
87. See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813 (2012).
88. Id.; see also, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716-18, 733 (1999) (explaining that
state sovereign immunity derives from the common law pre-existing the Constitution and the
Constitution's design); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1567-1621 (2002) (showing that, at the Founding, state sovereign
immunity was a personal jurisdiction doctrine derived from the general common law and law of
nations).
89. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[F]or
the meaning of the term habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common law.").
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Before Quirin, both the Constitution's provisions bearing on
court access (the Suspension Clause, Due Process Clause, and Article
III) and Congress's statutes giving habeas and federal question
jurisdiction to the federal courts were best understood as implicitly
excepting from their protections both enemy fighters and civilians who
were nonresident enemy aliens. My method of interpreting the
Constitution is catholic-to understand what the Constitution meant
to earlier generations of Americans, this Article looks at many kinds of
evidence including the original understanding, constitutional
structure and principles, judicial precedent, political branch practice,
and learned commentary. Background legal norms of the common law
and law of nations are crucial to the analysis. Because a bar on court
access for enemy fighters and nonresident enemy aliens was a well-
established rule of the common law and law of nations that was
repeatedly applied in practice, both the Constitution and Congress's
habeas and federal question jurisdiction statutes should be read as
implicitly carving out exceptions for those classes of petitioners. I have
examined congressional debates during the years in which the habeas
statutes were enacted or received important amendments-the 1789
Judiciary Act, the 1863 suspension statute, the 1867 amendments, the
1873-74 codification of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and
the 1875 enactment of federal question jurisdiction 91-and found no
indication that Congress expressly decided whether enemy fighters or
nonresident enemy aliens should have court access via habeas corpus
or otherwise. 92 But a background norm of the common law and law of
91. In chronological order of enactment, the relevant statutes are: Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch.
20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (vesting federal courts with power to issue writs of habeas corpus); Act
of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755 (allowing suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil
War); Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86 (vesting federal courts and judges with
power to grant writs of habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdictions" where "any person
[is] restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the
United States"); U.S. Rev. St. §§ 751-52 (1875) (to the same effect); Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137,
18 Stat. 470 (vesting federal courts with general federal question jurisdiction).
92. The 1867 act expanding habeas jurisdiction contained an interesting proviso:
This act shall not apply to the case of any person who is or may be held in the custody
of the military authorities of the United States, charged with any military offence, or
with having aided or abetted rebellion against the government of the United States
prior to the passage of this act.
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 387. In the limited debate about this provision, the
only objection, voiced by one senator, was that it would allow the detention of a U.S. "civilian."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4229-30 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis). Lyman Trumbull,
the bill's sponsor, pointed out that it was limited to persons "held in confinement in consequence
of the rebellion" like Jefferson Davis. Id. at 4229 (statement of Sen. Trumbull). I have found no
evidence that anyone thought that such a provision was necessary in order to prevent
Confederate prisoners of war from obtaining habeas corpus. Trumbull, for his part, clearly
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nations would have been understood to continue to apply absent
contrary legislative intent, and so the lack of debate is not dispositive.
I have repeatedly limited my claims to only "undisputed"
enemy aliens or enemy fighters. In Quirin, all eight men conceded
that they were employed by the German military to commit sabotage,
and seven of the eight conceded that they were not U.S. citizens.93
These facts-citizenship and employment in the enemy's military-
can be described as "jurisdictional facts," in that they determine
whether a detainee has a right to seek release from the civilian courts
or whether exclusive military jurisdiction over them is proper.94 I am
sympathetic to the view that when certain classes of detainees in
military custody dispute jurisdictional facts-whether they are in fact
enemy aliens or enemy fighters-habeas courts must be open to hear
and decide the facts.95 In the Quirin litigation, the Attorney General
conceded the propriety of this general view,9 6 and that position has a
lot to recommend it? A pervasive feature of post-9/11 habeas corpus
believed that enemy fighters had no right to habeas corpus. See infra note 204. At the time the
bill passed, the war was over and the Confederate States of America was no longer considered a
de facto foreign country, see infra notes 200 & 210 and accompanying text, and so the ban on
nonresident enemy aliens accessing the courts did not apply-positive law was required to
prevent civilian U.S. citizens in the United States from accessing the courts.
93. See supra Section II.A.
94. Cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950) (describing, in the context of
executive civil detention under the Alien Enemy Act, the citizenship of the detainee as a
"jurisdictional element[]" that Article III courts may review (discussing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335
U.S. 160 (1948))); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 283-85 (1922) (requiring independent
judicial determination of the "essential jurisdictional fact" of citizenship in a habeas corpus
challenge to deportation order). See generally Neuman, supra note 74, at 984-87, 993-94
(discussing jurisdictional fact review in the habeas context).
95. My prior work has shown that noncitizens without any property or physical presence in
the United States had never, until Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), been considered to
have any U.S. constitutional rights. See generally J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case
Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463 (2007) [hereinafter Kent, Global Constitution];
Kent, supra note 13; Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2010) [hereinafter Kent, Civil War]. Jurisdictional fact review by
an Article III court should therefore not be required for persons so situated. But for persons
present in the United States, or persons claiming to be U.S. citizens no matter where located, I
am sympathetic to the view that jurisdictional fact review is constitutionally required.
96. Transcript of Oral Argument of July 29, 1942, at 72, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
(Nos. - Original and Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of July 1942 Special Term), reprinted in 39
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 567 (Philip
B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS] ("In a writ of habeas
corpus it is perfectly clear that the alien enemy is not entitled to the use of the writ except to
determine the basic jurisdictional fact of whether he is an alien enemy").
97. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Enemy Combatants and the Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2008); Stephen I. Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy Property, and
Access to the Courts, 11 LEWIS & CIARK L. REV. 963, 965 (2007). A requirement that a habeas
court review disputed jurisdictional facts is related to the older doctrine that "superior courts"
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litigation has been disputes about jurisdictional facts. Because this
Article is primarily concerned with a different issue-court access
when jurisdictional facts are undisputed-it need not and does not
take a definitive position on such a complex issue. But the Article
notes the different views found in historical sources about what rules
pertain when jurisdictional facts are disputed.
The leading counterargument to mine is that, while undisputed
enemy civilians and fighters were generally barred from the courts
during wartime, that was true primarily in cases involving property,
and habeas was an entirely different and special case. Originally
conceived in Britain as vindicating the King's power to control his
officers and tribunals, and later seen in both Britain and America as
protecting a personal liberty interest of the highest order from
government overreaching, habeas was, on this account, a
quintessentially flexible and powerful judicial writ that reached any
place and any person the judges wanted it to, even enemy prisoners of
war, particularly if they were challenging a military commission
proceeding.98 This Part will assess the strength of this competing
narrative following the same historical chronology as my affirmative
argument.
A. The Allegiance and Protection Framework
This Section describes the general framework within which
aliens' and enemies' legal rights, including their right to access the
courts, were understood from the colonial period through the
Founding, the Civil War, and the turn of the twentieth century. The
twin pillars of this ancient framework, which developed in the
common law and law of nations before the United States declared
independence, were allegiance and protection, and they were
understood to be reciprocal.99 Only persons owing allegiance to the
government were under the protection of the government and its laws
and courts. Only persons within protection because of their allegiance
had standing to invoke the protection of the courts and were shielded
had power to review the jurisdictional determinations of "inferior tribunals." Neuman, supra
note 74, at 982-87.
98. In 2008, the Court in Bourmediene seems to have accepted this view, since it placed no
categorical limits-potential categorical limits rejected by the Court include citizenship, location,
or enemy status-on the reach of habeas corpus, instead finding it available whenever a six- or
seven-part, non-exclusive, totality of the circumstances test was met. See Kent, supra note 13, at
109 (discussing this aspect of Boumediene).
99. See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L REV. 1823, 1834-46 (2009).
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by rights under the domestic constitution and laws.100 The link
between protection and access to the courts was clear. As a popular
English law dictionary put it, "[Sluing is but a consequential Right of
Protection," that is a right that flows from being within protection.' 0
Philip Hamburger has demonstrated that this allegiance-protection
framework was understood in the United States to be one of the
conceptual foundations upon which the U.S. and state constitutions
were adopted during the Founding period.102 Earlier work of mine has
demonstrated the enduring nature of the framework, which persisted
through the Civil War' 03 and turn of the twentieth century. 104
Citizenship in the United States (or subjecthood in monarchical
Great Britain) was what paradigmatically carried with it allegiance
and protection.105 But an alien from a friendly nation could, when
visiting or residing within the United States (or Britain), be bound to
a "temporary" or "local" allegiance and therefore entitled to temporary
protection of the constitution, laws, and courts.106 Besides citizens (or
subjects) and friendly aliens within the country under temporary
allegiance, all other people were not under the protection of the courts
and laws. A group which paradigmatically had no protection of the
law-or access to courts-was the men in arms of an enemy nation
during wartime. For civilians who were citizens or subjects of an
enemy nation during wartime, the rules changed over time. The older
rule was that enemy nationals-called "alien enemies" or "enemy
aliens"-had no protection of the laws or access to courts during war.
This rule was softened over time. The newer rule was that civilian
enemy aliens who peacefully resided within the United States (or
100. See id. at 1826-29, 1833-40.
101. 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW, § Aliens (4th ed., London, W.
Strahan & M. Woodfall Printers 1778).
102. See Hamburger, supra note 99, at 1844-47, 1976.
103. Kent, Civil War, supra note 95, at 1853-60.
104. Kent, supra note 13, at 124-32.
105. See, e.g., 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 59 (London, E. & R. Nutt 1736) ("Because as the subject hath his protection from
the king and his laws, so on the other side the subject is bound by his allegiance to be true and
faithful to the king .... ); accord 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 354 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765).
106. Hamburger, supra note 99, at 1847, 1898-1901; Kent, Global Constitution, supra note
95, at 503; see also MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION OF
OYER AND TERMINER AND GOAL DELIVERY 183 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1762) ('With regard to
Natural-born Subjects there can be no Doubt. They owe Allegiance to the Crown at all Times and
in all Places. This is what We call Natural Allegiance, in Contradistinction to that which is Local
.... Local Allegiance is founded in the Protection a Foreigner enjoyeth for his Person, his Family
or Effects during his Residence here . . . ." (quoted material from second portion of work, known
popularly as Foster's Discourses)); accord BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at 358.
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Britain) from before the war, or those who arrived during the war with
permission of the government, were, like alien friends, under the
temporary protection of the laws because they owed temporary
allegiance. But peaceful civilian enemy aliens who were located
outside the United States (or Britain) owed no temporary allegiance
and hence had no protection of the laws or access to courts. The
following Sections detail these understandings, first in English
common law and then in the United States during the Founding era,
early antebellum period, Civil War, imperial period at the turn of the
twentieth century, and World War I. As shown below, although the
language of reciprocal "allegiance" and "protection" was dropping
away in the twentieth century, 107 the rules derived from the
framework-specifically the rules that enemy fighters and
nonresident civilian enemy aliens lacked protection from the law and
access to courts during wartime-remained established. 08
B. English Law
Old English law was harsh in its treatment of aliens. The
famous Calvin's Case of 1608 described the prevailing law: alien
friends-subjects of governments at peace with England-who were
resident or sojourning in England could access the courts for all
purposes except regarding real estate located within the realm; such
real estate they were prohibited from owning and hence from suing
about.109 But an alien enemy, wherever located, was "utterly disabled
107. This language did, however, still appear in important Supreme Court decisions about
alien rights during the 1940s and 1950s. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)
("[Tlhe Government's obligation of protection is correlative with the duty of loyal support
inherent in the citizen's allegiance . .. ."); id. at 769 ("[Olur law does not abolish inherent
distinctions recognized throughout the civilized world between citizens and aliens, nor between
aliens of friendly and of..enemy allegiance, nor between resident enemy aliens who have
submitted themselves to our laws and nonresident enemy aliens who at all times have remained
with, and adhered to, enemy governments."); Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 74 (1942) ("A lawful
residence implies protection, and a capacity to sue and be sued." (citation omitted)).
108. As a result of U.S imperialism and the complications of immigration laws, there are
today several categories of persons who are not U.S. citizens but who should be understood to
have the same rights and responsibilities as citizens in the allegiance/protection framework.
These include permanent residents of U.S. possessions like American Samoa, who are
denominated "U.S. nationals" rather than citizens, and so-called "green card" holders, who have
been granted permanent resident status within the United States. Because U.S. citizens are both
the paradigm and overwhelmingly the most numerous cases, I will use the term "citized' to
include the noncitizen groups with the same allegiance/protection rights and responsibilities.
109. Calvin's Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.) 397; 7 Co. Rep. 1 a, 17 a. On the
development of rules benefitting alien friends, see 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGIISH
LAW 94-98 (1926).
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to maintain any action, or get any thing within this realm.""10 Alien
enemies were entirely outside the protection of the municipal law. M
According to Blackstone's Commentaries, "Alien enemies have no
rights, no privileges, unless by the king's special favor, during time of
war."112 Blackstone's caveat was important. Civilian enemy aliens
might be within the protection of the laws and have access to the
courts if their presence in England were licensed by the Crown. A
leading case, Wells v. Williams, established that an alien who came to
England "in time of peace, per licentiam domini Regis [under the
license of the Crown] .. . and lives here sub protectione [under
protection]," may maintain a civil action even though later the alien's
home country went to war with England. 13 The same access to the
courts was allowed to civilian enemy aliens who came to England
during the war if they came under a license from the Crown.1 4 But
alien enemies resident in their home country-who owed no allegiance
and hence had no protection-were denied access to courts during
wartime.115 Even for alien enemies resident in Britain, lack of the
Crown's license meant no protection and hence no access to the
110. Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 397; see also, e.g., Hoppen v. Leppett, (1737) 95 Eng.
Rep. 305 (K.B.) 305-06; Andr. 76 (holding that because alien friends may maintain actions, to
bar suit it must be pleaded that the alien is "inimicus Curiae," an enemy of the Crown).
111. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 109, at 98 (stating that at common law an alien enemy
"could bring no action in the courts" and quoting Dyer that "being an enemy of our lord the king
he [the alien enemy] could have no benefit from his laws").
112. BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at 372; see also 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at 401
(1766) ("[S]uch [alien] enemies, not being looked upon as members of our society, are not entitled
during their state of enmity to the benefit or protection of the laws.").
113. Wells v. Williams, (1697) 91 Eng. Rep. 45 (K.B.) 46; 1 Salk. 46, 47; see also JOHN I.
BURN, THE ATTORNEY'S PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH 68 (London, J. Butterworth
1805) ("An alien friend may have personal actions, but an alien enemy cannot have any action
whatsoever. Yet it has been decided that an alien enemy, commorant here by the King's license,
and under his protection, may sue, though he came in time of war, without a safe conduct."
(citations omitted)). See generally HOLDSWORTH, supra note 109, at 100 (discussing the
importance of Wells v. Williams); Hamburger, supra note 99, at 1874-75 (discussing the
underlying legal principles).
114. See Hamburger, supra note 99, at 1876.
115. See, e.g., Brandon v. Nesbitt, (1794) 101 Eng. Rep. 415 (K.B.) 415, 417-18; 6 T.R. 23,
23--29 (dismissing an insurance action because it was initiated by an enemy alien); see also
Crawford v. The William Penn, 6 F. Cas. 778, 779 (C.C.D.N.J. 1815) (No. 3,372):
The general rule of the common law of England is, that an alien enemy cannot
maintain an action in the courts of that country, during the war, in his own name. The
rule is . . . [founded] upon the disability of the party to sue; arising out of the hostile
character which the war has impressed upon him. The rule appears to be inflexible,
except where the alien enemy is under the protection of the king; as where he comes
into the kingdom after the war, by license of the sovereign; or being there at the time
of the war, is permitted to continue his domicil.
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courts. 116 An explicit or implicit license from the Crown, which
brought with it protection, was the key to the civilian enemy alien
being protected by the municipal law and having access to the
courts.'17
Alien enemies who entered England in a hostile fashion, for
example as part of an attacking army or navy, owed no allegiance to
the Crown and received no license to remain and be protected by its
laws. Sir Matthew Hale, for a time Chief Justice of the King's Bench,
explained in his influential treatise that an "alien enemy [who]
come[s] into this kingdom hostilely to invade it" is outside of
allegiance (and hence also protection), but while "an alien, the subject
of a forei[g]n prince in amity with the king live here, [he would] enjoy
the benefit of the king's protection .. . for he owes a local
alleg[i]ance." 18 As John Locke wrote, temporary or "local protection"
was due to aliens "who, not being in a state of war, come within the
territories belonging to [the] government."'19
Enemy fighters-aliens in the military service of a nation at
war with Britain, who when detained were referred to as "prisoners of
war" 20-were the paradigmatic example of aliens who came to Britain
"hostilely" or "in a state of war," owing no allegiance and being
entitled to no protection.121 An early reported case concerning enemy
prisoners of war and habeas corpus was Rex v. Schiever, decided by
the King's Bench in 1759.122 France and Britain were at war. Schiever
sought a writ of habeas corpus to free himself from jail in Liverpool,
where he was held as a prisoner of war after being captured serving
aboard a French privateer.123 An affidavit supporting his petition
116. See, e.g., Sylvester's Case, (1703) 87 Eng. Rep. 1157 (Q.B.) 1157; 7 Mod. 150 (holding
that an alien enemy present in England who was not under the Crown's protection "shall be
seized and imprisoned by the law of England, and he shall have no advantage of the law of
England, nor for any wrong done to him here').
117. See, e.g., 1 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 11 (4th ed., Dublin,
Luke White 1793) ("[I]t is no Plea [barring access to the courts], that he is an Alien Enemy, when
a Man is under the Protection of the King.'). &e generally Hamburger, supra note 99, at 1874-
79.
118. HALE, supra note 105. Alien enemies who did not owe temporary allegiance to the
Crown, either because of hostility or lack of local residence, lacked protection of the municipal
law and could not be indicted for the municipal crime of treason; they could only be "tried and
executed by martial law." Rex v. Tucker, (1694) 91 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.) 898; 1 IA. Raym 1, 2.
119. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT § 122, at 65 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
1980) (1764) (emphasis added).
120. See supra note 10 for clarification about how I use the terms "enemy fighter" and
"prisoner of war."
121. See Hamburger, supra note 99, at 1887-93.
122. Rex v. Schiever, (1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B.); 2 Burr. 765.
123. Id. at 551.
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claimed that he was a Swedish mariner who had been seized and
impressed into service by the French warship. 124 Not being French-
not being an alien enemy-and having only involuntarily fought
against the British, he sought his freedom. According to the report of
the case, "the Court thought this man, upon his own shewing, clearly a
prisoner of war, and lawfully detained as such. Therefore they Denied
the motion,"125 refusing to issue a writ of habeas corpus on his
behalf.126
A second reported case concerning prisoners of war and habeas
corpus, The Case of Three Spanish Sailors, was decided by the Court
of Common Pleas in 1779.127 Britain was then at war with France,
Spain, and the rebellious colonists in North America. Three Spanish
sailors were held as prisoners of war on a British warship docked in
Britain. According to their habeas corpus petition, the sailors had
been captured by a British warship while serving on a Spanish
privateer and then taken to the British colony of Jamaica.128 There,
they were persuaded to help crew a short-handed British merchant
vessel heading home to Britain, with a promise that they would
receive wages and be released when they arrived.129 But the captain
broke his promise, instead delivering the Spanish sailors to the
custody of the British Navy. According to the court, the sailors "upon
their own shewing, are alien enemies and prisoners of war, and
therefore not entitled to any of the privileges of Englishmen; much
less to be set at liberty on a habeas corpus."130 Note the extremely
comprehensive language: "not entitled to any of the privileges of
Englishmen." They were outside the protection of the laws and courts
of England.11
In 1820, the King's Bench noted Schiever and Spanish Sailors
in dictum, stating that the writ of habeas corpus is properly refused
"when it appeared that the person applying was a prisoner of war."132
English treatises often stated the rule against enemy prisoners of war
being freed by habeas corpus in absolute terms, and several sources
124. Id.
125. Id. at 552.
126. See Hamburger, supra note 99, at 1890-91 (emphasizing that Schiever was "decided on
an affidavit in pre-habeas proceedings" and does not show that habeas was available to prisoners
of war).
127. Three Spanish Sailors, (1779) 96 Eng. Rep. 775 (C.P.); 2 Black. W. 1324.
128. Id. at 775.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 776 (citing Schiever).
131. See Hamburger, supra note 99, at 1890-91 (reading Spanish Sailors in this manner).
132. Hobhouse's Case, (1820) 106 Eng. Rep. 716 (K.B.) 717; 3 B. & Ald. 418, 420.
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made clear what was implied by the comprehensive language in
Spanish Sailors-that this was a jurisdictional bar on bringing suit at
all, like the rule barring from the courts nonresident alien enemies
who were civilians.133
Two additional cases are worth noting. In Sparenburgh v.
Bannatyne, decided by the Court of Common Pleas in 1797, the
plaintiff was a German national-a neutral-who served in the Dutch
fleet in its war against Britain; was captured and made a prisoner of
war by the British; and then, at the direction of a British officer,
served as a seaman on a British merchant ship and therefore came to
Britain, where he subsequently brought suit for unpaid wages. 134 The
defendant urged that the plaintiff should not be allowed to access the
courts of Britain during the war, being an alien enemy and prisoner of
war, but the court allowed the suit to proceed. The Chief Judge
seemed moved by the fact that the prisoner was from a neutral
country, had renounced his hostility to Britain by faithful service on a
British vessel, and had been made promises by a Crown officer. 135 The
policy reason for why alien enemies were barred from court was not
applicable; the Chief Judge stated, "I take the true ground upon which
the plea of alien enemy has been allowed is, that a man, professing
himself hostile to this country, and in a state of war with it, cannot be
heard if he sue for the benefit and protection of our laws in the courts
of this country."136 Because Spanerburgh was released through a
133. See, e.g., 1 MATTIEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 183 (7th ed., London, A
Strahan Law Printer 1832) ("An alien enemy, prisoner of war, is not entitled, under any
circumstances, to his discharge upon a habeas corpus."); 4 COMYNS, supra note 117, at 330
(same); GEORGE HANSARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO ALIENS AND DENIZATION AND
NATURALIZATION 101 (London, V. & R. Stevens & G.S. Norton 1844) ("[An alien enemy while
prisoner of war is not entitled under any circumstances to be discharged upon a habeas corpus;
and he cannot maintain any action at all .. ."); JOHN IMPEY, THE NEW INSTRUCTOR CLERICALIS:
STATING THE AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION, AND MODERN PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH
746 (9th ed., London, W. Clarke & Sons Law Booksellers 1818) (same); 1 THOMAS EDLYNE
TOMLINS, THE LAW-DICTIONARY, at Habeas Corpus II (3d ed., London, C. Baldwin Printer 1820)
("No habeas corpus lies for an enemy, prisoner of war . . . ."); see also From the Boston Gazette:
Review of a Most Important and Interesting Pamphlet Entitled "Treatise on Expatriation", VA.
PATRIOT (Richmond), Mar. 26, 1814, at 3 (contending that an English subject held in England as
a prisoner of war could under current law challenge that detention via habeas corpus but "[a]1
these privileges an alien enemy cannot have").
134. Sparenburgh v. Bannatyne, (1797) 126 Eng. Rep. 837 (C.P.) 837-39; 1 Bos. & Pul. 163.
135. Id. at 840-41 (statement of Eyre, C.J.).
136. Id. Two other judges concurred, stressing policy also. They emphasized that a prisoner
of war released on parole within Britain might, until he is exchanged and returned to his native
land, need to contract with Englishmen to buy food or other necessities, and it would be unfair to
allow him no judicial recourse in these necessary transactions. Id. at 841-42. The lenient result
in Sparenburgh was soon applied to an actual enemy alien. See Maria v. Hall, (1800) 126 Eng.
Rep. 1256 (C.P.); 2 Bos. & Pul. 236 (during war with France, allowing a French prisoner of war
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parole arrangement with the Crown and previously contracted with a
different Crown official regarding his transit, the case can also be
understood as turning on an implicit license from the Crown to receive
a measure of protection of the laws.13 7
Anthon v. Fisher, decided by the King's Bench in 1782,
emphasizes how narrow is the exception approved in Sparenburgh.
Anthon is factually and legally complex; it suffices here to say that it
limited the Sparenburgh exception to instances where the prisoner-of-
war litigant's civil (nonhabeas) claim does not arise out of his own
hostile actions or designs.138 As the court put it, an alien enemy
"cannot, by the municipal law of this country, sue for the recovery of a
right claimed to be acquired by him in actual war" against Britain. 139
The policy of Sparenburgh and Anthon seems clear: the courts must
not be used to aid enemies with regard to claims arising out of their
hostile actions. This provides policy confirmation for the bar on enemy
fighters using habeas corpus announced in Schiever and Spanish
Sailors.
in England to sue to recover wages owed him for voluntarily helping crew an English vessel on
its homeward voyage).
137. Hamburger, supra note 99, at 1893 n.231.
138. In the eighteenth century, privateering was a common tactic used by warring nations.
It was the practice of licensing private armed vessels to cruise the oceans and capture enemy
shipping. The captured vessels would be brought into a port in the home country and, in a so-
called "prize" proceeding, an admiralty court would determine whether the vessel and cargo were
in fact owned by an enemy. See WILUAM R CASTO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL 37-38, 43-45 (2006) (describing privateering and prize courts). If so,
they were sold and some of the proceeds went to the captor with the remainder going to the
government that had licensed the privateer. Some privateers and captured vessels worked out a
way to contract around the hassle of dragging the captured vessel and crew to a distant port and
litigating the prize case. The skipper of the captured vessel would sign a "ransom bill" pledging
that the owner(s) of the vessel and cargo would pay to the privateer a sum of money, in
exchange, the captured vessel was freed to pursue its voyage and sell its cargo, and was given a
pass by the privateer, which informed any other privateer who might try to capture the vessel
that it had already been captured and ransomed and so could not be seized again. Note that
ransoming could also occur when a vessel was seized by an enemy's public navy vessel instead of
a privateer. See W. Senior, Ransom Bills, 34 L.Q. REV. 49 (1918) (describing how ransom bills
worked in English law and practice).
In the early 1780s, during the war between Great Britain, on the one hand, and France,
Spain, and the American colonists on the other, a French privateer captured a British merchant
ship and released it in exchange for a ransom bill. The French privateer was then captured by an
English warship, and its crew brought to Britain as prisoners of war. Anthon v. Fisher, (1782) 99
Eng. Rep. 594 (K.B.); 3 Dougl. 166. In Britain, the captain of the French privateer vessel brought
suit to collect on his ransom bill. King's Bench was divided about whether the suit could be
brought, and entered judgment for the plaintiff only so that the cause could be appealed to the
Exchequer Chamber. Id. at 599-600. There, the judges of the Court of Common Pleas and the
Barons of Exchequer heard the case and held against the alien enemy. Id. at 600.
139. Id.
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In sum, the rules established by the old British cases and
commentary were the following: alien enemies resident abroad could
not sue in British courts during wartime. Peaceful civilian alien
enemies resident in Britain under the license of the Crown could sue
in British courts. Even if present on British soil, admitted enemy
fighters were barred from seeking a writ of habeas corpus. In addition,
enemy prisoners of war, even if detained in Britain and released on
parole, could not bring civil suits if the right they asserted grew out of
their hostile actions against Britain.
The conclusions I reach about old English law-the bar on
nonresident alien enemies and enemy fighters detained as prisoners of
war seeking habeas corpus-are not universally accepted. For
example, an amicus filed by legal historians supporting the detainees
in Boumediene claims that, under English law, "prisoners of war ...
could challenge the legality of their detention by way of habeas
corpus," relying solely on the reports of Schiever and Spanish
Sailors.140 But many other sources, discussed above and below,
contradict that conclusion, as does the language of Spanish Sailors
itself. A person who was undisputedly a prisoner of war could not be
released by a British habeas court, no matter what challenge to the
"legality of [his] detention" he raised. This conclusion is buttressed
somewhat by a recent book by historian Paul Halliday, for which he
examined several thousand unreported habeas corpus decisions of the
King's Bench dating from 1502 to 1798.141 Professor Halliday found a
handful of cases in which court records describe the habeas petitioner
as a prisoner of war. Reviewing these cases, he concludes that "a
person properly categorized" as a prisoner of war could not seek
release via habeas. 142
Halliday also concludes that "the writ could be used to
investigate whether a person was correctly labeled a POW."143 While
this is seemingly a narrow claim that is not inconsistent with this
Article's conclusions, Halliday actually seems to have a much broader
view of the scope of habeas in English history because he appears to
believe that nonresident alien enemies had a right to habeas review as
140. Brief of Legal Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6, Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196).
141. See HALUDAY, supra note 73.
142. Id. at 169. According to Halliday, the only relevant rule limiting judicial power was not
jurisdictional but substantive: the court could not release via habeas anyone who was in fact a
prisoner of war, because the government was authorized to detain them until exchanged or




well.144 In combination, these two claims-that nonresident enemy
aliens could access the courts via habeas during wartime and that
habeas could be invoked by enemy prisoners of war to test the factual
or legal bases of the English government's categorization of them as
prisoners of war and the legal basis for detention-would present a
very broad view of the permissible scope of habeas. This account is
facially consistent with the ambiguous public report of Schiever145 and
has the support of some other commentators.146
But there are reasons to doubt the conclusion that individuals
who were undisputedly nonresident enemy aliens and who were
detained by the government as prisoners of war were able to access
the courts via habeas corpus petitions. The comprehensive language in
Spanish Sailors certainly sounds like a categorical, jurisdictional bar:
"[U]pon their own shewing, are alien enemies and prisoners of war,
and therefore not entitled to any of the privileges of Englishmen;
much less to be set at liberty on a habeas corpus."147 The likelihood
that English law applied a jurisdictional bar on nonresident-enemy-
alien prisoners of war using habeas is strengthened by an interesting
case, Furly v. Newnham, in which the King's Bench refused to allow
the writ of habeas corpus to be used to bring an enemy prisoner of war
temporarily into court to testify as a witness for a third party.148 Furly
could be understood as an application of a jurisdictional bar on habeas
corpus being used with regard to enemy fighters who are nonresident
enemy aliens.'49
144. Id. at 171. Halliday does not always distinguish resident and nonresident enemy
aliens. In his book, he suggests that, during a war against France, "French captives, combatants
and noncombatants alike," successfully invoked the habeas jurisdiction of King's Bench. Id. A
"French . . . combatant[ ]" sounds like a nonresident enemy alien who, because he was a
"captive," would also be a prisoner of war. But at other times Halliday seems to view nonresident
enemy aliens who entered the country in a hostile fashion as categorically or jurisdictionally
barred from habeas corpus. See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause:
English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 708 (2008).
145. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 747 ('In Schiever and the Spanish Sailors'case, the courts
denied relief to the petitioners. Whether the holdings in these cases were jurisdictional or based
upon the courts' ruling that the petitioners were detained lawfully as prisoners of war is
unclear.").
146. See JUDITH FARBEY, R.J. SHARPE & SIMON ATRILI, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 119-20
(3d ed. 2011) (reaching the same conclusion as Halliday); Vladeck, supra note 77, at 949-50
(reviewing Halliday and agreeing with his conclusions).
147. See Three Spanish Sailors, (1776) 96 Eng. Rep. 775 (C.P.); 2 Black. W. 1324.
148. See Furly v. Newnham, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 269 (KB.) 269; 2 Dougl. 419, 419. The
specific form of writ here was habeas corpus ad testificandum. See generally WILLIAM S. CHURCH,
A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 180-81 (2d ed., San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney
Co. 1893).
149. See Hamburger, supra note 99, at 1891-92 (reading the case in this manner).
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Moreover, the legal understandings of Crown officials and
members of Parliament during a high-stakes debate about
subjecthood, prisoner-of-war status, and habeas corpus in the late
eighteenth century seems to be that nonresident-enemy-alien
prisoners of war could not access the courts via habeas. Soon after the
American colonists revolted and formed an army and navy to fight the
Crown, British forces began to capture and detain Americans. Britain
denied the legality of the united colonies' claim that they had become
an independent nation and that their captured soldiers and sailors
were prisoners of war, and instead insisted that the Americans were
simply rebellious British subjects-criminals, pirates, and traitors,
they were called. Within the British government, it was widely
assumed that American detainees brought to Great Britain were
within protection of the laws and courts and would be entitled to use
habeas corpus because they were British subjects. 50 As a result,
Parliament enacted statutes that had the effect of suspending their
right to be released via habeas.' 5' Lord Frederick North, Prime
Minister during the Revolutionary War, wrote that statutory
suspension of habeas corpus was needed in order to legally detain the
Americans outside of judicial review "like other prisoners of war," i.e.,
as if they were prisoners of war.152 Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice of
the King's Bench, and George Germain, Secretary of State for
America, also viewed the American detainees in Britain as potentially
entitled to habeas corpus precisely because they were British subjects
and therefore not properly considered enemy prisoners of war.153 The
situation changed dramatically in 1782 once American military
success forced Britain to concede that the United States had become
an independent nation. Even though a final peace treaty was not yet
signed, Parliament no longer considered the Americans to be British
subjects within the protection of the British laws and courts, and so no
more habeas suspension statutes were enacted.154 Instead,
Parliament's new legislation authorized the Crown "to hold and
detain.. . as Prisoners of War" the American soldiers and sailors, and
stated that they would be handled "according to the Custom and
150. See Amanda Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L
REV. 901, 924 (2012) (noting that it was "well settled" that persons under the protection of
English law would be dealt with as domestic criminals rather than enemies of the Crown).
151. Id. at 925.
152. Id. at 946 (citing 19 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 4 (London, T.C.
Hansard 1814) (known as COBBE'IT'S PARUAMENTARY HISTORY)).
153. Id. at 948-49.
154. Id. at 950-51.
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Usage of War, and the Law of Nations," that is, the law governing
relations between independent sovereign nations, not British domestic
law, which provided its special protections for subjects, including
habeas corpus. 55
An additional reason to believe that nonresident alien enemies
held as prisoners of war were not within protection and were
jurisdictionally barred from accessing the courts through habeas
corpus is that the unreported cases described by Professor Halliday do
not appear to provide strong support for a contrary view. Most seem to
concern subjects of the English Crown accused of the domestic crime of
treason; some petitioners were apparently referred to, imprecisely, as
prisoners of war, but were in fact not foreign enemies at all.156 Like
the American colonists captured fighting during the early stages of the
Revolutionary War, they would have been understood to owe
allegiance and be within protection of the laws and courts. Other cases
cited by Halliday did appear to involve foreigners-French-during a
time of war between England and France, but some of the petitioners
were apparently described in court papers as "merchants" accused of
"spying."15 7 It thus appears they were civilians, and quite possibly
resident in England as well, which would mean that they were within
the protection of the law and courts because their residence implied
temporary allegiance and protection.
Even if Halliday's data set does contain one or even a few
unreported cases that in fact involved habeas corpus being used by
someone who was actually a nonresident alien enemy and an enemy
fighter-it is hard to be sure from Halliday's brief descriptions, which
I assume are as fulsome as the underlying documents allow-one
must question how persuasive this evidence would be. For one thing,
the cases might be exceptions to a narrower rule rather than evidence
for a broader rule; courts can never be expected to consistently apply
even settled law in every single case over the course of centuries.
Moreover, for purposes of assessing the impact of British legal history
on the U.S. Constitution and laws, it is not clear that unreported
judicial decisions are our best source. Most Americans probably
learned their British law from treatises-for instance, by Blackstone,
Coke, Hale, and others-and from published reports of judicial
155. Id. at 951 (quoting An Act for the Better Detaining and More Easy Exchange, of
American Prisoners Brought into Great Britain, 1782, 22 Geo. 3, c. 10 (Gr. Brit.)).
156. See HALUDAY, supra note 73, at 169-71.
157. Id. at 171.
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proceedings and the popular digests that summarized them. 15 8 The
decisions in Schiever and the Spanish Sailors were widely cited in
treatises and digests, for example. Americans no doubt followed
British government debates about prisoner-of-war status and habeas
corpus during the Revolutionary War.
Finally, whatever may have been the case in either unreported
or.reported British decisions, in U.S. law, as discussed in the following
Sections, an undisputed nonresident enemy alien was understood to
be jurisdictionally barred from bringing suit during wartime. The law
about enemy fighters is somewhat less clear only because, until
Quirin, there were no reported American judicial decisions involving
them. But, as discussed in Part V, the best understanding of the
available evidence is that the bar was jurisdictional here as well.
C. American Reception and Application of the Common Law Rules
Until Quirin, American courts and commentators hewed very
closely to British precedents about the lack of court access for
individuals who were undisputedly nonresident enemy aliens or
enemy fighters. Although most cases and commentary did not involve
habeas corpus, there is strong evidence that the bar on court access
covered habeas as well. Whether judicial review of disputed
jurisdictional facts-concerning citizenship, domicile, or enemy-fighter
status-was available is a more difficult question, with the available
sources sometimes pointing in different directions. This Section traces
American law from the Founding, through the War of 1812, the Civil
War, the wars of imperialism, and World War I. The Civil War
occasioned an important change in how American law conceived of the
allegiance and protection of rebellious citizens.
1. Court Access for Civilian Alien Friends and Enemies
American law in the Founding era accepted that alien friends
present in the United States owed temporary or local allegiance and
hence were under protection of the law while in the United States.159
Of course the status of alien enemies was more complex. Blackstone's
158. See, e.g., HERBERT A. JOHNSON, IMPORTED EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LAW TREATISES IN
AMERICAN LIBRARIES, at xi-xiii (1978) (providing a bibliography of legal books and materials
present in American law libraries in the eighteenth century).
159. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2012 (1798) (statement of Rep. Livingston) ("It is an
acknowledged principle of the common law, the authority of which is established here, that alien
friends . . . residing among us, are entitled to the protection of our laws, and that during their
residence they owe a temporary allegiance to our Government.").
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Commentaries, one of the most influential law books in Founding era
America, conveyed a harsh view of the law about enemy aliens' access
to courts: "Alien enemies have no rights, no privileges, unless by the
king's special favor, during time of war."1 60 The stark rule stated by
Blackstone, that no alien enemy had standing in court during wartime
unless by special license of the sovereign, was accepted by prominent
members of the American Founding generation'6 ' and frequently
reiterated by American courts. 162 Although these were typically not
habeas cases, exceptionally comprehensive language was often used to
describe the bar on alien enemy court access,s63 making it unlikely
that habeas corpus was a gaping but unmentioned exception. A
number of influential antebellum treatise writers also stated in
unqualified terms that alien enemies could not access the courts
160. BLACESTONE, supra note 105, at 372.
161. See, e.g., Letter from Sec'y of State Thomas Jefferson to Minister George Hammond
(May 29, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 201 (Walter Iowrie &
Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1833) (noting that an "alien enemy"
"cannot maintain an action"); Remarks of James Madison to Virginia Ratifying Convention (June
20, 1788), in 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) ("[An alien enemy cannot bring
suit at all.").
162. See, e.g., The Adventure, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 221, 228 (1814) (indicating that British
subjects cannot make a claim in a U.S. prize court during the war between the United States and
Great Britain); Mumford v. Mumford, 17 F. Cas. 982 (C.C.D.R.I. 1812) (No. 9918) (reporter's
summary: "[A] bill in equity [showed] that the complainant was an alien enemy, to wit, a subject
of the king of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, resident within the realm
thereof ... and thereupon the Court ordered the bill to be dismissed'); Hamilton v. Eaton, 11 F.
Cas. 336, 339 (C.C.D.N.C. 1796) (No. 5980) (Ellsworth, Circuit Justice) (noting that an alien
enemy's judicial "remedy is suspended while the war lasts'); Hutchinson v. Brock, 11 Mass. (10
Tyng) 119, 122 (1814) ("The comity and intercourse, every where permitted and enjoyed, among
Christian and civilized nations in a state of peace, are at once withdrawn by a declaration of war.
The territories and the courts of justice of belligerent nations are closed against each other, to
the exclusion of their respective inhabitants and subjects. An alien enemy shall maintain neither
real nor personal action donec terrae fuerint communes, &c [sic]. An enemy to our sovereign shall
not have the use or advantage of his laws.").
163. See, e.g., Johnson v. Thirteen Bales, 13 F. Cas. 836, 837-38 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1814) (No.
7415) ("This claim to the protection of our courts does not apply to those aliens who adhere to the
king's enemies. They seem upon every principle to be incapacitated from suing either at law or in
equity. The disability to sue is personal. It takes away from the king's enemies the benefit of his
courts ..... (quoting Daubigny v. Davallon, (1793) 145 Eng. Rep. 936, 2 Anst. 462, 467)); Ex
parte Newman, 18 F. Cas. 96, 96 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 10,174) (Story, J.) ("[A]n alien enemy.
. . has no legal standing in court to acquire even inchoate rights."); Wall v. Robson, 11 S.C.L. (2
Nott & McC.) 498, 502 (S.C. Const. Ct. App. 1820) ("[I]n time of war no action can be maintained
by an alien enemy. . . ."); Levine v. Taylor, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 8, 9 (1815) ("That the plaintiff is
an alien enemy may be pleaded in disability of his person. As long as the war continues, he
cannot maintain any action in our courts."); Wilcox v. Henry, 1 Dall. 69, 71 (Pa. 1782) ("An alien
enemy has no right of action whatever during the war.").
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during war. 164 The policy underlying the rule was that U.S. courts
would not be used during wartime to aid a "hostile" plaintiff,165 much
the same as the English courts said. It made sense to apply this rule
to civilians, in addition to enemy fighters, because of the widespread
view that war made every person in one country the enemy of every
person in the other.166
But an ameliorative trend regarding civilian alien enemies was
soon apparent in both the decisional law and the treatises and digests,
especially during and after the War of 1812 with Great Britain.
English law had long recognized that protection of the law and courts
was available to civilian enemy aliens who were in England under the
license of the Crown. 167 This enlightened policy encouraged both trade
and immigration, great sources of strength to the state. American
courts came to presume that civilian enemy aliens were here under
license-and came to presume that they were within protection of the
law and courts-when they arrived in the United States prior to
wartime, or when they arrived during war but were permitted to
remain by the U.S. government, as long as they did not show any
actual hostile designs against the United States. 68
164. See PETER STEPHEN Du PONCEAU, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WAR: TRANSLATED FROM
THE ORIGINAL LATIN OF CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK BEING THE FIRST BOOK OF HIs
QUAESTIONES JURIS PUBLICI WITH NOTES 56 (Philadelphia, Farrand & Nicholas 1810) (noting the
doctrine that an enemy lacks persona standi in judicio); 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 68 (New York, 0. Halsted 2d ed. 1832) (same); THOMAS SERGEANT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 116 (Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 2d ed. 1830) ("[A]n alien
enemy cannot sustain a suit in the courts of the United States, if it be taken advantage of by a
proper plea in abatement."); HENRY WHEATON, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF MARITIME CAPTURES
AND PRIZES 211 (New York, R. M'Dermut & D.D. Arden 1815) (stating that in the law of "almost
every country" an alien enemy is "totally ex lex" and lacks "persona standi in judicio" even in
courts applying the law of nations, unless granted a specific exception by the government).
165. See, e.g., Crawford, 6 F. Cas. at 779 (quoted in supra note 115); Johnson, 13 F. Cas. at
837-38 (quoted in supra note 163); Hutchinson, 11 Mass. at 122 (quoted in supra note 162).
166. See, e.g., The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 160-61 (1814).
167. See supra Section III.B.
168. See Hutchinson, 11 Mass. at 122 ("[Tlhe citizen or subject of a foreign country or
sovereign, against whom we declare war, who is residing with us when war commences, and who
is permitted afterwards to reside, and be at large, under the protection of our laws, is enabled by
his residence, and by virtue of this protection, to maintain civil actions, notwithstanding the
war."); Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 70-71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (Kent, C.J.) (understanding
English law to hold, and adopting as the rule for America, that a license to remain, and hence to
access the courts, is presumed for a civilian alien enemy who either came "in time of peace, and
remained there quietly" or "came over in time of war, and continued without disturbance'); see
also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS §§ 51-52, at 52 (Boston, Little, Brown
& Co. 6th rev. & corrected ed. 1857):
An alien friend has a right to sue in any court; an alien enemy is incapable of suing
while he remains an enemy, at least unless under very special circumstances. . . .
Alien friends come into the country, either (as was formerly the case) with a letter of
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U.S. congressional policy was generally consistent with the
trends in judicial decisions and legal commentary. During the Quasi
War with France in the late 1790s-which predated the ameliorative
trend in judicial decisions just described-overblown fears of domestic
subversion by French immigrants, heightened by extreme domestic
partisan tensions in the emerging two-party system, caused a
Federalist-dominated Congress to enact two important statutes
concerning alien rights and disabilities, the Alien Enemy Act and the
so-called Alien Friends Act.169 The softening of rules regarding
peaceful civilian alien enemies resident in the United States,
described above, had not yet fully developed at this time. In pre- and
post-enactment legislative and public debates about the two 1798
Acts, some Federalists took the hard-line position that no aliens-
enemy or friendly-were entitled to protection under the Constitution
or other domestic laws but were only protected by the law of nations,
by diplomacy, and in the discretion of Congress and the executive.170
The majority view, held by Jeffersonian Republicans and more
moderate Federalists, drew a sharp distinction between friendly and
enemy aliens. As recognized in judicial decisions and commentary,
friendly aliens resident in the United States were under the protection
of the Constitution and all other domestic laws, they argued. 171 But
even those who held moderate views about the rights of friendly aliens
tended to agree with the Federalists that all enemy aliens were
outside the protection of the Constitution and domestic law, unless
permitted (licensed) by the government.172
The particulars of the statutes revealed the different
understandings regarding alien enemies and alien friends. The Alien
Friends Act was primarily an immigration statute, allowing the
safe conduct, or under a tacit permission, which presumes that authority. So, if they
continue to reside here after a war breaks out between the two countries, they remain
under the benefit of that protection, and are impliedly temporary subjects of the
country where they reside. . . . This claim to the protection of the courts of the country
does not apply to those aliens who adhere to the public enemies of the country. They
seem, upon every principle, to be incapacitated from suing either at Law or Equity.
A number of the decisions stating that alien enemies could not access the courts concerned
nonresident plaintiffs, and so were in conformity with the emerging rule. See, e.g., Johnson, 13 F.
Cas. at 837-38; Wall, 11 S.C.L. at 502.
169. See An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); An Act Concerning
Aliens (Alien Friends Act), ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800). The classic treatment of the
tumultuous 1790s in the United States is STANLEY ELKINS & ERIc MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF
FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800 (1993).
170. See Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 95, at 529 (describing these debates).
171. See id. at 529-30.
172. See id. at 529-31.
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President, in his discretion, to deport "all such aliens as he shall judge
dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States."v7 But,
recognizing that alien friends were within the protection of the law
and courts, the Alien Friends Act only allowed imprisonment after an
alien refused to depart and was duly convicted of such in court.174 The
Alien Enemy Act was much tougher, consistent with the
understanding that alien enemies were outside protection of the law
and courts unless permitted to remain by express or implied license of
the government. The Act allowed the President, "whenever there shall
be a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or
government, or any invasion or predatory incursion shall be
perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the
United States, by any foreign nation or government," to issue orders or
regulations to detain, deport, or restrain within certain areas "all
natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or
government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards,
who shall be within the United States, and not actually
naturalized."'7 5 If the President did not order the detention or removal
of particular alien enemies, the Act contemplated that they would
remain in the United States as before. Because it was an emergency
security measure for wartime, the Act allowed the President to act
quickly and detain under the Act without judicial process;176 but the
Act also contemplated that the President could choose to act through
the courts instead.177
That Congress's policy favored magnanimous treatment of
peaceful civilian enemy aliens already resident in the United States is
seen in the Act's provision allowing such aliens to remain until and
unless ordered to depart, and in a separate provision giving alien
enemies time to arrange their affairs and property prior to departing
or being detained under the Act, if the United States had a bilateral
treaty to that effect with the aliens' home nation or if the President so
directed unilaterally.178 In 1798, the United States had such treaties
in effect with the most important European powers and many lesser
173. Alien Friends Act § 1, 1 Stat. at 570-71.
174. Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 571; see also Hamburger, supra note 99, at 1894 n.238 (making this
point).
175. Alien Enemy Act § 1, 1 Stat. at 577.
176. Id.
177. Id. §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. at 577-78.
178. Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 577.
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states as well,179 showing strong executive and congressional
preference for lenient treatment of resident civilian enemy aliens.
Given this policy expressed in treaties and the noted features
of the Alien Enemy Act-a default rule that the status quo remained
until the President ordered otherwise; the provision allowing
presidential order or a treaty to delay execution of the Act; and
contemplation of certain types of judicial review-it is not surprising
that a decade later, when the Act was first invoked during the War of
1812, courts understood the U.S. government's policy to be that
peaceful resident civilian enemy aliens were entitled to access the
courts. 180 Contrary to the suggestions of some scholars, 181 such cases
do not show that hostile nonresident enemy aliens like prisoners of
war would have had the right to access the courts over the objections
of the U.S. government.
2. Prisoners of War
During the Revolutionary War, the Quasi War with France of
the late 1790s, and the War of 1812 against Great Britain, the United
States detained on its soil a great many prisoners of war-that is,
enemy fighters captured during war. Yet the extant historical record
to date has not revealed a single instance where one of these prisoners
of war sought judicial review of his military detention or otherwise
attempted to invoke the aid of the American courts to be freed from
military custody. Treatise writers during this period reflected the
179. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S. -G.B., art. 26, Nov. 19, 1794, 8
Stat. 116, 128; Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S. -Morocco, art. 24, Jan. 1787, 8 Stat. 100, 104;
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Prussia, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, 8 Stat. 86, 94-96; Treaty of
Amity and Commerce, U.S. -Sweden, art. 22, Apr. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 60, 74; Treaty of Amity and
Commerce, U.S.-Neth., art. 28, Oct. 8, 1782, 8 Stat. 32, 42; Treaty of Alliance, U.S.-Fr., art. 22,
Feb. 6, 1778, 8. Stat. 12, 24. With regard to France, note that the Alien Enemy Act became law
on July 6, 1798, and the next day Congress declared that the treaty with France was annulled
because of the Quasi War. Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578.
180. See, e.g., Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 73-74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812) (reading the Alien
Enemy Act to support this policy). During congressional debates, several prominent Federalist
supporters of the Alien Enemy bill had opined that habeas review would be available for persons
detained pursuant to it. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2026 (1798) (statement of Rep. Harper); id at
1960 (statement of Rep. Otis).
181. See Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law and Federal Jurisdiction as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 8-11, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-
1196), 2007 WL 2441580 (discussing, in a case concerning detention of alleged unlawful enemy
fighters, Alien Enemy Act cases concerning civilians and other authorities and stating that
"enemy aliens have always had access to the writ, whatever the reason for their detention");
Gerald L. Neuman & Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall and the Enemy Alien: A Case Missing
from the Canon, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 39, 44-45 (2005) (suggesting that an Alien Enemy Act habeas
case concerning a civilian might mean that detained enemy fighters could also use habeas).
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consensus that enemy fighters could not access the courts. And there
were some instances of judicial comment on the rights of prisoners of
war. A few state court cases during the Revolutionary War period
suggested that prisoners of war were outside allegiance or
protection.182 But it was not until the war ended and the Constitution
was adopted that there appeared the first clear statement in a
published American judicial opinion of the rights of prisoners of war.
This came in a dictum in a 1793 prize case:
The courts of England ... will not even grant a habeas corpus in the case of a prisoner of
war, because the decision on this question is in another place, being part of the rights of
sovereignty. Although our judiciary is somewhat differently arranged, I see not, in this
respect, that they should not be equally cautious. 18 3
The judge seems to have understood the bar as jurisdictional-no
hearing was available to the prisoner of war, that is, the writ would
not be granted to bring the prisoner into court where the hearing on
the merits would occur.
During the War of 1812, a British subject and merchant named
Charles Lockington, who came to the United States prior to the war
and resided in Pennsylvania, sought habeas corpus review for his
detention under the Alien Enemies Act. 184 In opposing Lockington's
petition, the U.S. government argued that Lockington was in the
situation of a "prisoner of war."185 The Chief Justice of Pennsylvania
granted that, if that were true, Lockington would not be entitled to the
privilege of using the writ of habeas corpus because prisoners of war
were outside the protection of the law and courts. 186 His
comprehensive language suggests a jurisdictional bar on bringing suit:
182. The cases did not involve prisoners of war challenging military detention or military
trial. See Government v. McGregory, 14 Mass. 499, 499 (1780) (argument of counsel for the
prisoners) ("[P]risoners of war are entitled to no protection, and therefore owe no allegiance . . .
."); Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53, 57 (Pa. 1781) (prisoners of war outside of
allegiance, as indicated by a Pennsylvania statute). McGregory involved men prosecuted in a
civilian court for murder. McGregory, 14 Mass. at 499. Chapman arose on a judicial order to
show cause why Chapman should not be attainted for treason and have his property confiscated.
Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 55-56.
183. Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 947 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895).
184. Lockington's Case (Pa. 1813), in REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE JUDGES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 269, 270 (Frederick C. Brightly ed., Philadelphia, James Kay
Jr. & Bro. Pub. 1851), also available in 5 AM. L.J. 92, 97 (1814); see also Lockington v. Smith, 15
F. Cas. 758, 759 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 8448) (stating Lockington's pedigree in a later tort suit
against a U.S. marshal).
185. REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA,




[T]here is another objection to this habeas corpus. . . that Mr. Lockington is in the
situation of a prisoner of war. If he be so, he is not entitled to a privilege which never
could have been intended for persons of that description. A prisoner of war is subject to
the laws of war; he is brought among us by force; and his interests were never, in any
manner, blended with those of the people of this country. He has no municipal rights to
expect from us. We gave him no invitation, and promised him no protection. 187
The Chief Justice agreed, though, with the recent holding of a
New York state case, that British civilians with prewar residences in
the United States were not akin to prisoners of war and could, despite
being alien enemies, invoke the protection of the courts during the
war.188 The case was appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
and in early 1814, Chief Judge Tilghman and two other judges
rendered opinions.189 Tilghman reiterated his prior views. 190 Judge
Yeates indicated that he agreed that Lockington was not a prisoner of
war under legal disabilities.191 The third judge, Brackenridge, thought
that Lockington was akin to a prisoner of war, that he had only rights
under the law of nations and not the municipal law, and that the
courts had no authority to second guess the decisions of the executive
about the rights of a subject of a "nation with whom we are at war."t92
As with a prisoner of war, a civilian alien enemy, concluded Judge
Brackenridge, "is out of the law"-outside the protection of the law-
"so far as to preclude interposition [of the courts] between him and the
general government. 193 Judge Brackenridge clearly understood the
habeas bar for prisoners of war as jurisdictional. 194
Relying on either Lockington or the published British decisions
discussed in Section III.B above, American treatises in the antebellum
period were unanimous that prisoners of war had no right to seek
release with a writ of habeas corpus, and many used broad language
suggesting that this was a jurisdictional bar. 195 Lockington was
187. Id.
188. Id. at 277.
189. Id. at 283, also available in 5 AM. LJ. 301 (1814).
190. Id. at 283-84 (opinion of Tilghman, C.J.).
191. Id. at 289 (opinion of Yeates, J.).
192. Id. at 296, 299-301 (opinion of Brackenridge, J.).
193. Id. at 298.
194. Echoing the Sparenburgh exception, the judge noted that a prisoner of war still might
sue to defend against private "trespasses." Id.
195. See, e.g., 2 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND: WITH
ADDITIONAL NOTES AND REFERENCES 109 (New York, W.E. Dean Printer, 1828) (editor's note)
("The writ of habeas corpus . . . cannot be obtained by an alien enemy, or a prisoner of war."); 7
NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 305 (Boston, Cummings,
Hilliard & Co., 1824) ("[N]o writ of habeas corpus ought to issue to bring up a prisoner of war
taken on board an enemy's privateer ship.. . . Nor for an alien enemy, prisoner of war, however
ill used or deceived."); SERGEANT, supra note 164, at 116, 285 (stating that "an alien enemy
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described as resting its comments about prisoners of war on a
jurisdictional disability. 196 In fact, as noted above, many of the leading
treatises (Kent, Wheaton, Sergeant) stated without qualification that
no alien enemy-of any kind, including apparently a civilian lawfully
resident in the United States---could sue during wartime, suggesting a
broad jurisdictional disability. 197
D. The Civil War
The Civil War raised important debates about the legal rights
of enemy fighters and civilian residents in enemy territory because
nearly all residents of the Confederacy and members of its armed
forces had been, prior to the war, American citizens with full
constitutional rights.s98 At the outset of the war, there was great
dispute about whether the war powers of the U.S. government could
be used against the rebels, displacing peacetime constitutional
limitations, or whether the nation could only protect itself from
treason using the constitutional processes of domestic law
enforcement. As detailed in prior work of mine, Congress, the
executive, and the Supreme Court eventually agreed on a dual theory
of the war. One part of the duality was this: rebellion on such a scale
made the conflict akin to a nation-to-nation war, and caused all
residents of the Confederate States of America ("CSA)-even the
civilians-to forfeit their right to protection of the laws and courts and
be liable to be opposed with the full war powers of the government,
limited only by the international laws of war.199 As was often said at
cannot sustain a suit in the courts of the United States" and reporting, based on the case of
Lockington, that "[p]risoners of war ... are not entitled to the privilege of a writ of habeas
corpus").
196. See, e.g., 1 FRANCIS WHAR'ION, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 140 (3d ed., Philadelphia 1855) (describing Lockington's ruling that habeas is not
available for prisoners of war because they are "not entitled to the same privileges" as other
potential litigants but are rather "subject to the laws of war").
197. A few cases arose during the War of 1812 concerning American citizens who were
arrested by the U.S military, having allegedly spied for the British. They were neither enemy
prisoners of war nor alien enemies, and, therefore, it is not surprising that the New York state
courts held that that these individuals were within the protection of the laws and could seek the
aid of the courts on habeas corpus. See Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815); In re
Stacy, 10 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813). For a discussion of these cases, see Ingrid Brunk
Wuerth, The President's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants": Modern Lessons from Mr.
Madison's Forgotten War, 98 Nw. U. L REV. 1567 (2004).
198. Most of the remainder were resident aliens who, because of their temporary allegiance,
would have been understood to be under the protection of the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
199. See Kent, Civil War, supra note 95, at 1872-83, 1899-1902, 1905-07, 1913-17.
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the time, by creating a de facto separate nation through their massive
armed rebellion, residents of the CSA had made themselves akin to
alien enemies out of protection.200 Hence, all residents of the CSA were
held barred from the civilian courts of the Union for the duration of
the war by the U.S. Supreme Court on at least ten occasionS201 and by
every state high court that considered the issue.202 Though these were
not habeas cases, the courts' language was comprehensive, rendering
200. See id. at 1876-83, 1899-1902, 1905-07.
201. See Lamar v. Micou, 112 U.S. 452, 464 (1884) ("A state of war ... suspends until the
return of peace the right of any one residing in the enemy's country to sue in our courts.'
(citations omitted); Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1879) (stating that during the Civil
War "the courts of each belligerent were closed to the citizens of the other" (quoting Fairfax's
Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 621 (1803))); Conrad v. Waples, 96 U.S. 279,
289-90 (1877) ("During the war, the property of alien enemies is subject to confiscation jure belli,
and their civil capacity to sue is suspended."); Masterson v. Howard, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 99, 105
(1873) ("The existence of war does, indeed, close the courts of each belligerent to the citizens of
the other. . . ."); Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 184 (1873) ("The principle of public law
which closes the courts of a country to a public enemy during war, renders compliance by him
with [a statute of limitation) impossible.'); Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216, 236
(1872) (noting the rule that enemies are "totally incapable of sustaining any action in the
tribunals of the other belligerent" and that there is an "[a]bsolute suspension of the right to sue
and prohibition to exercise it during war, by the law of nations") (citation omitted); Semmes v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 158, 162 (1871) ("We have no doubt that the disability to sue
imposed on the plaintiff [resident of Mississippi] by the war relieves him from the consequences
of failing to bring suit [against the defendant Connecticut corporation] within twelve months
after the loss, because it rendered compliance with that condition impossible."); Levy v. Stewart,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 244, 250 (1871) (noting the "[a]bsolute suspension of the right to sue . . . during
war, by the law of nations' of residents of the enemy's country); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 532, 536 (1868) (describing "the inability of an alien enemy to sue or sustain, in the
language of the civilians, a persona standi injudicio"); Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.)
404, 421 (1864) ("Mrs. Alexander, being now a resident in enemy territory, and in law an enemy,
can have no standing in any court of the United States so long as that relation shall exist.").
Lower federal courts repeatedly stated the same thing. See, e.g., Elgee's Adm'r v. Lovell, 8 F. Cas.
449, 454 (C.C.D. Mo. 1865) (No. 4344) (Miller, J.) (applying the "principle of the law of nations,
recognized and enforced in all civilized countries, that, in time of war, an enemy cannot sue in
the courts of the country with which he is belligerent").
202. See, e.g., Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385, 402 (1863) (holding, in suit by
resident of Arkansas, that "those principles of the common law, which suspend an alien enemy's
right of action during war, apply to this case, and forbid our courts from aiding the appellee to
recover money which might be used by her to support the war against the United States"); Stiles
v. Easley, 51 Ill. 275, 276 (1869) ("While hostilities continued, Easley, as the citizen of a hostile
State [Virginia], was disabled from suing in our courts . . . ."); Dorsey v. Kyle, 30 Md. 512, 519
(1869) ("As a general rule, an alien enemy is not allowed to maintain suit in the Courts of the
country with which he is, at the time, in hostility. This, however, is a personal disability, of a
temporary duration, and is founded upon reason and policy, and, to some extent, upon the
necessity of the case."); Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561, 563 (1868) ("The rule is certainly well
settled that during any war, foreign or civil, an action cannot be prosecuted by an enemy,
residing in the enemy's territory.. . ."); Bonneau v Dinsmore, 23 How. Pr. 397, 398 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1862) (applying to a resident of South Carolina, which "is in a state of actual hostility to and in
open war with the United States," the rule that an "alien enemy" must be "exclude[ed] ... from
our courts," but holding him not to be an enemy alien).
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it unlikely that an extraordinarily important category of cases-
habeas corpus-was an unmentioned but glaring exception to the
closure of the courts. Also supporting the view that all residents of the
CSA lacked any right to access the civilian courts via habeas corpus is
the Supreme Court's holding that Union military tribunals could
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over residents of the CSA free of any
limitations except the international laws of war.203
Since civilian residents of the CSA were outside the protection
of the laws and courts, it follows a fortiori that so too were
Confederate combatants in arms against the U.S. government. This
was true regardless of the fact that most were U.S. citizens. Rebellion
on such a large scale allowed the U.S. government to choose to treat
them as akin to alien enemy fighters. It was routinely stated during 204
203. See Kent, Civil War, supra note 95, at 1925-27.
204. See, e.g, Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att'y Gen.
74, 90 (1861) (opinion of Attorney General Bates) ("[S]hall it be said that when [the President]
has fought and captured the insurgent army, and has seized their secret spies and emissaries, he
is bound to bring their bodies before any judge who may send him a writ of habeas corpus, 'to do,
submit to, and receive whatever the said judge shall consider in that behalf?' I deny that he is
under any obligation to obey such a writ, issued under such circumstances.'); CONG. GLOBE, 37th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1861) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) ('[T]he judicial tribunals have no
right or power to interfere with the Army in the exercise of its powers in suppressing an
insurrection, either by issuing writs of habeas corpus or otherwise [in areas where the President
has exercised power delegated by Congress to call out troops to suppress insurrection.] [P]ersons
captured by the military authorities in insurrectionary districts may still be retained as
prisoners by the military power, without interference from the courts till their cases are finally
disposed of, notwithstanding they may, for purposes of safety, or other reasons of State, be
brought within districts where the judicial power is in full operation.'); CONG. GLOBE, 37th
Cong., 1st Sess. 339-40 (1861) (statement of Sen. McDougall) ("It is, therefore, an established
rule of law that the writ of habeas corpus does not run against a prisoner of war. . . ."); GEORGE
M. WHARTON, REMARKS ON MR. BINNEY'S TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 16 (Phila.,
John Campbell Bookseller 2d ed. 1862) ("If the Courts undertake to interfere with the military
power in its proper exercise, and to handle prisoners of war, their intervention is irregular; and it
is a sufficient return to a Writ of Habeas Corpus, issued in such a case to say, that the party is
held as a prisoner."); A.H. Reeder, The Habeas Corpus Question, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., June 15, 1861,
at 7 (contending that the government erred in Ex parte Merryman, discussed in infra note 206,
by failing to file a return to the habeas petition stating that the prisoner was held as a "prisoner
of war," because that would have convinced Chief Justice Taney and all other jurists that the
civil courts had no jurisdiction over the petition).
Even some Copperheads in the North (sympathizers with the CSA) agreed that enemy
prisoners of war could not benefit from habeas corpus. See Habeas Corpus-Personal Liberty,
AM. MONTHLY KNICKERBOCKER, Sept. 1864, at 206, 210 ("A prisoner taken in war, and kept by
the public authorities in confinement, is not entitled to be discharged from imprisonment, if the
fact appear that he is held as a prisoner of war. If the fact appear by the petition, the writ will
not be granted; if it appear by the return at the hearing, the prisoner will be recommitted. The
writ is the privilege of the citizen, and not of a public enemy."). For what it is worth, it appears
that Confederate executive authorities also maintained that civil courts in the Confederacy had
no power to question the detention of anyone averred by the military to be a prisoner of war. See
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and after the war 205 that enemy prisoners of war were barred from
using habeas corpus. Some of these sources go so far as to suggest that
the United States' view of the jurisdictional fact that a detainee is a
prisoner of war cannot be questioned by the courts. About one
hundred and fifty thousand Confederate soldiers were detained as
prisoners of war during the conflict; I have found no record of a single
one attempting to access the civilian courts during the war to protect
alleged rights by habeas corpus or otherwise.206
OLIVER P. TEMPLE, EAST TENNESSEE AND THE CIVIL WAR 393 (1899) (quoting statement by
Secretary of War Judah Benjamin).
205. See, e.g., Military Comm'ns, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 314 (1865) (opinion of Attorney
General Speed) ("[In time of war, if a man should sue out a writ of habeas corpus, and it is made
appear that he is in the hands of the military as a prisoner of war, the writ should be dismissed
and the prisoner remanded to be disposed of as the laws and usages of war require."); 1
MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW TO WHICH ARE ADDED NOTES AND
REFERENCES TO AMERICAN LAW AND DECISIONS BY JOHN BOUVIER 213 (Phila., T. & J.W. Johnson
& Co. 1876) ("An alien enemy, prisoner of war, is not entitled, under any circumstances, to his
discharge upon a habeas corpus.'); 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL
LAW § 63, at 33-34 (4th rev. ed. 1868) ("If a party is held by military arrest under the law-
martial, - that is, as a prisoner of war, - the judicial tribunals, even, it seems to the writer, by
the common law as brought to this country from England, would have no jurisdiction to proceed
in the case by habeas corpus; much less has the 'judicial power' any such authority under our
Constitution, wherein the different functions of the government are intrusted to separate
departments . . . ."); THEODORE W. DWIGHT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND
PERSONAL PROPERTY 96 (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1894) ("The writ will not run in favor of an
alien enemy, - a prisoner of war.").
206. A few cases came close to the line, and so are worth noting. Early in the war, two
federal judges sitting in Union states entertained habeas petitions from disloyal members of
local militias who had been detained by U.S. forces. See In re McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 17, 23 (E.D.
Mo. 1861) (No. 8751); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 144-47 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487)
(Taney, C.J.); see also BURRUS M. CARNAHAN, ACT OF JUSTICE 51-53 (2007) (discussing the arrest
and habeas petition of John Merryman, lieutenant in the Baltimore County Horse Guards); THE
WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND
CONFEDERATE ARMIES, SERIES 11, VOL 1, at 113-16 (Washington, Govt. Printing Office 1894)
(discussing the arrest and habeas petition of Emmett MacDonald, captain in the Missouri
militia). Since these men were residents of loyal states and not formally affiliated with the
Confederacy, their cases do not undermine the statement in the main text that no enemy
prisoners of war sought habeas corpus during the war. The Merryman case gave rise to the
famous controversy of President Lincoln directing his military to refuse to obey the federal court
order to produce the detainee in court for a habeas corpus hearing. See CARNAHAN, supra, at 51-
53.
Also early in the war, a federal judge in New York City entertained a habeas petition on
behalf of a man sometimes described in newspaper accounts as a prisoner of war. See Ex parte
McQuillon, 16 F. Cas. 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1861) (ordering the writ to issue to the U.S. Army
custodian to bring the detainee into court but declining to take further action when the military
refused to obey); The News, N.Y. HERALD, July 26, 1861, at 4 (reporting on the habeas case of
McQuillan [sic], "a British subject, seized as a prisoner of war"). Although the detainee may have
been enrolled briefly in the Confederate forces, he was in fact seized within Union lines while in
civilian life and held as a "state" or political prisoner, not a prisoner of war. See THE WAR OF THE
REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE
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The other side of the duality arose from the fact that the U.S.
government denied the legality of secession, denied that the CSA was
a de jure independent nation or had any legal existence, and sought to
return all of the rebels in the CSA to their allegiance as citizens. The
federal government could choose in its discretion to treat rebels as
mere criminals by holding them to the standards of domestic civil and
criminal laws. When and to the extent the government chose this
latter route-asserting that allegiance was unimpaired because
secession was illegal and a nullity, and using ordinary domestic legal
processes rather than war powers against enemies to fight rebellion-
the affected rebels retained the protection of the Constitution and
laws. 207 For example, in criminal prosecutions of rebels for treason, all
the usual safeguards of the Constitution and laws were available to
the defendant. 208 The dual theory meant that the U.S. government
had discretion to choose the means of fighting the rebellion, either war
or law enforcement. 209 And the applicable legal regime flowed from
this choice. When and where the United States chose to wage war
ARMIES, SERIES II, VOL II, at 228, 415-24 (Washington, Govt. Printing Office 1897) (describing
arrest and detention of Purcell M. Quillen [sic]). It does not appear that the U.S. government
ever argued that he should be jurisdictionally barred from using habeas corpus; instead, on
orders of Winfield Scott, the commander of the Union army who had suspended habeas corpus
along the eastern seaboard at the direction of President Lincoln, the government followed the
precedent of the Merryman incident and simply refused to obey the court order. &e id. at 423. In
any event, the detainee was soon ordered released by Secretary of State Seward at the request of
the British ambassador because he was a British subject and had apparently served the
Confederacy briefly and only under duress. See id. at 415-24.
In 1863, a city judge in New York ordered the release via habeas of a civilian resident of
Alabama who had been arrested in New York and charged by military authorities with spying
for the Confederacy. See The Kirtland Habeas Corpus Case, N.Y. HERALD, June 9, 1863, at 5. The
detainee contended that he left the Confederacy because he was a loyal citizen of the Union and
wanted to avoid conscription into the rebel army. Id. At the habeas hearing, the government
could produce no evidence to sustain its charges. See id. It is notable that the alien enemy
disability rule was not applied to bar Mr. Kirtland's use of the courts. Probably that was because
the court credited Kirtland's claim that he was a refugee who wanted to be in the Union because
of his loyalty. See generally Zacharie v. Godfrey, 50 Ill. 186, 193-94 (1869) (holding that a
resident of Louisiana who left the state at the outset of the war because of his loyalty to the
Union was not covered by the enemy alien disability rule). In any event, the fact that Mr.
Kirtland was not a combatant, and the general confusion and untidiness about citizenship status
during a civil war, makes his case an inapposite precedent for the admitted Germany military
saboteurs in Quirin. After the war ended, a New York court order freed via habeas corpus an
alleged spy caught in New York City in civilian dress who had apparently been "an officer in the
confederate army" and was held by the U.S. military. In re Martin, 31 How. Pr. 228 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1865). In its December 1865 opinion, the court reasoned that military detention authority
had ended with the close of the war and the President's repeal of the proclamation suspending
the writ of habeas corpus.
207. See Kent, Civil War, supra note 95, at 1872, 1884-85.
208. Id. at 1884-85.
209. Id. at 1872.
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against the CSA as a de facto enemy nation, rebels-de facto enemy
aliens-had no protection from domestic law or courts but only from
international laws of war.210 When law enforcement means were
chosen, the targeted residents of the CSA qua U.S. citizens had full
protection of domestic law and courts. 211
The dual theory-and its implications for access to the courts
during wartime for certain U.S. citizens-was a legal innovation of the
Civil War. Under English law and American law during the Founding
and antebellum periods, if citizens (in the United States) or subjects
(in Britain), or resident foreigners under the license of the sovereign,
revolted against the government, their obligation of allegiance was
deemed unimpaired and they remained within protection of the law
and courts, meaning that they could not be treated as military
enemies under the international laws of war and habeas corpus
remained available to them. 21 2 When captured in arms against the
government, they were entitled to be treated as civilians, not prisoners
of war.213 This understanding was exploded by the imperatives of the
Civil War-its massive territorial scale, akin to a nation-to-nation
conflict-and the dual theory took its place.
Nonetheless, it has recently been argued that the older
understanding continued unimpaired throughout the Civil War,214 and
specifically that all residents of the CSA, including Confederate
prisoners of war, remained within protection of the laws and had
access to Union courts, including via habeas corpus. 215 There is little
evidence to support this view. The primary evidence adduced is that
(1) Congress's 1863 statute allowing suspension of habeas corpus but
requiring subsequent judicial review for some classes of detainees
excluded "prisoners of war" from getting this judicial review, and (2)
President Lincoln's proclamation of habeas suspension pursuant to
the 1863 statute included "prisoners of war" within the suspension. 216
210. Id. at 1884-85.
211. Id. at 1872.
212. See id. at 1860-61.
213. Id.
214. See Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy
Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA L. REV. 863, 867, 919-20 (2006).
215. See Tyler, supra note 150, at 989-92.
216. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, §§ 1-2, 12 Stat. 755, 755 (providing that the President
may suspend the writ of habeas corpus anywhere in the United States; that when it is
suspended, a statement that the person is held by the U.S. military is a sufficient answer to a
writ; and providing judicial processes for the eventual release or criminal trial of detainees held
by the executive "otherwise than as prisoners of war" in loyal states); Proclamation No. 7,
reprinted in 13 Stat. 734, 734 (1863) ("[I]n the judgment of the President, the public safety does
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It is contended that both Lincoln and the Congress must have believed
that Confederate prisoners of war would have been entitled to habeas
corpus review of their detentions absent a valid suspension of habeas,
because otherwise neither the statute nor the proclamation would
have had any reason to mention prisoners of war.21 7
But that does not necessarily follow. As a general matter, the
government always has an interest in reducing burdensome or
vexatious litigation against its officers, especially during wartime,
even if the potential legal claims are meritless. 218 More specifically, in
1863 both Congress and the President operated in a fluid legal
environment dominated by risk and uncertainty, and would have
wanted to make clear in positive law that enemy prisoners of war
could not access the courts even though they did not believe that
prisoners of war should have had that entitlement under the
preexisting common law. In 1863, the Chief Justice of the United
States was still Roger Taney, an extremely visible symbol of the fact
that a number of federal judges were politically unreliable and took
exceptionally narrow views of the legitimate war powers of the federal
government and correspondingly broad views of the alleged rights of
rebels.219 In spring 1863, the Court by a 5-4 vote, with Taney
dissenting, had narrowly accepted the dual theory of the war as
require that the privilege of the said writ shall now be suspended throughout the United States
in the cases where, by the authority of the President of the United States, military, naval, and
civil officers of the United States, or any of them, hold persons under their command or in their
custody, either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy, or officers, soldiers,
or seamen enrolled or drafted or mustered or enlisted in, or belonging to, the land or naval forces
of the United States, or as deserters therefrom, or otherwise amenable to military law, or the
rules and articles of war, or the rules or regulations prescribed for the military or naval services
by authority of the President of the United States, or for resisting a draft, or for any other offence
against the military or naval service . . . .").
217. See Tyler, supra note 150, at 989-92.
218. As the Court commented about the related subject of immunity for executive branch
officials:
[It cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the innocent, as
well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a
whole. These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official
energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from
acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will
"dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public
officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (citation omitted).
219. On Taney's support for slavery and secession and opposition to many important war
powers claimed by the U.S. government, see BRIAN MCGINTY, LINCOLN AND THE COURT 65-91
(2008); 5 CARL B. SWISHER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEYPERIOD 1836-64, at 844-52 (1974).
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applied to prize seizures of Confederate civilians' property at sea.220
When Congress and President Lincoln acted to suspend habeas in
1863, it was still unknown how much further beyond the prize context
the Court would be willing to accept the U.S. government's dual
theory of the war, which treated U.S.-citizen Confederates as de facto
enemy aliens for some purposes. As it happened, the Court would fully
accept the dual theory in future decisions. But in 1863 Congress and
the President could not have known this and acted prudently in the
face of legal uncertainty to confirm important aspects of the dual
theory in unimpeachable positive law, such as the suspension of
habeas corpus for many classes of detainees, including prisoners of
war.221
The Nazi saboteurs placed great reliance on the famous Civil
War case of Ex parte Milligan222 in their arguments to the Court.
Milligan held unconstitutional the military commission trial of an
Indiana resident, not enrolled in the Confederate armed forces or
otherwise employed by the Confederacy or a disloyal state
government, who was accused of plotting in the loyal state of Indiana
to attack federal facilities to steal weapons and liberate Confederate
prisoners.223 Although the Court used some sweeping language about
the universality of the Constitution's protections, 224 language that was
220. See Kent, Civil War, supra note 95, at 1893-1902 (discussing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S.
(2 Black) 635, 666-68 (1863)). The Court contained six Democrats, three of whom were from
slave states and five of whom had been in the majority in Dred Scott. Id. at 1894 n.191. It was
entirely rational for Republicans in Congress and the White House to distrust the Court.
221. It was not until 1864 that the Court manifested its agreement with the Lincoln
Administration's view that all residents of the CSA were barred from U.S. courts for the duration
of the war because they were akin to enemy aliens. See id. at 1905-07 (discussing Mrs.
Alexander's Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404, 418-23 (1864)); see also supra note 201. These Court
decisions were not habeas cases, however, meaning that the legal uncertainty for the Union
continued through the end of the war. Only in 1866, after the war ended, did the Court in Ev
parte Milligan suggest in dicta that Confederate prisoners of war had no constitutional right to
be free from military detention or trial, see infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text, implying
that they were out of protection of the law and courts and, hence, would not have had access to
habeas. And it was several more years before the Court upheld the use of military tribunals in
captured CSA territory, stating that against residents of the CSA "the laws of war take the place
of the Constitution and laws of the United States as applied in time of peace." New Orleans v.
The S.S. Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387, 393-94 (1874); see also Kent, Civil War, supra note 95, at
1925-27.
222. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
223. Id. at 60, 118-31.
224. Id. at 120-21 ("The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times, and under all circumstances.').
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quoted to the Court in 1942 by the saboteurs' counsel,225 Milligan in
fact was a narrow decision, as other language in the opinion and many
other Civil War-era decisions of the Court made clear. In Milligan,
the Court suggested that military commissions could lawfully try
persons in certain categories including "prisoners of war" and persons
resident in enemy territory, 226 categories of people understood at the
time by the Court, executive, Congress, and leading commentators to
be outside the protection of the Constitution and laws when the U.S.
government was acting as a belligerent (exercising its war powers).227
Milligan's holding, therefore, only covered civilian residents of loyal
states, notwithstanding some expansive language in the opinion. Some
have suggested that Milligan established an extremely broad rule that
no person may be tried by a military commission in the United States
if the area is not under martial law and if the civilian courts are open
and functioning there. 228 But Milligan itself makes clear that its rule
about the exclusivity of civilian courts is limited to the case of "a
citizen in civil life, in nowise connected with the military service." 229
Mr. Milligan's military trial-and hence his detention without access
to habeas corpus-would have been upheld had he been in the position
225. See Transcript of Oral Argument of July 30, 1942, at 64, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942) (Nos. - Original and Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of July 1942 Special Term), reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 96, at 665.
226. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 118 ("The controlling question in the case is this: upon the facts
stated in Milligan's petition and the exhibits filed, had the military commission mentioned in it
jurisdiction, legally, to try and sentence him? Milligan, not a resident of one of the rebellious
states, or a prisoner of war, but a citizen of Indiana for twenty years past . . . ."); id. at 123
(stating that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment's jury provisions except members of the U.S.
military forces but protect "[a]ll other persons, citizens of states where the courts are open"); id.
at 126 (suggesting that the Court's holding does not speak to "what rule a military commander,
at the head of his army, can impose on states in rebellion to cripple their resources and quell the
insurrection"); id. at 127 (suggesting that martial law was proper "in Virginia, where the
national authority was overturned and the courts driven out"); id. at 131 ("But it is insisted that
Milligan was a prisoner of war, and, therefore, excluded from the privileges of the statute. It is
not easy to see how he can be treated as a prisoner of war, when he lived in Indiana for the past
twenty years, was arrested there, and had not been, during the late troubles, a resident of any of
the states in rebellion."); cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(stating that Milligan "turned in large part on the fact that Milligan was not a prisoner of war"
and suggesting that "[h]ad Milligan been captured while he was assisting Confederate soldiers
by carrying a rifle against Union troops on a Confederate battlefield, the holding of the Court
might well have been different. The Court's repeated explanations that Milligan was not a
prisoner of war suggest that had these different circumstances been present he could have been
detained under military authority for the duration of the conflict ... ").
227. See Kent, Civil War, supra note 95, at 1872-83, 1899-1902, 1905-07, 1913-17, 1925-
27.
228. For instance, this is how counsel for the saboteurs read Milligan. &e Transcript of Oral
Argument of July 30, 1942, at 49, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 96, at 650.
229. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22.
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of the Quirin saboteurs: residents of the enemy's country who were
also enemy fighters.
E. The Spanish-American War and Filipino Insurrection
The United States captured and detained at least thirty-seven
thousand Spanish troops during the Spanish-American War of 1898,
but none of them were held in U.S. territory within the reach of U.S.
courts. 230 The fact that none of them sought to access to U.S. courts via
habeas corpus is, therefore, unremarkable.2 3 '
The Filipino insurrection against the United States (1899-
1902) is a different matter, however. For most of the insurrection, a
U.S. civilian court system functioned in the archipelago, but enemy
fighters had no right to seek habeas corpus in those courts. The
Philippines was ceded to the United States by Spain as of April 11,
1899.232 In spring 1899, the U.S. military government reestablished
the civilian Philippine Supreme Court, courts of first instance, and
justice of the peace courts to operate in pacified districts and granted
them their former criminal and civil jurisdictions, but with the proviso
that military tribunals retained exclusive jurisdiction over a broadly
defined set of crimes involving the military conflict and laws of war.2 33
The writ of habeas corpus was introduced in the civil courts in April
230. See GEORGE G. LEWIS & JOHN MEWHA, HISTORY OF PRISONER OF WAR UTILIZATION BY
THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1776-1945, at 44-46 (Dep't of Army Pamphlet No. 20-213, 1955)
(reporting that twenty-four thousand Spanish troops surrendered in Cuba and thirteen thousand
in the Philippines, but providing no numbers for Puerto Rico).
231. Some Spanish nationals without residence in the United States did appear in U.S.
courts during the war, but these instances do not undermine my description of the prevailing law
on alien enemy court access. They appeared as claimants in prize proceedings, suits initiated by
the U.S. executive to condemn as prizes of war Spanish merchant vessels. See, e.g., The Buena
Ventura, 87 F. 927, 928 (D. Fla. 1898) (subsequent history omitted). The Spaniards' access to
courts was permitted by the rule announced by the Supreme Court during the Civil War in
property confiscation cases that enemy aliens can defend suits initiated against them or their
property by the U.S. government. See infra note 360 and accompanying text.
232. See Kent, supra note 13, at 119 (describing the diplomatic and legal process by which
the Philippines became a U.S. territory).
233. General Orders No. 22, of June 17, 1899, in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE WAR DEP'T FOR
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1899: REPORT OF MAJ.-GEN. COMMANDING THE ARMY IN THREE
PARTS, PT. 2, H.R. DOC NO. 56-2, at 148 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1899) (noting
the re-opening of the civil courts and providing that their jurisdiction "shall not extend to and
include crimes and offenses, committed by either citizens of or persons sojourning within the
Philippine Islands, which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except by
authority specially conferred by the military governor. Jurisdiction to try and award punishment
in the class of cases designated remains vested in provost courts, courts-martial, or military
commissions.').
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1900 by military order,234 but civil tribunals were barred from
employing the writ to free prisoners of war or question the legality of
military detentions or trials.23 The Philippine Supreme Court upheld
this comprehensive ban on habeas jurisdiction over military
detentions.236
F. World War I
In April 1917, the United States entered the First World War,
which had been raging since fall 1914, fighting against Germany and
on the side of the Allied or Entente Powers. A few thousand enemy
prisoners of war were detained in the United States during and after
the war.237 Like all previous wars, World War I came and went
without a single known case arising in which an enemy prisoner of
war sought habeas corpus or other judicial relief in a state or federal
court in the United States. There were some notable developments,
however. Courts, Congress, and commentators reaffirmed core rules
that enemy fighters and nonresident civilian enemy aliens were
barred from U.S. courts during wartime.
1. Trading With the Enemy Act
In 1917, Congress codified and amended long-standing common
law rules concerning trading with the enemy during wartime. 238 The
basic rules, dating back centuries, held that the existence of war
automatically made illegal all contracts and other commercial
intercourse between civilian residents of the respective warring
234. See General Order 58, in REPORT OF MAJ.-GEN. E.S. OTIS, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE
DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND MIUTARY GOVERNOR OF THE PHILIPPINES, SEPT. 1, 1899 TO
MAY 5, 1900, at 268-70 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1900) (outlining provisions for
a writ of habeas corpus).
235. See In re Calloway, 1 PHIL REP. 11 (1901) (recounting the military order).
236. Id. at 11-12.
237. See, e.g., Germans Have Good Time in Prison Camps Here, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1918, at
77 (reporting two thousand German prisoners of war currently detained in the United States,
including German sailors at a camp in Hot Springs, North Carolina); German Prisoners 507
Strong, Join Interned Comrades, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 2, 1918, at 4 (reporting 1,373 German
prisoners of war at Fort McPherson in Georgia, and that other camps are located in Georgia and
Utah); Largest Camp for Interned Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1917, at SM6 (reporting that
hundreds of captured German navy officers and men were held as prisoners of war at Fort
Douglas in Utah, along with civilian enemy aliens and some "spies").
238. Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917).
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nations.239 A ban on alien enemy access to the courts had long been
understood to be part of these common law rules.
Congress's Trading with the Enemy Act ("TWEA") codified
some of this while liberalizing other features of the common law. Of
interest in this Article, Congress addressed the question of an enemy
alien's entitlement to access U.S. courts during wartime. With regard
to natural persons, the TWEA defined "enemy" in three separate
ways: (1) a person having his or her residence or commercial domicile
in the territory of a nation with which the United States was at war;
(2) any officer or agent of a government of a nation with which the
United States was at war; and (3) any person wherever located who
was the citizen or subject of a nation with which the United States
was at war and whom the President proclaimed must be treated as an
enemy as required for "the safety of the United States or the
successful prosecution of the war."24 0 As to the ability of these enemies
to sue in U.S. courts during the war, the Act stated that "[n]othing in
this Act shall be deemed to authorize the prosecution of any suit or
action at law or equity in any court within the United States by an
enemy or ally of enemy prior to the end of the war," with a few
exceptions.241
The legislative history makes clear what is implicit in this
structure-that Congress intended the Act to leave in place the old
common law rules regarding alien enemy access to courts unless it
specifically changed them. According to the committee report, "The
enemy, or ally of an enemy, has no jurisdiction other than that
conferred by [the Act] to maintain suits or actions within the United
States... ."242 This Senate report reprinted a legal memorandum by
Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren-an important
constitutional historian-which announced that "an alien enemy. . .
239. See Matthews v. McStea, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 7, 9-10 (1875) ("It must also be conceded, as a
general rule, to be one of the immediate consequences of a declaration of war and the effect of a
state of war, even when not declared, that all commercial intercourse and dealing between the
subjects or adherents of the contending powers is unlawful, and is interdicted."); Hanger v.
Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 535 (1867) ("[A]s soon as war is commenced all trading,
negotiation, communication and intercourse between the citizens of one of the belligerents with
those of the other, without the permission of the government, is unlawful.").
240. Trading with the Enemy Act § 2.
241. Id. § 7(b). A noteworthy exception was that "an enemy or ally of enemy may defend by
counsel any suit in equity or action at law which may be brought against him." Id. This is
consistent with prior precedent. See infra note 360 and accompanying text. Two other exceptions
were insignificant and irrelevant to this Article. See Trading with the Enemy Act §§ 7(b), 10(a),
(g) & (h).
242. AN ACT TO DEFINE REGUIATE AND PUNISH TRADING WITH THE ENEMY, S. REP. No. 65-
111, at 14 App. A (1st Sess. 1917).
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has no right to sue" in U.S. courts, and cited cases from the Civil War
and War of 1812 that established the distinction between alien enemy
civilians with prewar residence in the United States who were
generally allowed to sue and those resident abroad who were strictly
barred from the courts.243 Warren's memorandum cited Lockington as
representing the law in the United States regarding alien enemy
access to courts.244 Thus, under the TWEA and the common law, any
agent or officer of an enemy government had no access to the courts.
Civilian alien enemies who were resident abroad were also barred
from the courts, while civilian alien enemies resident in the United
States could access the courts unless the President issued a
proclamation barring them. In suits filed after the war had reopened
the courts to them, former enemies challenged the constitutionality of
various aspects of the TWEA, which was repeatedly upheld by the
Court on the theory that it was an "exertion of the war power, and
untrammeled by the" Constitution's protections for individual
rights.245
2. Case Law and Commentary
Apparently no prisoners of war attempted to use the U.S.
courts during World War I. Three types of cases arose during the war
and after concerning civilian enemies' access to the courts: commercial
or property cases arising under the TWEA, detention cases arising
under the Alien Enemy Act, and private law cases where U.S. litigants
claimed that their adversaries in litigation could not sue because they
were alien enemies. In a TWEA case, the Supreme Court noted "the
rule ... denying access by enemy citizens to our courts," but did not
have the need to make a holding on that issue. 246 One habeas case was
pursued by an alleged German spy facing a military commission trial.
These cases generally left the law where they found it at the start of
the war.
a. Cases Concerning Enemy Civilians
Pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act, the United States interned
several thousand enemy civilians during the First World War. In a
number of instances, the detainees sought writs of habeas corpus
243. Id. at 21-22 App. B.
244. Id. at 22 App. B. For a discussion of Lockington, see supra Section III.B.
245. Cummings v. Deutsche Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft, 300 U.S. 115, 120 (1937).
246. Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1926).
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challenging their imprisonment. In line with earlier cases, the courts
held that habeas corpus could be used for the limited purpose of
challenging the jurisdictional fact whether the detainee was a citizen
or subject of a nation at war with the United States; if that fact were
established, the courts no longer had any role to play and dismissed
the petitions.247 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
Alien Enemy Act from a constitutional challenge, stating that
Blackstone's view that alien enemies lacked all rights except by
license of the government was still the law in the United States. 248
A number of cases arose in state and federal courts where U.S.
litigants claimed that their adversaries in private litigation could not
sue because they were alien enemies. The courts were quite consistent
in holding, in line with long-established law, that alien enemies who
were civilians and lived in the United States prior to the war could
invoke the aid of the courts, whereas alien enemies who lived abroad
could not.249
b. Prisoners of War
Although no prisoners of war attempted to use the U.S. courts
during World War I, there was some judicial dicta and commentary
noting that enemy prisoners of war could not access the courts on
habeas corpus, 250 and that civilian enemy aliens could not access the
courts if they had been guilty of hostile acts against the United
States. 251
247. See, e.g., Ex parte Graber, 247 F. 882, 887 (N.D. Ala. 1918); Ex parte Fronklin, 253 F.
984 (N.D. Miss. 1918). See generally Vladeck, supra note 97, at 970-73.
248. De Lacey v. United States, 249 F. 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1918). On Blackstone, see supra
note 112 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., Speidel v. N. Barstow Co., 243 F. 621, 621-22 (D.R.I. 1917); Held v.
Goldsmith, 96 So. 272, 272-75 (La. 1919); Kolundjija v. Hanna Ore Mining Co., 193 N.W. 163,
164-65 (Minn. 1923); Rothbarth v. Herzfeld, 167 N.Y.S. 199, 199-200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917),
aff'd, 119 N.E. 1075 (N.Y. 1918).
250. See Krachanake v. Acme Mfg. Co., 95 S.E. 851, 852 (N.C. 1918) ("[The alien enemy
resident here ... may be interned and held as a prisoner of war without the right to apply for the
writ of habeas corpus.'); cf. Ev parte Graber, 247 F. 882, 887 (N.D. Ala. 1918) (noting that under
English and Canadian law "the rule that a court will not entertain an application for habeas
corpus from a prisoner of war applies to a civilian subject of an enemy state, who has been
interned as a measure of public safety"). Commentary published in England discussed the
situation of prisoners of war. See, e.g, W. M. DAVIDSON, THE STATUS OF THE AUEN 128 (1909)
("An alien enemy, a prisoner of war, was not entitled to bring any action nor even to be
discharged upon a writ of Habeas Corpus.").
251. See Rau v. Rowe, 213 S.W. 226, 227 (Ky. 1919) ("[The following general principles
seem to have received full recognition in England, Canada, and the United States: First. That a
person of enemy nationality resident in his own country can neither institute an action in the
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There was one prominent case concerning an alleged German
military spy, cited in the Quirin litigation by counsel for the
saboteurs. But the case provides little support for the Nazi saboteurs.
Herman Wessels arrived in the United States in November 1916, prior
to the United States' involvement in the World War, and lived north of
New York City, claiming to be a Swiss businessman named Carl
Rodiger.252 After the United States entered the war and the U.S.
government developed information that Rodiger was in fact a German
national named Wessels, "an officer in the Imperial German navy,"
and a spy for Germany, he was arrested in May 1918 and detained
under the Alien Enemy Act.25 3 In 1918, Wessels was indicted for
treason and conspiracy to commit espionage in federal court in New
York. 254 The government's theory explaining how a German citizen
was guilty of treason against the United States was that his prewar
residence during peacetime meant that he owed allegiance to the
United States. 255 In other words, the U.S. government itself argued
that Wessels was an alien enemy with a peaceful prewar residence in
the United States-exactly the category of person who had long been
held to have a right of access to the courts. Wessels sought habeas
corpus only after the war in 1920, when the government began
military proceedings against him in a navy court-martial on the
charge of spying.256 The government did not argue that Wessels lacked
access to the courts,257 and the district court did not consider whether
the petitioner's status as a German spy, allegedly in the employ of the
German military, prevented him from having a right to access civilian
courts. The court proceeded directly to the merits and held that the
Constitution and laws of the United States provided no protection
courts of the country with which his own is at war, during the continuance of the war, nor
prosecute one instituted before its commencement, but such disability continues only while he is
abiding in his own country, and consequently does not exist where he is permitted to enter and
remain in the country in which suit is brought, unless while therein he is carrying on trade with
the enemy country, is a spy, or has been guilty of other acts of hostility.').
252. United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 F. 754, 756-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1920).
253. See id. at 757.
254. Id. at 759.
255. See Transcript of Record at 10, Wessels v. McDonald, 256 U.S. 705 (1921) (Nos. 287,
465 & 813) ("Abstract of Treason Indictment of December 6, 1918. Wessels, resident and
domiciled here, adhered to the enemy, the German government .. .. '); Grand Jury Indicts Two
for Treason, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7. 1918, at 22 (describing the indictment's allegations about
Wessels's pre-war residence and consequent duty of allegiance).
256. Apparently, the venue change resulted because the treason prosecution in civilian court
had run into evidentiary difficulties. See Navy to Try Wessels Here as German Spy, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1919, at 1; Wessels Taken to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1920, at 20.
257. See Transcript of Record, supra note 255, at 14-18.
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against military trial for an alleged enemy spy. 258 Because the
government did not argue and the lower court did not rule on the
court access issue, and because Wessels had a prewar residence in the
United States that the government claimed gave rise to a duty of
allegiance, his case does not support the Nazi saboteurs.
IV. THE OTHER 1942 DECISIONS ABOUT ALIEN ENEMY ACCESS TO
CIVILIAN COURTS
In 1942, the Supreme Court decided two cases besides Quirin
raising the issue of whether, and in what circumstances, enemy aliens
had a right to access U.S. civilian courts during wartime. Neither 1942
case involved enemy fighters, but one did involve a representative of a
government at war with the United States. The rules announced in
both cases were consistent with prior precedent and practice denying
court access to enemy fighters and to nonresident enemy alien
civilians. Neither case gave any hint that the Court in Quirin would
overthrow centuries of precedent and find a right of access to habeas
corpus for admitted enemy fighters during wartime.
A. Exparte Colonna
In January 1942, just months before the Nazi saboteurs landed
in the United States, the Supreme Court decided Ex parte Colonna, a
suit by the Italian ambassador to the United States. 259 The United
States had declared war against Italy on December 11, 1941. Colonna
invoked the Court's original jurisdiction, and sought writs of
prohibition and mandamus to free an Italian government vessel that
had been seized under orders of the district court of New Jersey.260
The Court made quick work of his petition. It noted that the TWEA
defined enemies who could not sue during wartime to include the
officers and agents of any government with which the United States
was at war, and then stated that "[t]his provision was inserted in the
act in light of the principle recognized by Congress and by this Court
that war suspends the right of enemy plaintiffs to prosecute actions in
258. Wessels appealed to the Supreme Court, but by agreement with the government, he
dismissed his appeal. See Wessels v. McDonald, 256 U.S. 705, 706 (1921). The government
apparently agreed to stay the military trial in exchange for his not seeking Supreme Court
review. About one year later the government dismissed the federal court indictment against him.
See Treason Charges Dismissed in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1922, at 11.
259. 314 U.S. 510 (1942).
260. Id. at 510-11.
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our courts."26 1 Accordingly, "the application will not be entertained."262
This would seem to be a very strong precedent against the Nazi
saboteurs, who admitted they were in the employ of the German
military, and who sought to use another ancient prerogative writ,
habeas corpus.
B. Ex parte Kawato
Kumezo Kawato immigrated to the United States from Japan
in 1905 but never became a U.S. citizen.263 In 1941, he filed a libel in
admiralty court, seeking unpaid wages and compensation for an injury
sustained while working on a U.S.-flagged fishing boat based in
California. After the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, the
United States declared war on Japan. The boat owner defended the
case by asserting that, as an enemy alien, Kawato was barred from
U.S. courts for the duration of the war. The Supreme Court
unanimously held in November 1942 that Kawato had a right to
pursue his case notwithstanding his enemy nationality.264 According
to the Court, a "policy of severity toward alien enemies was clearly
impossible for a country whose life blood came from an immigrant
stream." 265 Therefore, as early as the War of 1812, "peaceable law-
abiding aliens seeking to enforce rights growing out of legal
occupations" had been allowed to access U.S. courts even when their
home country was at war with the United States.266 Quoting a leading
case arising from the War of 1812, the Supreme Court explained that
"[a] lawful residence [in the United States] implies protection, and a
capacity to sue and be sued." 267 This amelioration of the harsh
common law rule against enemy alien court access only protected
"resident alien enemies," whose peaceful residence in the United
States established their temporary allegiance and hence right to
protection. 268
261. Id. at 511 (citing cases from the Civil War).
262. Id.
263. Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 70 (1942). Because of his race, Kawato was not eligible
for naturalization under then-existing law. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922)
(holding Japanese were not eligible for naturalization under the existing statute).
264. This result was consistent with announced U.S. policy. See Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae, Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (No. 10); Press Release, Dept. of Justice (Jan. 31, 1942)
(quoted in Kawato, 317 U.S. at 77 n.13).
265. Kaunto, 317 U.S. at 73.
266. Id. at 78.
267. Id. at 73-74 (quoting Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813)).
268. Id. at 74-75.
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It is difficult to understand how the Nazi saboteurs were
allowed to access the courts, given the Kawato Court's (correct)
explication of the law. Quirin is even more inexplicable in light of this
caveat in Kawato: "The ancient rule against suits by resident alien
enemies has survived only so far as necessary to prevent the use of the
courts to accomplish a purpose which might hamper our own war
efforts or give aid to the enemy."2 69 In other words, even a civilian
enemy alien who had peacefully resided in the United States prior to
the outbreak of war would be barred from the courts if allowing access
would "hamper" the United States' "war efforts or give aid to the
enemy." A fortiori, allowing German military saboteurs fresh off their
U-Boats to protect themselves from a U.S. military tribunal by
accessing civilian courts would seem to be clearly barred.270 Making
Quirin even more inexplicable is the way Colonna was distinguished
by the Court in Kawato, on the ground that it concerned "an enemy
government" and as such had "no bearing on the rights of resident
enemy aliens."271 Nazi agents who admitted they entered the United
States on a mission of sabotage while on the payroll of the German
High Command should have been understood to fall under this rule.
V. THE CASE OF HAUPT, THE U.S. CITIZEN
Recall that one of the saboteurs, Haupt, claimed to be a U.S.
citizen. Though the executive challenged this before the Supreme
Court, the Court assumed his citizenship. Because U.S. citizenship
has always been understood to bring with it heightened protection
from the Constitution, laws, and courts of the United States, Haupt
was differently situated than the other saboteurs regarding court
access. Haupt's claim for court access is the only one that presents a
close call legally. The bar on nonresident enemy aliens accessing the
courts was deeply entrenched in U.S. law, and hence the other
saboteurs had no right to be in U.S. courts because of citizenship and
domicile, without even reaching the issue of their enemy-fighter
269. Id. at 75.
270. See, e.g., Bernheimer v. Vurpillot, 42 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (decided prior to
Quirin in January 1942):
It may be stated generally that in time of war no nation will permit a citizen of an
enemy country to use its courts in any way which might be hurtful to it, or helpful to
the enemy, in the prosecution of the war. But it has been held that a citizen of an
enemy country peaceably residing in this country during time of war may maintain a
purely personal action here, where no possible benefit could inure to the enemy nation
thereby.
271. Kawato, 317 U.S. at 75 n.7.
2013] 213
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
status. But the categorical bar on the use of the courts by nonresident
enemy aliens did not, of course, apply to Haupt as a U.S. citizen. It is
necessary to address whether a U.S. citizen in Haupt's situation would
fall within the bar on undisputed enemy fighters using habeas corpus.
I believe the best legal answer is yes, though the question is
undoubtedly a difficult one.
First, notwithstanding his (assumed) U.S. citizenship, Haupt
voluntarily took up residence in Germany during the war against the
United States. There is authority for the proposition that voluntary
residence in the enemy's country is enough to bar a U.S. citizen from
U.S. courts during wartime. 272 Second, the rule articulated in Colonna
as interpreted by Kawato and by Congress in the TWEA (barring
agents of an enemy government from court)273 should still have
applied to him no matter what his citizenship. Third, even assuming
that, prior to the Civil War, Haupt's citizenship would have meant
continued protection of the law and access to courts even after he
joined an enemy nation's war effort against the United States, that
allowance of court access ended during the Civil War. As discussed
above in Section III.D, during the Civil War, the Court, Congress, the
executive, and prominent Union commentators all accepted the dual
theory of the war. On the one hand, secession was illegal and void, the
allegiance of all residents of seceded states was unimpaired, rebels
could be prosecuted for treason and other domestic crimes, and, if the
U.S. government chose this route, rebels still had protection of the
law. On the other hand, the CSA had become a kind of de facto
independent military power and, despite their U.S. citizenship, its
residents had become de facto alien enemies outside the protection of
the law because their massive rebellion and rejection of allegiance had
forfeited protection. So, at its option, the U.S. government could use
its full war powers against them, untrammeled by any municipal law
limitations and without giving them access to the courts to protect
themselves. 274
272. See, e.g, Lamar v. Micou, 112 U.S. 452, 464 (1884) ("A state of war ... suspends until
the return of peace the right of any one residing in the enemy's country to sue in our courts.");
Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404, 421 (1864) ("Mrs. Alexander, being now a
resident in enemy territory, and in law an enemy, can have no standing in any court of the
United States so long as that relation shall exist."). In prize proceedings, a U.S. citizen who
established a domicile in the enemy's country was treated as an enemy whose vessels and goods
could be seized during wartime. See The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 277-80 (1814).
273. See supra Part IV.
274. See supra Section III.D; see also Kent, Civil War, supra note 95, at 1872-83, 1899-
1902, 1905-07, 1913-17, 1925-27.
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Did the dual theory of the Civil War represent a broad and
enduring change in U.S. law that covered the case of Haupt-a U.S.
citizen who arguably forfeited his right to protection by traveling to
Germany and agreeing to work for the German military against the
United States after the declaration of war? While the issue cannot be
said to be free from doubt, the better understanding is that once
Haupt admitted to being a German military saboteur who, though a
naturalized U.S. citizen, had taken up residence in Germany during
the war, he should have been barred from proceeding any further in
court. Under the Civil War paradigm, the default state for U.S.
citizens who lived in enemy territory, and especially those who joined
the enemy military, was out of protection-with no access to the
courts. During the war, it was only when the U.S. government chose to
recall specific residents of the CSA to their allegiance, for example by
instituting domestic criminal prosecutions against them for rebellious
acts, that they were within protection. A full return of protection for
everyone had to await the U.S. government's defeat of the CSA. The
U.S. government could have recalled Haupt to his lapsed allegiance by
charging him with treason in civilian court; if it had done so, he would
have had full protection of the Constitution and laws. But it chose to
treat him as a military enemy outside of protection, and under the
Civil War precedents, his U.S. citizenship could not prevent that.
VI. EXPLAINING THE QUIRINDECISION
Parts III-V demonstrated the continued validity in 1942 of
legal rules that should have been applied to deny the German
saboteurs access to the courts. In Quirin, the Supreme Court chose not
to apply these established legal rules or to enforce the President's
proclamation denying the saboteurs access to the civilian courts. This
Part attempts to understand why. Both internal and external
explanations are offered. By internal, I mean explanations arising
from the substantive and procedural law itself and the legal materials
prepared by counsel and consumed by the Court, namely the briefs
and oral arguments. In addition, I discuss issues of timing and other
characteristics of the Quirin litigation itself, as well as the
negotiations and deliberations among the Justices. By external
explanations, I refer to the political and ideological contexts in which
the case arose, the nature of unique interbranch (Court-executive)
dynamics, the ideological predilections of the Justices, and the shape




Internal explanations for a court decision are, among lawyers,
the ordinary mode of legal analysis. But explanation might be thought
necessary for two of the external analytical perspectives used below.
One is based on the claim by political scientists and some legal
scholars that judicial review occurs within a politically constructed
space. As Richard Fallon describes this thesis, "[T]he domain within
which the [Supreme] Court possesses recognized and effective
authority is politically constructed. . . . by the wishes and tolerances of
Congress and the President, as supported by public opinion."275 In
other words, the Court, either consciously or unconsciously, recognizes
the political limits of what it can do, and tends to abide by them. One
way to study the Court's review of the government's actions in Quirn
is, therefore, to examine how much and what kind of judicial review
was constructed by the President, Congress, and public opinion as
politically tolerable.
The second is the "attitudinal model" in political science, which
claims that Supreme Court Justices' votes can be predicted with a
high degree of success based on their ideological predispositions
toward the issues in a case.276 Many traditional legal scholars and
some political scientists respond that precedent and legal reasoning do
importantly constrain the Justices' ability to reach ideologically
preferred results.277 I do not take a definitive position on this debate
but simply use an attitudinal perspective as one among many means
to try to explain the Quirin Court's decision to hear the saboteurs'
habeas petitions.
It is worth noting that the Court's behavior in Quirin-
disregarding established law and ruling against a powerful President
during the depths of wartime, on behalf of despised enemy
saboteurs--contradicts a standard claim made about courts' behavior
during wartime: that they defer too much to the government and fail
to adequately protect unpopular individuals' rights. 278 Trying to
275. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An
Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L REV. 352, 360, 363 (2010).
276. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 272-74
(2005) (summarizing the literature).
277. Id. at 274-76.
278. See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-
War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (2005) (surveying the literature and concluding that "the
belief that the Court acts to suppress rights and liberties under conditions of threat is so widely
accepted in post-September 11 America, and has been so widely accepted since the World War I
period, that most observers no longer debate whether the Court, in fact, behaves in this way"); cf.
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL
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understand why the Court acted differently in Quirin should therefore
be particularly useful. Using both internal and external perspectives, I
suggest the following explanations.
A. The Justices'Backgrounds
Compared to previous Courts, the Court that heard Quirn in
1942 was composed of ideologically and politically liberal Justices,
including some whose pre-Court legal careers showed real concern for
the due process rights of aliens. It is possible that the Justices'
ideological predispositions may have had some influence on the
outcome in Quirin. I do not mean this as a criticism of the Justices; it
seems both inevitable and desirable that pre-Court attitudes and
experiences help shape behavior on the bench. My point is simply that
understanding the views of the Justices who heard Quirin might have
some explanatory value.27 9
The most widely used measure of the ideological predilections
of Justices was devised by political scientists Jeffrey Segal and Albert
Cover.280 They measure ideology prior to the Justice joining the Court
rather than based on Court voting-because it is precisely votes as
Justices that Segal and Cover are trying to explain. 281 Segal and Cover
have rated the ideology of Justices starting with Franklin D.
Roosevelt's appointees, giving each an "ideological value" score
ranging from -1.00 ("extremely conservative") to 1.00 ("extremely
liberal").282 In 1942, seven of the Justices were Democrats who had
been appointed by Roosevelt. Their Segal-Cover scores, ranging from
0.33 to 1.00, show that the Roosevelt appointees were moderately to
"extremely" "liberal."283 The Roosevelt Justices were all recently
INQUIRIES L. 1 (2004) (finding that historically the Court has engaged in meaningful judicial
review during wartime, but that it has focused on preserving institutional structures for
decisionmaking rather than making first-order judgments evaluating the merits of individual
rights claims).
279. As a thought experiment, ask yourself whether it is possible that a Court still
containing the "four horsemen of reaction" might have approached Quirin in a somewhat
different way than the 1942 Court did.
280. See Epstein et al., supra note 278, at 55-56 (describing Segal-Cover scores as the most
widely used measurement).
281. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM POL SC. REV. 557 (1989).
282. Id. at 816.
283. The scores were: Black 0.75, Reed 0.45, Frankfurter 0.33, Douglas 0.46, Murphy 1.00,
Jackson 1.00. See id. Segal and Cover did not rate James Byrnes, probably because he sat for
such a brief time on the Court (July 1941 through Oct. 1942). Note that Murphy recused himself
from Quirin because of his position in the Army.
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appointed in 1942,284 making it more likely that they retained their
pre-Court ideologies on which the Segal-Cover scores are based.
All of Roosevelt's appointees had significant ties to the
President. In the view of some commentators, this dampened their
willingness to buck Roosevelt and contributed to the Court running
roughshod over the civil liberties of the saboteurs. 285 I see it somewhat
differently. Roosevelt put these men on the Court because of their
congenial political and ideological views, as demonstrated by their
careers in government, the academy, or in private law practice before
joining the Court.286 The Justices' relative liberalism likely
contributed to their decision to uphold the Court's power of judicial
review of civil liberties issues.
Segal and Cover did not rate the ideologies of Justices
appointed by presidents before Roosevelt. Sitting in 1942 were Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, who had been appointed Associate Justice
by Coolidge but was elevated to the chief's chair by Roosevelt in 1941,
and Owen Roberts, appointed by Hoover. Both were Republicans,
which might perhaps have some relevance to their willingness to rule
against the Democrat Roosevelt. At the time of Roosevelt's
inauguration in 1933, Stone was "commonly rated as [a] liberal."287
While dean of Columbia Law School, Stone had publicly opposed
Attorney General Palmer's "Red Raids" of 1919. He sent a letter to an
investigating congressional committee arguing that any alien lawfully
present in the United States was a "person" under the Due Proce'ss
Clause, and that the Palmer raids had not comported with
constitutional due process. 288 When Roosevelt elevated Stone to Chief
Justice, the philosopher Morris Cohen praised him as a civil
284. The longest serving, Hugo Black, had not even been on the Court for five years when
Quirin was heard.
285. See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 4, at 220, 229.
286. See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 3, 10-11 (1948) (detailing pre-Court
backgrounds of FDR's justices). Felix Frankfurter, a well-known Harvard law professor and
informal FDR advisor before joining the Court, was-despite his later reputation on the bench as
a conservative because of his philosophy of judicial restraint-in the 1930s arguably the leading
liberal or progressive intellectual in the United States. An immigrant himself, Frankfurter had
long been active on behalf of the rights of immigrants and aliens. He protested Attorney General
Palmer's "Red Raids" of 1919, and filed an amicus brief "condemn[ing] Palmer's Justice
Department for denying the detainees access to lawyers and for obtaining evidence through
illegal searches." NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR's GREAT
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 14 (2010). Later, Frankfurter worked tirelessly for Sacco and
Vanzetti, advised the NAACP, and served as a national leader of the American Civil Liberties
Union. Id at 21-27.
287. PRITCHErT, supra note 286, at 3.
288. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 113 (1956).
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libertarian who knew that "even an alien is a person and entitled to
the protection of civilized law."289 During the titanic fights of the mid-
1930s over the constitutionality of the New Deal, Stone frequently
joined Justices Brandeis and Cardozo in a liberal bloc voting to uphold
the New Deal. Roberts, the other pre-Roosevelt justice to hear Quirin,
was seen as an ideological moderate. 290 He had joined the liberal
justices in 1937 to decisively swing the Court in favor of the
constitutionality of the New Deal-in the famous "switch in time that
saved nine." Roberts was capable of defending civil liberties during
wartime, as demonstrated by his dissenting opinion in Korematsu.291
As it turned out, it was these two liberal or moderate Republicans who
lacked close ties to Roosevelt-Roberts and Stone-who took the lead
on promoting court access for the saboteurs.
B. The Broader Legal Context
Several aspects of U.S. law probably helped shape how the
Justices thought about the issues in Quirin. First, the long tradition of
allowing resident enemy aliens who were peaceful civilians to access
U.S. courts during wartime was discussed above in Parts III and IV.
Because enemy fighters never sought to access U.S. courts and
nonresident civilian enemy aliens rarely did, a great number of the
decided cases concerned the sympathetic situation of the peaceful
resident civilian alien enemy who was merely trying to protect his or
her private rights. Anyone reading law books in 1942 would have come
across many of these cases. As discussed in Part IV, one was on the
Court's docket already in summer 1942-Ex parte Kawato.292 This
tradition of access probably influenced some Justices by making the
government's argument for court closure in Quirin seem like a harsh
attempt to make an exception to a general rule of openness.
Second, in 1942 the Court was on the verge of a revolution in
habeas corpus jurisprudence, turning it from a very narrow and
limited procedure for ascertaining that jurisdiction had been proper in
the tribunal that ordered the detention into an extremely broad
procedure allowing collateral review of all aspects of the processes
that led to detention. For several decades prior to 1942, the Court had
289. Id. at 568-69.
290. PRITCHETT, supra note 286, at 3.
291. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225-33 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
292. Chief Justice Stone referenced the Kawato papers during oral argument in Quirin. See




been liberalizing its habeas corpus jurisprudence to allow more and
more error correction to occur on collateral review; when Quirin was
litigated, the Court was on the cusp of an incredible expansion of
federal habeas corpus that provided much of the procedural
underpinning for the Warren Court's revolutions in criminal
procedure and civil rights. 293
Third, in 1942 the Court was in the beginning stages of another
revolutionary change-the move to bifurcated review in which
economic constitutional rights were given minimal judicial protection,
but civil liberties and civil rights were more aggressively protected. 294
Chief Justice Stone, the chief proponent of court access for the
saboteurs, was one of the leading theorists of this revolution, as seen,
for example, in his famous footnote four in Carolene Products.295
Fourth, the Court has shown particular sensitivity when it
perceived that the President or Congress had or might attempt to
restrict habeas corpus jurisdiction over controversial executive
detentions. In Milligan, for example, the Court reached out to decide a
constitutional issue not presented by the case in order to suggest that
using military courts during the postwar reconstruction of the South
could be unconstitutional. 296 In McCardle, the Court strained to find a
path for habeas review of a military trial of a civilian during
Reconstruction even though Congress had attempted to strip its
jurisdiction. 297 After Quirin, the Court has applied exacting clear
statement rules to avoid finding that Congress stripped habeas
jurisdiction over executive detentions.298 In Boumediene v. Bush, the
Court misread precedent in a fairly dramatic fashion in holding
unconstitutional Congress's stripping of habeas jurisdiction over
habeas cases by Guantanamo Bay detainees. 299 In retrospect, Quirin
was arguably part of an emerging trend of the Court aggressively
protecting habeas jurisdiction over executive detentions, especially
293. See Bryant & Tobias, supra note 5, at 338-54 (summarizing the expansion of habeas
corpus jurisprudence from 1879 to Quirin).
294. See generally G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of
Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 301-02, 310-52 (1996)
(reviewing the historical development of "bifurcated review").
295. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
296. See Kent, Civil War, supra note 95, at 1928-29.
297. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1869); see also Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 85 (1869) (exercising the jurisdiction claimed in McCardle).
298. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576-84 (2006); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 517 (2003); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300, 314 (2001).
299. See Kent, supra note 13 (showing that Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), relied
on a demonstrably incorrect reading of key precedents).
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during war or similar crises, and even when it required creative
misreading of statutes or Court precedent to accomplish that.
Professors Jack Goldsmith and Cass Sunstein have posited
that civil liberties have been increasingly protected in wartime due to
a "ratchet" mechanism, because after each war, elites have criticized
what appeared in retrospect to be abuses, and "[d]uring the next war,
the perceived abuses of the last war are used as the baseline for
determining which civil liberties restrictions are appropriate."O It is
possible that Quirin was an example of the ratcheting up of habeas
corpus protections against potentially questionable executive
detentions, as a result of perceptions by Justices and other elites of
abuses during past wars, like the Civil War.
One might also posit that these cases show that the Court can
be moved to act, even during security crises and on behalf of
unpopular claimants, when it is trying to preserve for itself "a seat at
the table" by resisting attempts by the political branches to limit its
jurisdiction.301 I explore this latter thought more in Section VI.E
below.
C. The Politically Acceptable Scope of Judicial Review
The Court's actions in Quirin-taking jurisdiction, hearing the
merits, but ruling for the government--conformed almost exactly to
the politically acceptable scope of judicial review. This issue must be
examined at two levels. The less important one is general public
opinion. The more important is what the President and Congress
would tolerate from the Court. The Court's involvement in Quirin-
just four days from when the clerk announced the Court would
convene until the issuance of the per curiam decision-was too brief
for Congress to make its views known. But the President did convey to
the Court the limits of what he would tolerate in terms of judicial
review, in quite dramatic fashion.
1. The President
By way of the Attorney General, the Court heard two messages
from the President: first, that hearing the case was acceptable,
300. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 285 (2002).
301. See Stephen I. Viadeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
122 (2011) (explaining the Court's post-9/11 national security jurisprudence in this way).
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perhaps even desirable; and, second, that it would be intolerable for
the Court to order that the saboteurs be freed.
Once defense counsel decided to seek Supreme Court habeas
review, they contacted the Attorney General and proposed that they
jointly reach out to the Justices. One might have expected the
Attorney General to oppose Supreme Court review; he had, after all,
recently drafted the President's proclamation purporting to deny the
saboteurs access to civilian courts and would soon write a brief
arguing the same thing. In fact, though, Biddle traveled with defense
counsel and personally told several Justices that he supported
Supreme Court review.302 This information was conveyed to the Chief
Justice, who decided to call a special Court session. Days later, when
Biddle in his brief and orally told the Court that it had no right to
entertain the habeas petition, he might have seemed a little
schizophrenic, perhaps undercutting his authority with the Justices
on the court access issue. Biddle probably desired that the Court agree
to entertain the saboteurs' case on the theory that it had jurisdiction
to decide its jurisdiction, but then to hold that it lacked jurisdiction (or
that the saboteurs lacked capacity to sue). It is not clear that the
Justices understood this subtlety.303
While the President's and Attorney General's views on court
access may have seemed muddled, their views on the merits were
clear and clearly conveyed to the Justices: the saboteurs could not and
would not be freed by habeas corpus. Sometime in late June or early
July, Biddle met with FDR to discuss the case. The President
informed his Attorney General, "I want one thing clearly understood,
Francis: I won't give them up .. . . I won't hand them over to any
United States marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus.
Understand?"304 "I understood clearly," wrote Biddle in his memoirs,
while going on to note the difficult position that this put him in.305 The
President's unwillingness to see a civilian court free the saboteurs was
302. See supra note 47 (quoting Biddle's memoirs). According to Lauson Stone, the Chief
Justice's son who was working on the defense team, though at first Biddle "showed signs of
resisting" the application to the Supreme Court, he soon "became cooperative" and even had
lawyers from the Department of Justice working with defense counsel to make sure the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction was established. See Mason, supra note 45, at 818 (quoting letter from
Lauson Stone to Mason, June 27, 1952).
303. Based on Biddle's support for Supreme Court review, G. Edward White concludes that
"Ex parte Quirn came into being because an expedited constitutional challenge to the
commission suited all the parties in the case." G. Edward White, Felix Frankfurter's 'Soliloquy'in
Ex parte Quirin, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 423, 427-28 (2002).




conveyed by Biddle-directly or indirectly, we do not know-to at least
one justice, Owen Roberts, who told the rest of the Court. Notes taken
by Justice Murphy at the July 29 conference of the Court, just before
the first day's oral argument in Quirn was to begin, report that
Roberts told his brethren that "Biddle has real[] apprehension that
commission may enter order and president will order men shot despite
proceedings in this court."306 "That would be a dreadful thing," the
Chief Justice responded, according to Murphy.307 Jackson, who was
personally close to the President, tried to reassure his colleagues,
saying, again according to Murphy's notes, that the President was
extraordinarily pressed by time and events, and "he is punch drunk in
a sense and has pounded Biddle who is really frightened. But [the]
president is jealous of his place in history + will do [the] right
thing."308 It is unclear whether this prediction mollified the Justices.
Douglas later wrote in his memoirs that this incident represented "a
blatant affront to the Court" by both the President and Attorney
General.30 9 On the first morning of oral argument, coming just after
the conference at which Biddle's fears about FDR were related by
Justice Roberts, Biddle told the Court that the case might "very
quickly become moot."310 In light of their earlier discussion, the
Justices might have perceived this as a veiled warning about the
President's unwillingness to tolerate judicial interference that would
lead to release of the saboteurs.
2. Public Opinion
Like the President, the American public seemed to agree that it
was acceptable and perhaps even desirable for the Court to hear the
saboteurs' pleas, but that swift punishment by the military
commission was the only acceptable result on the merits. Some
newspapers noted discontent with the Court's decision to hear the
case.311 There was certainly a strong feeling that Supreme Court
306. Frank Murphy, Notes on Supreme Court Cases Concerning President's Powers During
Wartime 1 (July 29, 1942) (on file in Box 2 of the Papers of Eugene Gressman, Univ. of Mich.
Bentley History Library) (copy on file with author).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. DOUGLAS, supra note 7, at 139.
310. Transcript of Oral Argument of July 29, 1942, at 10, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 96, at 505.
311. See, e.g., Lewis Wood, Supreme Court Is Called in Unprecedented Session to Hear Plea
of Nazi Spies, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1942, at 1, 10; Editorial, The Saboteurs Seek Civil Court
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review should not divert the saboteurs from their path to the
gallows. 312
At the same time, many leading papers expressed the view that
Supreme Court review was a positive development because it ensured
that the Constitution was being followed and gave an object lesson to
Americans and to the world in the superiority of American justice as
compared to the practices of the Nazis and their allies.313 The Wall
Street Journal editorialized that the Court's action in hearing the
saboteurs' case showed that, in the United States, the "liberties" of the
people were safe even during "total global war."314 The New York
Times editorial page praised the Court for giving the saboteurs "due
process" and showing that "this country and its government are
sufficiently free from hysteria to pause in the midst of a ... dreadful
conflict and deal out calm and exact justice."315 The influential Times
columnist Arthur Krock celebrated that, in America, the maxim inter
arma silent leges-the law is silent during wartime-was not the
prevailing rule and noted that the Court was hearing the saboteurs'
pleas "in an hour when this country's own nationals were returning
from Axis captivity to relate ordeals of torture and inhuman
confinement on trumped-up charges or no charges at all."316 The
Washington Post opined that the Nazis were known to summarily
execute their captives but that "the Nazi way is not our way":
Americans have faith in their institutions, confidence in their inherent strength. Even
in as desperate a crisis as that which faces our Nation and other free nations today, we
do not propose to imitate the enemy, but only to act in accordance with the precepts of
law and right. For that reason there is an element of the sublime in the action of Chief
Justice Stone in calling this extraordinary session of the court .... It is not [the
saboteurs'] liberties which are involved in the elaborate precautions that have been
taken to see that they got a fair trial, but ours. 317
Relief, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1942, at A4; see also Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 300, at 264-
70 (surveying the American press's views about the saboteurs case).
312. See, e.g., Lewis Wood, Capital Awaiting High Court Action on 7 Nazis Today, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 1942, at 1, 11 (quoting a congressman that "[a]ny interference with [the military
commission] trial by civil court would strike a severe blow to public morale," and that the
saboteurs "should be executed with all possible dispatch"); Saboteur Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 1,
1942, at 8 (opining that it would be "intolerable" and would "help Hitler immensely" if spies
could not be swiftly executed after military rather than civil trials).
313. According to Chief Justice Stone's biographer, "[p]ublic sentiment . . . seemed to favor
giving the Nazis a judicial hearing before they were shot." MASON, supra note 288, at 653.
314. Editorial, A Constitution Still Governs, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1942, at 6.
315. Editorial, Due Process in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1942, at 14.
316. Arthur Krock, In the Nation: The Issues of Law and Fact in Sabotage Case, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 1942, at 20.
317. Editorial, Habeas Corpus, WASH. POST, July 31, 1942, at 12.
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Other leading papers echoed these sentiments. 318 it is striking how
closely the Court's actions in the case conformed to the politically
acceptable scope of the judicial review.
D. Fears of Presidential Domination
1. Ideological, Political, and Institutional Contexts
The views of the Court that decided the saboteurs' fate was
likely shaped by concerns about its institutional integrity in the face of
presidential domination. Roosevelt, who had recently been elected to
an unprecedented third term, was, in 1942, arguably the most popular
and powerful president in American history. This was, to some
observers, a concerning development. American constitutional law has
always been obsessed with balance between and among the so-called
"coordinate" or "coequal" branches of the national government. As
intended by one of its chief designers, James Madison, each branch
would jealously guard its powers and prerogatives against
encroachment by the others. Though the capacity of each branch to
consistently engage in institutional self-protection has probably been
overstated,319 it nonetheless has clearly been an enduring feature of
the American scheme of government, at least at the rhetorical level.
The desire of the Court to protect its prerogatives from
domination by other branches was almost certainly heightened in
1942, when Quirin came before the Court. Events of the 1930s and
early 1940s in Europe colored many Americans' attitudes about
domestic issues, including about the desirability of a super-strong
presidency. The rise of totalitarianism in Europe caused some
American elites to fear the exploitation of the masses' emotional
desires by charismatic leaders, and to prize a truly independent
judiciary as an essential bulwark against the rise of dictatorship
here.320 At the same time, "revulsion against Nazi practices influenced
318. See, e.g., Editorial, Saboteurs' Plea, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 1, 1942, at 4 ("That the
Supreme Court of America heard [the saboteurs'] plea has irritated many Americans who have
not thought it through. We are fighting for civilized rights and among those rights are the rights
of appeal to courts."); Editorial, The Cburt Speaks, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 1, 1942, at 10 ("The fact that
our government was required to prove its right to try the suspects under military law has had
the effect, and quite probably the intended effect, of pointing the contrast between totalitarian
justice and American justice. That is all to the good'").
319. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Iarties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REv. 2311, 2312-16 (2006).
320. See, e.g., David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority
Rights: Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 759 (1981). For contemporary
examples, see, for instance, William J. Donovan, An Independent Supreme Court and the
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American attitudes toward racial and religious minorities, treatment
of criminal defendants, . . . eugenic sterilization . .. [and] freedom of
speech."321 The need to decisively distinguish American law and
values from the horrors of totalitarianism was widely felt, including by
the Supreme Court Justices.322
In this developing ideological context there occurred, in 1936
and 1937, a momentous confrontation between President Roosevelt
and the Supreme Court. The clash was still reverberating in 1942, and
the meaning of the events of 1936-37 would have unavoidably been
filtered through the prism of the emerging antitotalitarianism, with
its concomitant emphasis of judicial independence from the executive
and judicial preservation of civil liberties. The story of Roosevelt's
confrontation with the Court about the constitutionality of the New
Deal has been told many times and will not be rehashed here. I think
it suffices to make two points. First, even many people who were
committed New Deal Democrats and strong supporters of President
Roosevelt felt that he had overreached with his court-packing plan,
which was widely seen as a brazen attempt to put the Court under his
thumb.323 Whatever their feelings about court packing while they were
private citizens or executive officials in 1937, once on the Court,
Roosevelt's Justices would likely have felt protective of the institution
and its independence. Second, besides Stone, Justice Roberts seems to
have been the most committed to resisting Roosevelt's argument that
Protection of Minority Rights, A.B.A J., Apr. 1937, at 254, 254-56 (arguing that the
independence of the Supreme Court must be protected so it can defend minority rights, in
contradistinction to what was happening in Europe); Robert N. Wilkin, An Appointed Judiciary-
Its Place in the Balance of Government, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1937, at 57, 57-59 (implying that the role
of an independent, appointed judiciary was to "restrain[ ] the ambition of 'the one' and the
emotions of 'the many"').
321. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1996).
322. See id. at 34, ' 65. See generally Richard Primus, A Brooding Omnipresence:
Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 423 (1996) ("[The desire
to articulate principles that distinguished America from the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany
contributed to a long line of liberal Supreme Court decisions from the Second World War through
the Warren era.").
323. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 286, at 108-10 (stating that even Justice Brandeis was
adamantly against the court-packing plan and explaining that the plan "looked ... like a grab
for power on the part of a president who would not take no for an answer. The brazenness of
telling the Supreme Court that if it would not accept his policies, he would change its
composition, ranked as one of the most remarkable pieces of constitutional one -upsmanship ever
tried."); JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 315-16,
321 (2010) (describing the Senate progressives' abhorrence to the idea of "remaking the Supreme
Court virtually overnight'). Some critics of court-packing compared FDR "to Stuart tyrants and
European dictators." WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 137 (1995).
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the courts were closed to the saboteurs. It might be relevant that
Roberts had personally borne the brunt of charges that in 1937 certain
Supreme Court Justices had switched their views and votes in
response to Roosevelt's court-packing threat. Just a few years later, in
1942, Roberts might have desired to show that he could not be pushed
around by the President. 324
Another factor may have caused the Court in the summer of
1942 to wish to send a message that the President could not preclude
judicial review of wartime detentions. The Japanese and Japanese-
American removal and internment program was well underway by
July 1942,325 and was already controversial for its race-based
targeting of an entire ethnic group. 326 Habeas corpus challenges had
already been filed in federal courts when the Court heard Quirin.327
324. As of 1942, the leading academic and popular accounts of the Court's "switch in time" in
1937 concluded that politics-the overwhelming election victory of FDR and his congressional
supporters in November 1936 and his spring 1937 "court packing" plan-caused Justice Roberts
and Chief Justice Hughes to switch their views and votes. See, e.g., Michael Ariens, A Thrice-
Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARv. L. REV. 620, 631-33 (1994) (surveying contemporary
accounts of the switch in time). Roberts, in particular, was singled out as having switched his
position in response to political pressure. According to Professor Carl Swisher's 1943 book on the
Supreme Court and the Constitution, "the feeling of the public, and probably of the bar as well,
was that Justice Roberts had deemed it expedient to change his position because of the
movement to reorganize the Court." CARL B. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 946 (1943). The best-selling popular account of the court-packing crisis and
switch in time came to the same conclusion. See JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168
DAYS 140 (1938) (suggesting that Roberts might have decided to "take a hint from the election
returns"). Such public and repeated accusations of weakness and surrender of principles in the
face of Roosevelt's criticism and threats must have stung Roberts. President Roosevelt's Attorney
General, soon to be on the Court himself, poured some salt on Roberts's wounds. In his 1941
book, Robert Jackson wrote that "some Justices"--obviously referring to Hughes and Roberts-
"belated[ly]" recognized "the validity of the complaints against their course of decision" made by
the President and others, changed their views, "confessed legal error and saved themselves from
political humiliation." ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY vi (1941).
Recently there has been a lively debate about whether Roberts and Hughes in fact switched their
views in 1937, and, even if they did, whether political pressure was an important causal factor.
See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEw DEAL COURT (1998). Whatever actually
occurred behind the scenes, Hughes and in particular Roberts were publicly accused of
succumbing to political pressure at the time.
325. See e.g., Exec. Order 9102, 7 Fed. Reg. 2,165 (Mar. 18, 1942) (establishing the War
Relocation Authority); Exec. Order 9066, 7 Fed. Reg 1,407 (Feb. 19, 1942) (empowering the
Secretary of War or a designee to deem U.S. territory "military areas" and exclude "any and all
persons" from them); West Coast Finishes Removing Japanese, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1942, at 5
(reporting the progress of evacuation efforts). See generally ROGER DANIELS, PRISONERS
WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICANS IN WORLD WAR II (rev. ed. 2004).
326. See, e.g., Japanese Decries Mass Evacuation, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1942, at 8
(describing the ACLU, American Friends Service Committee, and various Japanese-American
organizations' criticisms of evacuations).
327. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Davies, Evacuation Stay Denied to Japanese, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
23, 1942, at 15.
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Some Justices might have been thinking they would have to rule on
its legality, and wanted to send a message to the President that the
courts would be open to all comers.
A final bit of context might help explain why the Court in 1942
stood up to the President on court access. Chief Justice Stone was
concerned that Justices were too personally and professionally close to
the executive branch, and probably feared that President Roosevelt
was intentionally drawing them into his web. In early June 1942,
when the Court recessed for the summer, Justice Murphy accepted a
commission as lieutenant colonel (inactive status) in the U.S. Army
and departed for officers' training school.328 Stone, who had not been
consulted ahead of time, was reportedly "furious," since he thought
that it was inappropriate and perhaps illegal for a sitting Justice to
accept an executive-branch appointment.329 A few months earlier,
Justice Roberts had accepted Roosevelt's request to head a commission
studying the Pearl Harbor tragedy. 330 Stone believed that this
extrajudicial employment hurt both "the work and reputation" of the
Court.331 Since the war began, Justice Byrnes had been operating as
an unofficial White House employee, to the Chief Justice's dismay.332
The newspapers were, according to Stone's biographer, "full of stories
about Justice Douglas and Felix Frankfurter going over to the White
House to see F.D.R. and advise him. Occasionally Stone would
grumble about the Court participating in such affairs . .. ."333 In the
early summer of 1942, Roosevelt had asked Stone himself to lead an
investigation of problems in the supply of rubber, a critical war
commodity. Stone refused, believing it essential to the separation of
powers that Justices not become too entangled with the executive
branch.334 He wrote President Roosevelt a long letter about the need to
preserve judicial independence. 335 While individually the justices
doubtless all were pleased by the President's attention and desired to
help their country, especially during wartime, it seems reasonable to
speculate, especially in light of Stone's documented views, that some
328. See SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 216-17 (1984).
329. See id. at 217; Melvin I. Urofsky, The Court at War, the War at the Court, J. Sup. CT.
HIST., July 1996, at 3.
330. See Exec. Order No. 8983, 6 Fed. Reg. 6,569 (Dec. 20,1941) (creating the commission).
331. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: The Views of Chief Justice
Stone, 67 HARV. L. REV. 193, 199 (1953).
332. See MASON, supra note 288, at 581; Mason, supra note 331, at 199.
333. Mason, supra note 331, at 198 (internal quotations omitted).
334. See id. at 201-05; Urofsky, supra note 329, at 3.




number of them became uncomfortable that the President might be
compromising judicial independence by his constant attempts to
deputize them.
In combination, it seems that the ideological, political, and
institutional contexts in 1942 all pointed toward the need for the
Court to demonstrate its independence from the President and show
that the federal courts would be open to wartime claims involving civil
liberties.
2. The Executive's Mishandling of the Court Access Issue Raised Fears
of Executive Overreaching
If I am right that concerns about presidential domination of the
judiciary and its potential effect on civil liberties were salient for the
Justices in 1942, then it seems likely that the manner in which the
executive branch handled the court access issue in Quirin exacerbated
these concerns and helps explain why the Court ruled against the
government. Recall that the executive's first action regarding court
access came weeks before the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
A presidential proclamation issued in early July described the
saboteurs and then stated that:
[S]uch persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding
directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf,
in the courts of the United States ... except under such regulations as the Attorney
General, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may from time to time prescribe.336
It is not entirely clear what legal effect the President's advisers
thought this provision would have. Before the proclamation was
issued, the Attorney General had advised the President-accurately-
that the saboteurs had no legal right to access the courts because it
had "long been traditional to deny our enemies access to the courts in
time of war."337 Because the saboteurs had, under preexisting law, no
right to access the courts, the Attorney General advised Roosevelt-
again, accurately-that a proclamation purporting to deny them
access would not constitute a legally controversial attempt by the
President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.338 (President Lincoln
had purported to suspend the writ on his own authority at the outset
of the Civil War, when Washington, DC was besieged and Congress
336. Proclamation No. 2561, supra note 40.
337. FISHER, supra note 5, at 50 (quoting Memorandum from Biddle, Attorney Gen. of the
United States, to Roosevelt, President of the United States (June 30, 1942) (on file with the
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Official File 5036, Box 4)).
338. See id. (quoting Memorandum from Biddle, supra note 337).
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not in session; Chief Justice Taney had declared the presidential
suspension unconstitutional in Ex parte Merryman; the full Court
never decided the issue.339) But since the saboteurs had no right to
access the courts, it is not entirely clear why the Attorney General
advised the President that he should issue a proclamation stating
this.340
The way the proclamation was framed contributed to the
impression that mere executive discretion was being invoked to close
courts that otherwise would have been open to the saboteurs. The
proclamation did not cite the rule of the common law and law of
nations barring enemy aliens and military enemies from the courts
during wartime. It did not cite any specific cases, statutes, or other
legal authorities; nor did it cite the historical practices of the U.S.
government in previous conflicts. It did not even assert that the
saboteurs lacked any entitlement to access the courts. Instead it was
framed as a denial of access by the President. The proviso that the
Attorney General could authorize case-by-case access added further to
the impression that it was pure executive discretion being invoked. 341
Defense counsel for the saboteurs were savvy lawyers, and they
picked up on this mistake by the executive. In their briefing and oral
argument, they framed the issue of court access as an attempt by the
President to suspend habeas corpus and to use a mere executive
proclamation to bar the courthouse door.342 They successfully fostered
the perception that Roosevelt was heavy-handedly seeking to deny
judicial review that would otherwise have been available. The
government's response to this defense tactic was not good enough. In
339. See Kent, Civil War, supra note 95, at 1866-67.
340. The executive may have believed that the Alien Enemy Act's provision allowing the
president, by proclamation, to "direct the conduct to be observed, on the part of the United
States, toward" alien enemies, An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798), could
be read to authorize the President to proclaim a bar on court access. The proclamation cited
unnamed "statutes" authorizing it, but did not mention the Alien Enemy Act. Proclamation No.
2561, supra note 40.
341. See Proclamation No. 2561, supra note 40.
342. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 52, at 18 (arguing that the proclamation is
"unconstitutional and invalid" because "there is a lack of statutory authority for such action of
the part of the Executive," and it violates the Habeas Suspension Clause); id. at 37 ("We contend
that the President has no authority to issue such Proclamation in the absence of a statute giving
him this authority. We know of no inherent Constitutional right of the President to issue
Proclamations in matters affecting such substantial rights as this Proclamation purports to
affect."); Transcript of Oral Argument of July 29, 1942, at 40, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 96, at 535 ("We do not think, sir, that [the President] has any constitutional authority
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in the absence of an express statute."); id. at 41, reprinted
in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 96, at 536 (framing the issue as whether "the President has
authority to make this proclamation and to deprive these men of a right in the civil courts').
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his oral argument, the Attorney General contended that the saboteurs
had no right to access the courts "because of the President's
proclamation and because of the statutes governing the case, and also
because of the very ancient and accepted common law rule that such
enemies have no rights in the courts of the sovereign with which they
are enemies."343 The Attorney General mentioned the proclamation
first, as if it were the most important consideration in denying access,
and then suggested that certain statutes had some bearing on the
question, but without specifying which ones. Throughout oral
argument, the Attorney General largely acceded to the defense's
framing of the issue as involving executive discretion. Biddle even
emphasized that "in cases of war the rights of an enemy depend on the
grace of the sovereign." 344
There are some indications that the Justices were indeed
influenced by the perception that the President was overreaching
dictatorially and seeking to deny a preexisting right to the saboteurs
and to oust the judiciary from its proper role. Stone's private letters
suggest this perspective was salient for him. For instance, after the
Court issued its full opinion in October, the Chief Justice wrote to his
close friend Sterling Carr: "I hope you noticed that the opinion flatly
rejected (as unobtrusively as possible) the President's comment that
no court should hear the plea of the saboteurs. That, I thought, was
going pretty far."34 5 A former law clerk wrote to Stone asking about
the Court's brief and confusing discussion of the court access issue in
the full opinion in Quirin. Stone wrote back: "The somewhat cryptic
sentence appearing on page 6 of the Saboteur opinion on which you
comment was the result of patient negotiations to get the Court to
agree unanimously to rejecting of the argument that access to the
court by the prisoners could be denied."346 Writing to a friend and
former colleague, John Bassett Moore, Stone stated: "The Saboteur
cases presented a great many legal puzzles which have never been
ironed out or considered by the courts. An interesting feature of the
cases which was not commented on by the newspapers was the
343. Transcript of Oral Argument of July 29, 1942, at 70, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 96, at 565; id at 73, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 96, at 568.
344. Id. at 73, reprinted in. LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 96, at 568.
345. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Sterling Carr (Nov. 17, 1942) (on file in Box 9,
Folder "Carr, Sterling 1942" of the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Manuscript Div., Library of
Congress).
346. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Roger Nelson (Nov. 30, 1942) (on file in Box 69,
Folder "July Special Term 1942 Ex Parte Quirin et al." of the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers,
Manuscript Div., Library of Congress).
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President's Order prohibiting any court from listening to the
saboteurs."347 Note that Stone consistently focused on whether the
President could bar court access, rather than asking whether the
saboteurs were entitled to access. In other words, the Chief Justice
seems to have seen the proclamation as a power play by the executive
to sideline the Court, and to have reacted to preserve the Court's seat
at the table. There are some indications that other Justices might
have felt the same as Stone about this issue. For instance, according
to a leading historian of the Quirn case, Justice Roberts read an early
draft of Stone's full opinion for the Court "as recognizing the validity
of the president's proclamation closing the courts to the petitioners"
and indicated to his colleagues that he "thought that the Court should
say that the President does not have such power."348
Seen through this lens, the Court's resolution of Quirin-
rejecting the executive's claim that the courts were closed, thereby
preserving judicial power to fight another day, but ruling for the
executive on the merits on the politically explosive issue that really
mattered to the President-might be usefully compared to Chief
Justice Marshall's artful resolution of the executive-Court
confrontation in Marbury v. Madison. In Marbury, the Court asserted
its power for the future-judicial review of congressional (and by
implication, executive) actions for constitutionality and control by
mandamus of the executive's conduct-but in a way that gave the
President the immediate political victory he desired and therefore
avoided direct interbranch confrontation. Seen in this way, what I
have been calling the Court's "error" on court access in Quirin might
be seen instead as an act of high judicial statesmanship. But critics
who deplore the Quirin Court's holding on the merits that the military
commission was lawful might have preferred that the Court duck the
issue entirely.
E. Court Processes and Internal Dynamics
This final Section turns back to familiar terrain, the internal
processes and dynamics on the Court that might help explain the
result in Quirin. One obvious point, mentioned by numerous prior
commentators, is that the Court's processes were hasty and flawed-
four days after first announcing it would hear the case, the Justices
347. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to John Bassett Moore (Dec. 31, 1942) (on file in Box
69, Folder "July Special Term 1942 Ex Parte Quirin et al." of the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers,
Manuscript Div., Library of Congress).
348. Danelski, supra note 4, at 75.
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issued a brief per curiam decision that, as later deliberations about
the full opinion showed, had papered over serious internal
disagreements about key issues. In addition, the Justices and counsel
lacked expertise in the relevant legal issues, and Chief Justice Stone
misread key precedents.
The Court announced on July 27 that it would hear the case. 34 9
The briefs were quickly drafted and filed the morning of July 29, when
the Court convened to begin hearing oral argument. Chief Justice
Stone remarked to his law clerk that "[bloth briefs have done their
best to create a sort of legal chaos."350 This was an uncharitable
comment by the Chief Justice, who himself contributed greatly to the
Court's error on court access. But it is true that the briefing would
have been much better had the lawyers more time to prepare. The
government's briefing on court access was perfunctory and
inadequate, relying primarily on English authorities predating the
U.S. Constitution and making no real attempt to show that the
principles established in those cases had been accepted in American
law. 351
The Quirin briefs were filed the morning that oral argument
started, so it is not a surprise that at least some Justices had not read
them. 352 The oral argument transcript suggests that the Justices may
have known relatively little about the laws of war, practices relating
to prisoners of war, or relevant jurisprudence on access to the courts
during wartime. 353 None of them had relevant experience in their
careers before the bench, and none had been a Justice when the
country was last at war.
Already on the first day of oral argument-in other words,
probably before he had fully digested the briefs, much less the
underlying legal materials-Chief Justice Stone seems to have made
up his mind about how to think about the question of court access for
349. Wood, supra note 311, at 1.
350. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Bennett Boskey (Aug. 4, 1942) (on file in Box 69,
Folder "July Special Term 1942 Ex Parte Quirin et al." of the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers,
Manuscript Div., Library of Congress).
351. See Government's Brief, supra note 49, at 13-18.
352. See Transcript of Oral Argument of July 29, 1942, at 13, reprinted in LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 96, at 508 (Justice Frankfurter stating "I have not read any of the papers").
Justice Douglas missed the first day of argument while traveling to Washington, and it seems
certain that he would have had little time to absorb the lengthy briefs before argument resumed
on July 30.
353. See, e.g., id. at 19, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 96, at 514 (Chief Justice
Stone misusing term of art "martial law"); id. at 102, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note
96, at 597 (Justice Reed expressing surprise that prisoner-of-war status was unavailable to
combatants who did not wear uniforms).
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the saboteurs. In a colloquy with defense counsel, Stone suggested
that the saboteurs had a "right to make a defense" to the government's
charges and that this right might extend to "habeas corpus in order to
make their defense effective."354 Stone pressed harder on this point
when the Attorney General argued on the first day.355 By the second
day of oral argument, Stone was confidently articulating this theory:
What I was raising is whether, when a man has a right to make a defense, and that
includes the court in which he should be tried, he is foreclosed from making that defense
by way of habeas corpus because he is an alien enemy. . .. These men are engaged in
defense of their liberty, and they are using this process as an instrument of defense. .. .
I think it is the duty of the Court in coming abreast of habeas corpus to look through
forms.356
Stone likely picked up this idea from either or both of two
sources. First, there were civil cases decided during both World War I
and the early parts of World War II in which American plaintiffs had
sued alien defendants who, once war began, had become alien
enemies-for instance, because they were German citizens. When the
American plaintiffs then argued that they should win their suits
because the alien enemy defendants had no right to appear in court
during wartime, the courts had generally rejected this and held that
alien enemies had a right to defend themselves if sued, even though
they might lack the ability to affirmatively sue themselves.357 A
second and older set of precedents came from the Civil War. As
discussed above, the Supreme Court and lower federal and state
courts had made clear that residents of the Confederacy were akin to
nonresident alien enemies in that they had no right to sue during
wartime. But it was a different matter when Confederates were sued
in civil courts of the Union. This occurred frequently when the U.S.
government sued in federal court to confiscate rebel property. 358 In
some instances, lower federal courts had stricken the answers filed by
354. See id. at 23, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 96, at 518.
355. See id at 71-72, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 96, at 566-67 ("[An alien]
would have his right to defend himself? That is recognized even in a court martial.... What I am
coming to is this: Is the writ of habeas corpus anything more than a mode of defense . . . ?').
356. Transcript of Oral Argument of July 30, 1942, at 4, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 96, at 605.
357. See generally Rau v. Rowe, 213 S.W. 226, 227 (Ky. 1919):
[T]he liability of an alien enemy to be sued carries with it the right to use all the
means and appliances of defense that might be employed by a resident citizen of the
country in which the action is brought. In other words, although the existence of war
closes the courts of each belligerent to the citizens of the other, it does not prevent the
citizens of one belligerent, when sued, from taking proceedings for the protection of
their own property against the citizens of the other when sued by the latter.
358. These were styled as in rem proceedings where the property was technically the
defendant, but courts recognized that the property owner was the true defendant.
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Confederates and entered default judgments on the ground that they
had no right to access the courts during the war. 359 The Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that, if sued in civil courts, rebels had a right
to defend themselves in those same courts. 360
Stone misapplied this idea of the right of an alien enemy to
make a defense to the saboteurs' case. The government did not deny
that the saboteurs could defend themselves before the military
tribunal. The saboteurs had very capable lawyers appointed by the
President for that purpose. Habeas corpus has always been conceived
of as an affirmative civil proceeding that was separate and distinct
from the criminal trial or other process that resulted in detention.361
When habeas corpus review of a military detention is sought, it is an
attempt to transfer jurisdiction and control over the proceeding from
the military authorities to the civil judicial system. But only certain
kinds of persons have a right to civilian judicial review, and admitted
enemy fighters and nonresident alien enemies were not among
them. 362
How did Stone convince the other Justices to adopt his view-a
view contrary to voluminous practice and precedent-that the
saboteurs had a right to "defend" the military commission charges by
seeking collateral review via habeas? Few Justices kept notes about
their oral deliberations, and those that exist are often hard to decipher
and/or in conflict with the notes of other Justices. The papers of Stone,
Jackson, Black, and Douglas at the Library of Congress contain some
memoranda that the Justices exchanged about Quirin, but these all
date from the period after the per curiam opinion had been issued,
diminishing their utility for explaining the genesis of the decision to
allow the saboteurs to proceed to the merits. Still, it is possible to
piece together some hypotheses about what might have happened to
convince the Justices to support Stone's view about the "right to
defend."
359. See, e.g., Law Reports: Notes of Admiralty Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1863, at 2
(describing decision of Judge Betts of the federal district court in New York City, in the case
United States us. Seventeen Hundred and Fifty-six Shares of the Stock of the Great Western
Railway).
360. See Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 274, 277 (1876); Univ. v. Finch, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 106, 111 (1873); McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259, 267 (1870).
361. See generally Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1923) ("The writ of habeas corpus
is not a proceeding in the original criminal prosecution, but an independent civil suit . . . ."); Er
parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1883) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus is not part of a
criminal prosecution, but rather "a suit brought ... to enforce a civil right").
362. See supra Parts III & IV.
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Recall that the per curiam opinion of July 31 did not address
the government's argument that the saboteurs had no right to judicial
review, and that the October full opinion made three points about
court access: (1) court access had already been decided in the per
curiam, and (2) whether or not the proclamation has the effect of
denying access, the Supreme Court was authorized to look at it to see
if the proclamation applied to these specific petitioners, and (3)
"neither the Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy aliens
forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners' contentions that
the Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally
enacted forbid their trial by military commission." 363
It is clear that, at their conference before issuing the per
curiam, the Justices discussed how to handle the government's and
saboteurs' competing arguments about court access. But the notes of
Justices Black and Frankfurter give somewhat different accounts of
what was said and decided. Black's typed notes report that Stone
recounted "Biddle's argument that aliens cannot resort to habeas
corpus," but was "[r]eluctant to say that [an] alien enemy cannot
resort to habeas corpus. Thinks we should avoid if possible."364 Seen in
this light, the per curiam decision would likely have been understood
by the Justices as passing over the contested issue of court access
because, on the dispositive issue of entitlement to substantive relief,
the Court was unanimous that the saboteurs must lose. In the pre-
Steel Co. era, this was an acceptable way of resolving a case. 365 If that
was what the Justices agreed to, Stone's later claim in the full October
opinion that court access had already been decided in favor of the
saboteurs in the per curiam was not accurate. This raises an
uncomfortable and seemingly unlikely possibility-that Chief Justice
Stone claimed in July that the Court's opinion would not address the
jurisdictional issue of court access and got his brethren to agree to
issue a per curiam that discussed the merits, but then in October
pointed to the merits discussion in the per curiam as evidence that
court access had already been granted to the saboteurs. Stone was
well known to be a man of great integrity, making it unlikely that he
would have been anything less than exceptionally forthright with his
colleagues. But the Court's mysterious actions in Quirin make it
363. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1942).
364. Notes of Hugo Black, Nos. 1-7 Ex parte Quirin - July Special Term 1942, at 3 (on file in
Box 77, Folder 25 of the William 0. Douglas Papers, Manuscript Div., Library of Congress).
365. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (stating that before Steel Co., courts did not
always distinguish between questions of jurisdiction and questions of merit, and often made
jurisdictional decisions by reference to the merits).
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necessary to examine all possible explanations. One possibility is that
Stone did not have a preordained plan in mind in July, but that by
October he came to see the fact that the per curiam had addressed the
merits as a way to press his colleagues to resolve the court access
issue in favor of the saboteurs.
Justice Frankfurter's notes of the July 31 conference are very
hard to decipher-his handwriting is terrible-but do not seem to
contradict Black's or disprove the possibility that Stone managed the
process to get the result he wanted. According to Frankfurter's notes,
Stone first recounted Biddle's argument about court access and then
stated: "Habeas Corpus a defensive proceeding[.] Reluctant to say
suspending [indecipherable] bet. belligerents, being narrow. Procl. not
necessary."36 6 One leading scholar of Quirin reads these notes as
stating that Stone "said that despite the presidential proclamation,
habeas corpus was available to the petitioners and the Court had
jurisdiction to hear the case."3 67 If that is the right reading of those
notes, there was no craftiness on the part of the Chief Justice, but I
am not absolutely convinced that it is the right reading of the notes.
We know from Frankfurter's notes that Stone adverted to his view
that habeas corpus was merely "defensive" and thus did not fall within
the general ban on prisoners of war or nonresident civilian enemy
aliens accessing the courts. But the rest of Frankfurter's notes do not
establish that Stone reached agreement with his colleagues that the
per curiam would be understood to have adopted that theory. Rather,
the references to being "narrow" and the issue of the proclamation not
being "necessary" might instead confirm Black's account-that the
Chief Justice advocated that the threshold issue of court access need
not be reached. Frankfurter's notes are too hard to decipher to allow a
conclusion one way or the other.
But, notably, there is evidence suggesting that in July, Stone
might not have received the assent of all seven colleagueS368 to the
proposition that the saboteurs had a right to access the courts. We
know from other evidence that at least one, and maybe two or three, of
his colleagues disagreed with Stone on court access. This
disagreement was, of course, not made manifest in the full October
opinion, which was unanimous. But it was real nonetheless, as
internal Court documents reveal. Justice Jackson's disagreement
366. Felix Frankfurter, Conference Notes in Saboteur's Case (July 30, 1942) (on file in Paige
Box 12 of the Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Div., Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.).
367. Danelski, supra note 4, at 71 (emphasis omitted).
368. Murphy had recused himself.
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about court access is easiest to document. Sometime after July, he
drafted a separate opinion that he ultimately decided not to issue, for
reasons discussed below. Several drafts of this separate opinion exist
in the Justices' papers at the Library of Congress; each version rejects
court access for the saboteurs: 369
The prisoners admit that while engaged in the enemy's service they were landed on our
shores by enemy submarines, and were especially trained, equipped and under German
military instruction to execute enemy schemes of destruction among us. Their presence
under such circumstances was indistinguishable in point of law from invasion. When
these facts appear I do not see how they have standing to proceed further in our civil
courts. Beyond this I am unable to find that they have in any law that it is my function
to apply any rights to assert here. Certainly the majestic generalities of the Bill of
Rights designed to safeguard our own free society are not to be made available to enemy
military forces while attempting to invade or invest it.... If advancing views not
accepted by a single one of my respected seniors in service on this Court seems to
betoken over-self-confidence, I may say in extenuation that the field they are entering is
as novel to experienced judges as to new ones. If any court of any jurisdiction to which
we pay the respect of citation has ever before admitted prisoners of war to standing to
sue their military custodians, the [draft majority] opinion does not cite it. If any judicial
body ever before construed procedural or substantive provisions of domestic law to be
available as a shield for enemy military forces in the act of invasion, the opinion does
not cite it.370
Jackson's draft did not cite any authority for the proposition that the
saboteurs, as enemy prisoners of war, lacked a right to access the
courts and, on the merits, lacked any protection from domestic law. As
shown in Parts III and IV, above, Jackson was correct, but did not do a
good job demonstrating that to his colleagues.
Jackson decided not to issue this separate opinion after
Frankfurter circulated on October 23 an extraordinary memo, styled
by him "F.F.'s Soliloquy," which was in the form of an imaginary
dialogue between the Justice and the saboteurs.37' Before the dialogue
begins, Frankfurter's prefatory note states that he sees no essential
legal differences between the views expressed by Stone's draft
369. Several versions, including a handwritten first draft, are kept in Box 124, Folder 10 of
the Robert H. Jackson Papers, Manuscript Div., Library of Congress. Copies can also be found at
the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress in the Box 77, Folder 26 of the William 0.
Douglas Papers and Box 269, Folder "Special Term July 1942 Ex parte Quirin" of the Hugo L.
Black Papers.
370. The easiest version of Jackson's opinion to access is the October 23 draft reprinted in
the GREEN BAG. &e Jack Goldsmith, Justice Jackson's Unpublished Opinion in Ex parte Quirin,
9 GREEN BAG 2D 222, 232-41 (2006). The first part of the language quoted in the main text above
is found id at 233; the text after the ellipsis is located id. at 239.
371. Copies of "F.F.'s Soliloquy" can be found at the Manuscript Division of the Library of
Congress in Box 124, Folder 10 of the Robert H. Jackson Papers; Box 269, Folder "Special Term
July 1942 Ex parte Quirn" of the Hugo L. Black Papers; and Box 77, Folder 26 of the William 0.
Douglas Papers. It too is reprinted in the GREEN BAG. See White, supra note 303, at 438-40.
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majority opinion and Jackson's separate opinion.372 This is very hard
to understand, but I will put it aside for the moment. The first portion
of the imaginary dialogue has Frankfurter telling the saboteurs that
"[y]ou damned scoundrels have a helluvacheek to ask for a writ that
would take you out of the hands of the Military Commission," because
Congress authorized the use of military commissions in these type of
cases and had constitutional power to do so, and therefore "I will deny
your writ and leave you to your just deserts with the military." 373
Rather than focus on the issue of court access-about which Jackson
and Stone clearly differed-Frankfurter just emphasizes that the
saboteurs had no right to relief on the merits. Frankfurter probably
exaggerated about Stone and Jackson being close to each on the
substance in order to get his brethren to agree to his larger point, that
the Court needed to be unanimous and say as little about
controversial constitutional issues as possible.
The second part of the Soliloquy's dialogue has Frankfurter
berating the saboteurs for stirring up a needless interbranch conflict
during wartime and simultaneously advocating that his brethren
present a united front to the outside world. 374 Frankfurter closes by
imagining what men serving in the U.S. armed forces at the moment
would say to the Court if it issued a splintered decision containing
disagreement about the constitutional powers of the President.375 In
the face of the Soliloquy, Jackson decided to join a majority opinion
that he clearly thought was deeply wrong on the issue of court access.
Justice Byrnes probably agreed with Jackson, not Stone, about
court access. But by summer and fall 1942, he was spending very little
time on his Court duties because he had effectively become a White
House employee. As of October 2, Byrnes officially resigned from the
Court 37 6 and became head of the War Mobilization Board. I have found
no memos or other documents by Byrnes or other Justices that
372. See White, supra note 303, at 438-39 (quoting Frankfurter's Soliloquy).
373. Id. at 439.
374. See id. ("You've done enough mischief already without leaving the seeds of a bitter
conflict involving the President, the courts and Congress after your bodies will be rotting in lime.
It is a wise requirement of courts not to get into needless rows with the other branches of the
government by talking about things that need not be talked about if a case can be disposed of
with intellectual self-respect on grounds that do not raise such rows.').
375. See id. at 440 ("Haven't we got enough of a job trying to lick the Japs and the Nazis
without having you fellows on the Supreme Court dissipate the thoughts and feelings and
energies of the folks at home by stirring up a nice row as to who has what power when all of you
are agreed that the President had the power to establish this Commission and that the
procedure under the Articles of War for courts martial and military commissions doesn't apply to
this case.").
376. See Danelski, supra note 4, at 76.
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describe what Byrnes said behind closed doors about the Quirin case.
But from the tone and substance of his questions at oral argument in
July, it seems that he thought the saboteurs' legal claims were
frivolous.377
I said above that a third Justice may have disagreed with
Stone about court access, referring to Justice Frankfurter.378 There is
a decent amount of documentary evidence about Frankfurter's views,
but they are hard to pin down. Frankfurter's overriding concern-seen
in his Soliloquy as well as other internal memoranda-seems to have
been to get a unanimous opinion that ruled against the saboteurs
while saying as little as possible about controversial constitutional
issues. He was clear about that and much less so about his underlying
legal views.379
Despite Jackson's dissenting views, possibly shared by Byrnes
and Frankfurter, Stone was able to get a unanimous decision issued in
October 1942 that declared that the saboteurs had the right to access
the courts. That Stone was uncomfortable about how he had handled
the court access issue in Quirin can be inferred from the fact that he
soon seriously misdescribed it. The occasion arose just after World
War II, when a U.S. military tribunal was set up to try some Japanese
377. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument of July 29, 1942, at 25, reprinted in LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 96, at 520.
378. Recall that Jackson's draft opinion of October 23 stated that he was setting forth "views
not accepted by a single one of my respected seniors in service on this Court." Goldsmith supra
note 370, at 239. This does not contradict my claim that one or perhaps two of Jackson's
colleagues agreed with him on court access. First, Byrnes had left the Court by the time Jackson
circulated his draft. Second, it is not clear that Jackson's statement refers to the court access
issue specifically, instead of other parts of his draft. For instance, Jackson's opinion made an
aggressive claim about the President's power to disregard statutory limits on his war powers
that would certainly have provoked opposition from his brethren.
379. Frankfurter wrote to his colleagues that the President had the authority to unilaterally
suspend the writ of habeas corpus, though he had not purported to exercise it here, see Danelski,
supra note 4, at 75 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fiske Stone (Oct. 15, 1942)
(located in Box 172 of the Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School)), and that "legislation
bearing on the exercise of this [the President's commander-in-chiefl military power - the actual
combative aspect of war - is peculiarly outside the expectancies of judicial review," Memo from
Felix Frankfurter to Harlan F. Stone, copied to Robert Jackson (Oct. 29, 1942) (on file in Box
124, Folder 10 of the Robert H. Jackson Papers, Manuscript Div., Library of Congress). This does
not bear directly on the issue of court access, but Frankfurter's robust view of the President's and
Congress's war powers and minimal role for judicial review during war suggest he may have
believed that admitted enemy fighters lacked access to the courts. Mostly Frankfurter referred to
the court access issue as a "Pandora's box" that was best kept closed by saying as little as
possible about it. See Danelski, supra note 4, at 75-76 (stating that when Roberts thought
Stone's opinion recognized the President's proclamation as valid and urged that they say the
President does not have that power, Frankfurter wrote to Stone saying "that he was satisfied




soldiers for war crimes. One of the defendants, a General Yamashita
who was tried in the Philippines, then a U.S. territory, sought habeas
corpus review in the Supreme Court in 1946. Here is what the Court,
per Chief Justice Stone, said regarding Quirin and Yamashita's right
to access the civilian courts:
[W]e held in Ex parte Quirin, as we hold now, that Congress by sanctioning trials of
enemy aliens by military commission for offenses against the law of war had recognized
the right of the accused to make a defense. It has not foreclosed their right to contend
that the Constitution or laws of the United States withhold authority to proceed with
the trial. It has not withdrawn, and the Executive branch of the government could not,
unless there was suspension of the writ, withdraw from the courts the duty and power
to make such inquiry into the authority of the commission as may be made by habeas
corpus.380
This is not accurate. In the Articles of War, the statutes Stone
referenced, Congress had said nothing about access to civilian courts
via habeas corpus for defendants tried by military commission. 381
Congress had spoken about enemies' court access in the Trading with
the Enemy Act of 1917; as discussed above, Congress there recognized
and supported the continued application of common law rules
depriving essentially all enemies, except civilians with peaceful
prewar residence in the United States, of access to the courts. During
deliberations about the final October 1942 opinion in Quirin,
Frankfurter had sent a memo to his colleagues about the court access
issue that noted that all the Justices were "agreed that the President
did not go counter to any legislation."382 The Court in Quirin said
nothing about Congress's views on the court access issue. Stone's
suggestion to the contrary four years later in Yamashita is simply
incorrect. This mistake might have been due to sloppiness and the
press of time and events; it is also possible that it indirectly evidences
some caginess about how Stone had resolved the court access issue in
Quirian.
It appears that Quirin's holding on court access for the
saboteurs did not arise from any single cause, but rather from a
complex of factors. No definitive conclusions can be drawn because the
380. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (citations omitted).
381. The relevant provision, Article 15, as quoted in Quirin, simply stated that "the
provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts martial shall not be construed as
depriving military commissions . . . or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in
respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such
military commissions.. . or other military tribunals." Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27 (1942).
382. Felix Frankfurter, Comments on Brother Roberts' Suggestion (on file in Box 124,
Folder 10 of the Robert H. Jackson Papers, Manuscript Div., Library of Congress).
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extant documentary record does not describe the Court's internal
deliberations with any specificity. Several factors, however, seem
likely to have been important. The Court did not have sufficient time
to research and deliberate, and may have misunderstood or been
unaware of key precedents. At least several members of the Court,
including Chief Justice Stone and Justice Roberts, were probably
concerned that the Court demonstrate its independence of President
Roosevelt and its commitment to protection of civil liberties during
wartime, given the historical context in Europe and at home in which
concerns about executive overreaching were salient. The executive's
handling of the saboteurs' case-framing the proclamation as a denial
of access by presidential fiat, and failing to dispel that impression in
the written and oral arguments--contributed to the Court's concerns.
Especially when seen in the light of subsequent habeas jurisdiction-
stripping cases, we can speculate that what may have seemed an
attempt by President Roosevelt to withhold otherwise-available court
access by mere executive fiat was received by some Justices as a red
flag is by a bull, motivating them to smack down the President's
pretentions and assert the Court's authority and jurisdiction. In
addition, the Court received signals that limited judicial review-
taking jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction at least, and perhaps more-
was viewed as appropriate by both the executive branch and elite
public opinion reflected in leading newspapers.
VII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CouRT's REVERSAL
This final Part first discusses the significant legacy of Quirin's
overthrow of the old rules barring court access for enemy fighters and
nonresident enemy aliens, and then suggests some policy reasons why
its rule on court access for enemy fighters is problematic.
A. Quirin as a Precedent
Quirin's holding on court access has had important doctrinal
effects. Just a few years after Quirn was decided, the Court received a
habeas corpus petition from a Japanese general, held as a prisoner of
war, who was being tried for war crimes before a U.S. military
commission in the Philippines, then a U.S. territory. 383 The
government urged that an undisputed "enemy belligerent" had no
383. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 4-5.
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right to access the courts during wartimeS& but, based on Quirin, the
Court found that the general was entitled to habeas review, and
implied that this was a constitutional rule based on the Suspension
Clause.385
The next occasion on which Quirin's influence was felt was in
the 1950 case Johnson v. Eisentrager.386 Quinn's influence on the way
the Court resolved Eisentrager has had far-reaching consequences. In
Eisentrager, German agents convicted of war crimes by a U.S. military
tribunal sitting in China sought review of their convictions and
detention in the D.C. Circuit and then the Supreme Court. The Court,
per Justice Jackson, struggled somewhat to say why these Germans
were different than the German soldiers in Quirin in their entitlement
to judicial review. We know from Jackson's unpublished opinion in
Quirin that he believed that undisputed enemy fighters had no right
to access U.S. courts, wherever they were located.387 But he could not
say that, because the Court had unanimously held otherwise in Quirin
(and Yamashita). Instead, for the majority in Eisentrager, Jackson
pointed to a number of factual differences between the cases,
ultimately focusing primarily on territorial location-these petitioners
had been tried and detained abroad, rather than in the United
States.388 Jackson relied entirely on the long-standing rule that
noncitizens outside the United States lack constitutional rights
because he could not rely on their enemy-fighter status, due to Quirin.
For the dissent in Eisentrager, the Constitution was potentially a
global document whose protections, including the Habeas Corpus
Suspension Clause, did not depend for their application on
384. Brief of Petitioner at 1, In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (No. 61 Misc. & No. 672).
385. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9; see supra note 380 and accompanying text.
386. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779-80 (1950).
387. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
388. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779-80 (citations omitted):
The prisoners rely, however, upon two decisions of this Court to get them over the
threshold-Ex parte Quirin, and In re Yamashita. Reliance on the Quirin case is
clearly mistaken. Those prisoners were in custody in the District of Columbia. One
was, or claimed to be, a citizen. They were tried by a Military Commission sitting in
the District of Columbia at a time when civil courts were open and functioning
normally. They were arrested by civil authorities and the prosecution was personally
directed by the Attorney General, a civilian prosecutor, for acts committed in the
United States. They waived arraignment before a civil court and it was contended
that the civil courts thereby acquired jurisdiction and could not be ousted by the
Military. None of the places where they were acting, arrested, tried, or imprisoned
were, it was contended, in a zone of active military operations, were not under martial
law or any other military control, and no circumstances justified transferring them
from civil to military jurisdiction. None of these grave grounds for challenging
military jurisdiction can be urged in the case now before us.
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geographical location. They asked, pointedly, why the fortuity of the
location of detention should be entirely determinative of individual
rights and court access. For admitted agents of the German military
tried in China and detained in Germany, geographical location seemed
to the majority to be a perfectly satisfactory reason to reject their
court access, in light of the well-established rules against
extraterritorial constitutional rights for noncitizens. But in later cases
with different petitioners seeking court access, geographic location
alone came to seem to some like an arbitrary and unsatisfactory
answer. Quirin had prevented the Court from giving a stronger
answer, based on the longstanding policy of not allowing military
enemies to enlist U.S. courts against the U.S. executive during
wartime.
The next military detention case the Court decided in which
Quirin featured prominently was the post-9/11 decision in Hamdi.389
Here, the government conceded that the prisoner-a U.S. citizen who
had been captured in Afghanistan allegedly fighting for the Taliban, a
jurisdictional fact that he denied-had a right to habeas corpus review
of his detention in a military facility in the United States.390 As a
result of the concession, the Court did not linger over the access issue.
In particular, it did not specify precisely whether habeas corpus access
was based on citizenship, the location of detention in the United
States, and/or the dispute about a key jurisdictional fact (whether
Hamdi was an enemy fighter). Based on Quirin, Yamashita, and
Eisentrager, it seems most likely that the Court assumed that Mr.
Hamdi was entitled to habeas corpus solely because of his presence in
the United States. 391 This understanding is consistent with Rasul v.
Bush, decided the same day as Hamdi, which concerned the statutory
territorial jurisdiction of federal courts over habeas petitions filed by
noncitizens detained at Guantanamo Bay. The Rasul Court described
Quirin as establishing "the federal courts' power to review
applications for habeas relief .. . of admitted enemy aliens convicted of
war crimes during a declared war and held in the United States."392
389. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004) (plurality opinion).
390. See Brief for Respondents at 10, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696)
("An enemy combatant who is a presumed citizen and who is detained in this country is entitled
to judicial review of his detention by way of habeas corpus.").
391. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525 (plurality opinion) ("All [parties] agree that, absent
suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the
United States." (citations omitted)).
392. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474-75 (2004) (citations omitted).
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Four years later in Boumediene v. Bush, the agreed-upon
availability of habeas corpus for everyone within the United States,
even undisputed enemy fighters who were also enemy aliens (as in
Quirin), had an important but unacknowledged impact on how the
constitutional issues were understood. Quirin's court access rule likely
made it seem but a small step for the Court to extend habeas to
territory that was extremely close to being under U.S. sovereignty, 393
and where detainees who were noncitizens but not alien enemies
challenged the jurisdictional fact of whether they had committed
hostile acts against the United States during the post-9/11 conflict.
Quirin's legacy was quite important here. Before Quirn, being within
protection of the Constitution and other domestic laws depended on
citizenship, territorial location, and enemy status. The concepts of
allegiance and protection provided a coherent way to think about both
legal rules and the policy reasons justifying those rules. Because it
was correlative with allegiance, protection was reserved for U.S.
citizens and peaceful alien civilians present in the United States;
everyone else was outside protection. Quirin exploded the protection-
allegiance framework and therefore disrupted the policy justifications
for excluding certain people from court access and entitlement to
constitutional rights. After Quirin, the only people outside protection
were noncitizens located outside the United States. Noncitizens in the
United States were within protection, even if they were admitted Nazi
military saboteurs fresh off the U-Boat. Once admitted enemy fighters
seeking to destroy U.S. citizens' lives and property at Hitler's direction
were within protection (when present in the United States), it seemed
excessively harsh and arbitrary to deny protection of the courts and
laws to noncitizens who were or claimed to be civilians, solely because
of their territorial location. Quirin's destruction of the allegiance-
protection framework of justification therefore greatly helped to
undermine the centuries-old principle that constitutional protections
were unavailable to noncitizens outside the United States.
Some people doubt that this principle has been undermined-
and hence will doubt my claim about Quirin's far-reaching doctrinal
effects-and defend Boumediene against charges of being overly
expansive by describing it as a narrow decision only about the
Suspension Clause and only about a unique quasi-sovereign piece of
393. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 753 (2008) (explaining that the United States
controls Guantanamo under a permanent lease, which formally disclaims sovereignty, but gives
the United States "complete jurisdiction and contror' and, according to the Court, effectively
excludes Cuba from exercising any sovereign rights there (quoting 1903 Lease Agreement)).
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territory.394 I think this is mistaken. There are several reasons to
think Boumediene, building on Quirin, points toward a new era of a
globally protective Constitution for noncitizens, even including
military enemies. First as to which constitutional rights noncitizens
abroad can assert: Boumediene was not only about the Suspension
Clause, no matter what the Court might have said. 395 The Insular
Cases, key precedents that Boumediene mistakenly relied upon to hold
that the Constitution 'can protect noncitizens outside the United
States, 396 involved claims under a diverse array of constitutional
provisions. After deciding Boumediene, the Court vacated and
remanded "for further consideration in light of Boumediene" a D.C.
Circuit opinion that had dismissed Guantanamo detainees' damages
claims under the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clauses because of circuit precedent that aliens outside the United
States lacked constitutional rights. 397 Even before Boumediene, in
Hamdi, the Court had confirmed that having a right to habeas corpus
entails having rights under the Due Process Clause.398 In explicating
394. See, e.g., Stephen I. Viadeck, Insular Thinking About Habeas, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL
16, 18-19 (2012) (arguing that Justice Kennedy's Boumediene analysis was anchored by the
understanding that the scope of the Suspension Clause is unrelated to individual rights). But see,
e.g., Jules Lobel, The Supreme Court and Enemy Combatants, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1131, 1141
(2008) ("The Court's rejection of a test that focuses exclusively on the formal legal status of a
territory and its invocation of the concept of 'objective degree of control' that the United States
exercises, suggests that Boumediene might not be cabined to the particular status of
Guantanamo, and could possibly be a significant step in an expansion of habeas jurisdiction and
other constitutional rights to aliens abroad.').
395. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732-33 ("We hold these petitioners do have the
habeas corpus privilege.... [Other questions regarding the legality of their detention are to be
resolved in the first instance by the District Court."); id. at 798 ("It bears repeating that our
opinion does not address the content of the law that governs petitioners' detention. That is a
matter yet to be determined. We hold that petitioners may invoke the fundamental procedural
protections of habeas corpus.").
396. Id. at 756-60 (discussing, inter alia, Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), and
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)). In a recent article, I showed that the Insular Cases said
literally the opposite of what Boumediene claims they did-properly understood, the Insular
Cases confirmed the long-standing rule that noncitizens outside the United States lacked
constitutional rights. See Kent, supra note 13, at 103, 109-16 (explaining how the Court erred in
2008 in relying on the Insular Cases to support the expansion of constitutional rights to
noncitizens and "alleged military enemies held abroad").
397. See Rasul v. Myers, 555 U.S. 1083, 1083 (2008) (vacating and remanding 512 F.3d 644
(D.C. Cir. 2008)).
398. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (plurality opinion) (stating that "the
Due Process Clause . . . informs the procedural contours of" of habeas corpus); id. at 555-57
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the close relationship between "due process as the right
secured, and habeas corpus as the instrument by which due process could be insisted upon by a
citizen illegally imprisoned"). It is true that the plurality and dissenting Justices made these
statements in the context of a U.S. citizen present in the United States, but it is hard to
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what habeas review entailed, Boumediene cited the same key Due
Process precedent that Hamdi adopted 399 and then implied that the
Suspension Clause might provide even broader procedural rights than
the Due Process Clause. 400 Moreover, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
involving a noncitizen Guantanamo detainee's challenge to his
military commission trial, the Court appeared to rely on constitutional
separation of powers in ruling for the detainee.401 Likewise,
Boumediene itself repeatedly invoked "separation of powers" to justify
its holding.402 It therefore appears that wherever habeas is available-
and Boumediene held that it is available in at least some
extraterritorial locations-noncitizen detainees will be able to assert,
at the least, Due Process and separation of powers claims under the
Constitution. Why not other constitutional claims as well? And why
not in a cause of action other than habeas corpus? It is not obvious
why there should be any limits once the old categorical rules have
been overthrown.
Nor was Boumedieae a narrow and limited decision as to the
places where it applies. It is true that the Court emphasized that
Guantanamo Bay was almost U.S. territory.403 But the Court
decisively rejected the government's argument for continued
application of the bright-line rule that noncitizens outside the United
States had no constitutional rights.404 In its place, the Court
substituted what it called a "practical" and "functional approach." 405
This "framework" is an extraordinarily open-ended and malleable test
that includes either six or seven factors (the Court described it as
understand why the conceptual link between due process and habeas corpus would turn on
citizenship.
399. See Boumedieae, 553 U.S. at 781 (discussing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)).
400. Id. at 784-85.
401. The government had argued that as an alien outside the United States Hamdan could
not rely on the constitutional separation of powers. See Brief for Respondents at 43, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 460875 (asserting that "an enemy
combatant detained outside the United States . . . does not enjoy the protections of our
Constitution"). The Court did not expressly hold otherwise, but used language sounding in the
separation of powers. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591-93, 602. Justice Kennedy expressly relied on
separation of powers in his concurrence. See id at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Trial by
military commission raises separation-of-powers concerns of the highest order.').
402. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743, 746, 755, 764-65, 772, 784, 797.
403. Id. at 753-55, 771.
404. Id. at 755 (rejecting "the Government's argument that, at least as applied to
noncitizens, the Constitution necessarily stops where de jure sovereignty ends'). For the
government's briefing on this, see, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 9-10, Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196), 2007 WL 2972541.
405. Bounediene, 553 U.S. at 764.
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three406) and is nonexclusive, unweighted, and largely undefined by
the Court.407 The Court also implied that it would violate the Court's
Marbury power to "say 'what the law is' " if the Constitution were
thought to be wholly "off' in any given piece of territory.408 Thus in
Boumediene the Court surely intended to leave itself the maximum
amount of flexibility as to where the Constitution applies
extraterritorially, and to keep the political branches off balance by not
allowing them to assume that the Constitution was wholly "off'
anywhere.409 It was no accident, then, but almost certainly an
intended effect of Boumediene, that the U.S. military in both the
Afghanistan and Iraq theaters of war took dramatic steps to change
their arrest and detention procedures to account for the possibility of
judicial review. 410 One might criticize as novel this threatened
intrusion of the judiciary into wartime detention of many people who
are undisputedly enemy fighters, but then again, there is the
precedent of Quirin.
In sum, Quirin's overthrow of the allegiance-protection
framework has had far-reaching but previously under-appreciated
effects on the doctrine about the availability of constitutional rights
and court access for noncitizens abroad.
B. Quirin as Policy
Quirin's holding-that undisputed enemy fighters who are
detained in the United States during a state-to-state war have a right
to access civilian courts via habeas corpus in order to challenge the
President's disposition of them-raises serious policy concerns. With
the accumulation of Supreme Court precedents allowing undisputed or
alleged enemy fighters to invoke habeas jurisdiction as a
406. Id. at 766 ("[W~e conclude that at least three factors are relevant in determining the
reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy
of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites
where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in
resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ.').
407. See Kent, supra note 13, at 109 (describing the ambiguous nature of the test created in
Boumediene).
408. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
409. See id. at 794 (suggesting that the Court might not extend constitutional habeas corpus
to an extraterritorial location if it deemed that the political branches had provided "suitable
alternative processes ... to protect against the arbitrary exercise of governmental power').
410. See Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Dktention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives
from the Other War, 2003-2010, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 549, 570-72 (2011); Robert M. Chesney, Who
May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L REV. 769, 849-51 (2011).
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constitutional right when they are in de jure U.S. territory (Quirn,
Yamashita, Hamdi) or in U.S.-controlled foreign territory
(Boumediene), the U.S. military could well be besieged by habeas
corpus petitions if a future war again brings significant numbers of
prisoners of war to the United States proper or de facto U.S. territory
like Guantanamo.
There are many reasons to doubt that undisputed enemy
fighters in a state-to-state war need the protections of Article III
judicial review applying constitutional standards. As of World War II,
and even more so today, there is a comprehensive framework of
international treaty law concerning who can be detained during armed
conflicts, for how long, under what circumstances, and what can be
done to prisoners during their detention, including what forms of
military trial are appropriate and for what types of offenses. 411 In the
interstices of these rules of international law, both diplomacy and
military-to-military negotiations have always been active as well.41 2
There is also an active nongovernmental organization ("NGO')
community, led by the International Committee for the Red Cross,
which monitors compliance with these international laws of war and
seeks to fill gaps in protection by advocating for the extension of
existing law or the creation of new legal instruments.413 In the state-
to-state wars like the conflict underlying Quirin, Yamashita, and
Eisentrager, one-sided U.S. judicial involvement-meaning judicial
protection for enemies in U.S. custody that has little chance of being
reciprocated-is arguably both unnecessary and undesirable.
Since 9/11, courts, the executive, Congress, scholars, and NGOs
have thought long and hard about what kind of judicial review via
habeas corpus should be available to persons detained by the United
States as part of the conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
affiliated groups. Among the most persuasive justifications for habeas
review in post-9/11 military detention and trial cases are: the
pervasiveness and factual complexity of disputes about jurisdictional
facts, primarily whether the detainee is in fact a fighter; the
concomitant likelihood of "false positives," which is increased by the
fact that citizenship cannot be used as an easy proxy for enemy status
and that detainees who in fact are enemy fighters lack an incentive to
self-identify as such because they will not receive prisoner-of-war
411. See, e.g., Geneva POW Convention, supra note 10, at pt. III (detailing the conditions,
protection, and activities of prisoners of war in captivity).
412. See generally PRISONERS IN WAR 57-70 (Sibylle Scheipers ed., 2010) (discussing the
practices of exchange and negotiation for prisoners of war during conflict).
413. See id. at 68-69.
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protections but instead might be tried for unlawful belligerency or
domestic crimes; the indeterminacy about which international legal
protections apply to detainees, and skimpiness of those which do
apply, like Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; the
indefinite and highly malleable scope and length of the conflict; and
the fact that the home governments of many detainees are U.S. allies
in the conflict against al Qaeda and the Taliban and therefore do not
always advocate for strongly the detainees' interests. In my view, none
of these justifications for habeas corpus review applies to cases like
Quirin, where the detainees are undisputedly members of an enemy
nation's military forces during a traditional international war duly
declared by Congress and comprehensively regulated by international
law, diplomacy, reciprocity, and NGO oversight.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Quirin's holding on court access for undisputed enemy fighters
was contrary to practice and precedent, is not supported by
substantial reasons, and interferes with a detailed framework of
international law and diplomacy that has long governed detention and
treatment of captured enemy combatants. It is ripe for
reconsideration.
Some might wonder how significant in practice is the argument
of this Article against court access for undisputed enemy fighters. I
suggest that it is quite important in both traditional state-to-state
wars and conflicts against nonstate actors. Consider first a traditional
state-to-state war. In World War II, hundreds of thousands of enemy
prisoners of war were detained in the United States. 414 This could well
occur again in a future large-scale war.415 Under Quirin as interpreted
by later decisions, all prisoners of war detained in the United States
would apparently have a right to access the civilian courts to
challenge their detention or treatment.416 It is even possible, under
414. At its peak in the spring of 1945, the total was approximately four hundred and
twenty-five thousand. &e LEWIS & MEWHA, supra note 230, at 91.
415. Notably, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 require that prisoners of war be held a safe
distance from the battlefield. See Geneva POW Convention, supra note 10, at art. 19.
416. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 purported to strip jurisdiction over habeas
claims by persons determined by the U.S. government to be "enemy combatant[s]." 28 U.S.C. §
2241(e) (2006). Though that term was not defined by Congress, it seems clear that it would cover
both unprivileged, illegitimate belligerents like terrorists as well as lawful, privileged
belligerents like members of an enemy nation state's military who qualify for prisoner-of-war
status. Boumediene's invalidation of jurisdiction-stripping would apply equally to habeas
petitions brought by lawful or unlawful enemy combatants.
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Boumediene, that prisoners of war detained outside the United States
will in the future be deemed to have a constitutional entitlement to
habeas.417 While it might appear that Congress could respond by
simply "suspending" the writ of habeas corpus, as the Constitution
clearly allows, 418 this is not the quick fix it appears to be. The
Constitution only allows suspension "in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion," which are events internal to the United States. A war
fought wholly in and around China or Iran, for example, would likely
not qualify for habeas corpus suspension, even if the United States
were deluged with prisoner-of-war habeas petitions that were tying up
the courts, distracting the military and civilian executive agents, and,
potentially, providing real aid and comfort to the enemy. 4 19 The
Supreme Court should consider overruling Quirin's grant of court
access to undisputed enemy fighters in state-to-state armed conflicts.
Were the rule revived that undisputed enemy fighters are
barred from U.S. courts, this could have important implications in the
ongoing post-9/11 conflict. But the policy reasons for reviving the rule
in untraditional conflicts against nonstate actors are not as clear cut
as they are in the state-to-state context. The dozens of detainees at
Guantanamo who have been found by habeas courts in the aftermath
of Boumediene to be enemy fighters might, on that basis, be denied the
right to file additional legal claims in the future. 420 Or consider Salim
Hamdan. Once he conceded that he had been "captured on the
battlefields of Afghanistan and claim[ed] POW protection," under pre-
Quirin law, that would likely have been enough to find him an enemy
fighter and perhaps bar him from further litigation in U.S. civilian
courts. 421 If so, his famous challenge to the legality of his military
417. The D.C. Circuit recently refused to extend Boumediene to detainees in Afghanistan.
See al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 2010). This is surely not the last word on
the subject, if for no other reason than the highly fact-specific and malleable nature of
Boumediene's test for when and where habeas is constitutionally required. See supra notes 403-
10 and accompanying text (discussing the indeterminate nature of the Boumediene test).
418. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.').
419. 1 have previously argued that the political branches' inability ever to suspend habeas
during conflicts occurring wholly outside the United States is a powerful structural reason to
read the Suspension Clause as not protecting extraterritorial habeas. See Kent, Global
Constitution, supra note 95, at 521-24 (articulating why the Suspension Clause should be read to
have a "domestic limitation").
420. See Kent, supra note 82 (sketching the argument that Bournediene rights to court access
have expired for judicially confirmed enemy fighters at Guantanamo).
421. Brief for Petitioner at 25, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184).
Hamdan was quite careful in his admissions. He denied membership in al Qaeda or knowing
participation in any terrorist attacks against the United States, and denied that he qualified as
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commission trial, which he won before a splintered Supreme Court,
should never have been heard.
I am purposely hedging here, however, because the
implications of a rejection of Quirin are less straightforward with
respect to nontriditional wars like that against al Qaeda than they
are with state-to-state conflicts. The factual concession by someone
like Hamdan, or the determination by a post-Boumediene habeas court
that a war-on-terror detainee is an enemy fighter, settles the issue
with regard to the jurisdictional fact of their combatant status.
Perhaps, under pre-Quirin law, that should be enough to bar them
from the courts. But important parts of my policy argument for
judicial review being unnecessary for undisputed enemy fighters do
not apply to detainees like Hamdan who are not in a national military
during a state-to-state conflict. For instance, because al Qaeda is not
and cannot be a party to the Geneva Conventions, almost all of the
comprehensive protections of those treaties, including strict limits on
detention authority and military trials, are unavailable to its
members. Whether or not one supports this result on policy grounds, it
seems undeniable that it distinguishes the situation of these unlawful
combatants from the case of prisoners of war in a state-to-state
conflict.
Since Quirin's holding on court access is the law of the land
and seems likely to remain that for the foreseeable future (see
Boumediene), it is not necessary to fully pursue difficult
counterfactual inquiries about what all aspects of a world without
Quirin would look like. The major aims of this Article were to (1) show
that Quirin overturned a significant body of practice and precedent
that had denied court access to enemy fighters and nonresident enemy
aliens, (2) highlight Quirin's problematic policy result with regard to
undisputed members of an enemy nation's military, and (3) explain
an "unlawful combatant." Joint Appendix at 51, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184), 2006 WL
46431. However, he apparently conceded that he worked for bin Laden. See Brief for
Respondents at 5, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184) (alleging that petitioner "acknowledged
that he worked for bin Laden for many years"). Under post-Boumediene detention law elaborated
by the D.C. Circuit in habeas cases, a person may be detained under the Congress's post-9/11
Authorization for the Use of Military Force if he admits or the government shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is, among other things, "part of' al Qaeda or that he
"purposefully and materially support[ed]" al Qaeda or Taliban forces "in hostilities against U.S.
Coalition partners." Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012). Under the D.C. Circuit's "functional test,"
"demonstrating that someone is part of al Qaeda's command structure is sufficient to show that
person is part of al Qaeda." Id. at 403. Receiving orders from someone in al Qaeda's "command
structure"-which Hamdan appears to have conceded when he admitted working for bin Laden-
suffices. Id.
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why the Court shifted gears in such a significant fashion and decided
to offer novel judicial protection to admitted enemy fighters during the
depths of total war.

